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“You can know the name of a bird in all the languages of the world, but 
when you’re finished, you’ll know absolutely nothing whatever about the 
bird…So, let’s look at the bird and see what it’s doing – that’s what 
counts. I learned very early the difference between knowing the name of 





“Do not fail 
To learn from 
The pure voice of an 
Ever-flowing mountain stream 
Splashing over the rocks 
-Morihei Ueshiba, 
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Spontaneous speech is replete with disfluencies: pauses, hesitations, restarts, and less than 
ideal deliveries of information. Disfluency is a topic of interdisciplinary research with insights 
from psycholinguistics, phonetics and speech technology. Researchers have tried to determine: 
When does disfluency occur?, Can disfluency be reliably predicted to occur?, and ultimately, 
Why does disfluency occur? The focus of my thesis will be to address the question of why 
disfluency occurs by reporting the results of analyses of disfluency frequency and the relationship 
between disfluency and eye gaze in a collaborative dialogue.  
Psycholinguistic studies of disfluency and collaborative dialogue differ on their answers to 
why disfluency occurs and its role in dialogue. One hypothesis, which I will refer to as Strategic 
Modelling, suggests that disfluencies are designed by the speaker.  According to the alternative 
view, which I will call the Cognitive Burden View, disfluency is the result of an overburdened 
language production system. Throughout this thesis, I will contrast these two theories for an 
ultimate answer to why disfluency occurs. Each hypothesis attaches a functional role to a 
structural definition of disfluency and therefore in order to determine why disfluency occurs, I 
will contrast the structural and functional characteristics of disfluency. I will attempt to do this by 
analysing the dialogue behaviour in terms of speech goals and eye gaze behaviour a speaker is 
engaged in when they make certain types of disfluencies. 
A multi-modal Map Task paradigm was used in this thesis, in which speakers were asked to 
describe the route on a cartoon map to a distant confederate listener who provided either visual or 
verbal feedback. Speakers were eye-tracked during the dialogue and a record was kept of when 
the speaker attended to the listener’s visual feedback. Experiment 1 tested the visual feedback 
paradigm to establish its validity as a baseline condition. Speakers were found to make more 
disfluencies when they could interact with the visual feedback, suggesting disfluency is more 
common in interactive circumstances. Experiment 2 added verbal feedback to the experimental 
paradigm to test whether listeners react differently to the two modalities of feedback. Speakers 
made more disfluencies when the feedback was more complicated. Structural disfluency types 
were also observed to fulfil different functions. Finally, Experiment 3 manipulated the motivation 
of the speaker and found that Motivated speakers gazed more often and were more disfluent per 
opportunity than Control speakers suggesting that highly motivated subjects are more willing to 
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CHAPTER 1  – Introduction 
 
Why write a thesis about disfluency? Disfluency is notoriously more common in spontaneous 
speech than in written text.  Take for example an exchange in a court room where the speaker 
said ‘Yes, we were there….I mean we didn’t leave the um the place ehm Lake Street Cafe 
<pause> until about um t-  ten-… eh eleven o’clock’. In this case, the court reporter would have 
transcribed ‘We didn’t leave the Lake Street Café until about eleven o’clock’ without all of the 
‘ums’ and ‘uhs’ and restarted phrases.  Since spoken speech differs in this manner from written 
text, the study of disfluency offers a potential insight into human language production and human 
behaviour and by studying it empirically one can tap into these insights.  Since disfluency is one 
output of language production, it is important to review some of the psycholinguistic models of 
language production and collaborative dialogue in order to understand disfluency in relation to 
other features of dialogue. In this chapter, I will outline two theories of collaborative dialogue and 
introduce the issues considered in this thesis.  According to one view, the Cognitive Burden 
View, disfluency is an output error of an overburdened cognitive system.  Alternatively another 
hypothesis, which I will call the Strategic-Modelling View, argues that disfluency is a signal of 
delay and commitment to a listener.   
It is important to note that disfluency differs from speech errors, or ‘slips of the tongue’, and 
from stuttering.  A person is considered to have made a speech error when ‘the actual utterance 
differs from the intended utterance’ (e.g. ‘White Anglo-Saxon prostitute’ instead of ‘White Anglo-
Saxon Protestant’) (Wells-Jensen, 1999).  Speech errors can be delivered in an entirely fluent 
manner with no disruptions and not be considered disfluent.  Most of the disfluencies considered 
in this thesis tend to involve correction of some sort or another (e.g. ‘yeah, if you just continue 
down to the left…ehm right, sorry’) but disfluencies need not always be corrected or detected. All 
disfluencies are in some way a disruption in otherwise fluent speech. I will not discuss stuttering 
in this thesis.  
    As far as disfluencies are concerned, disfluencies are thought by some to express a strategic 
signal to the listener (Clark, 1996; Clark & Wasow, 1998; Fox Tree & Clark, 1997).  It is the 
purpose of this thesis to investigate this question: ‘Why do disfluencies occur?’  In order to do 
this, I will contrast the strategic signalling proposal with another hypothesis which suggests that 
disfluencies do not fulfil a signalling function and only occur because it the easiest thing for the 
speaker to do at that point in time or simply as an error (Bard, Lickley, & Aylett, 2001; Pickering 
& Garrod, 2004).  I will first explain the labelling systems used to describe disfluency and the 
two models of dialogue which offer potential answers for why disfluency might occur. 
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1.1 Disfluency Description 
 
What is the structure of a disfluency?  Here I will address this question by explaining the 
labelling systems used to describe disfluency. 
Spontaneous speech is notoriously unlike written text in part because it frequently includes a 
variety of extended pauses, filled pauses (e.g. ‘um’, ‘er’, ‘eh’), cut off, and repaired utterances.  In 
order to model these disfluency phenomena consistently, several categorisation systems have 
been developed to label the various components which comprise a speech repair (e.g. Levelt, 
1983; Nakatani and Hirschberg, 1994; Shriberg, 1994; Lickley, 1994).   For the most part, these 
labelling systems are interchangeable but the occasional discrepancy does exist.  It is the purpose 
of this section to examine these differences and determine the standard referred to henceforth in 
this dissertation.  The most widely used scheme comes from Levelt (1983). 
 
      OU (original utterance)    editing phase         R (repair) 
  Go from left again to      uh ….                From pink again to blue 
 
The structure above is useful because it allows reference to particular disfluent regions of speech.  
The OU (original utterance) designates all the speech prior to the Interruption point including the 
reparandum, or portion of the utterance to be repaired.  Between the OU and the Interruption 
point there is a delay period that may range over any number of words.  The editing phase may 
contain a filled pause, as it does in the example above or any editing terms (sorry, or, I mean) or 
nothing.  Following the editing phase is the Repair which contains the alteration, or speech 
which is meant to replace the reparandum.  Optionally the Repair may also contain retracing, or 
repeated words (eg. from in the example sentence above) that occur between the Interruption 
point and the Repair. 
Subsequent study by Nakatani and Hirschberg (1994) also defined the structure of disfluency 
by decomposition into three intervals.   First, the reparandum interval corresponds to Levelt’s OU 
and contains all the ‘flawed’ speech that is replaced by the Repair.  The disfluency interval 
corresponds to Levelt’s ‘editing phase’ or region of filled pauses, silences and overt markers of 
correction.  The repair interval corresponds to Levelt’s Repair and spans from the resumption of 
speech to the end of the material replacing the reparandum. 
Since Levelt (1983) a number of authors have adopted the terms ‘reparandum’ and ‘repair’ 
(Blackmer & Mitton, 1991; Lickley, 1994; Savova & Bachenko, 2002; Shriberg, 1994).  
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However, there is some disagreement about how to refer to the intervening speech between 
Reparandum and Repair (i.e. Levelt’s ‘editing phase’).  Shriberg (1994) coins the term 
‘interregnum’ to refer to Levelt’s ‘editing phase’ while Blackmer and Mitton (1991) use the term 
‘cutoff-to-repair’ to refer to this region.  Shriberg (1994) states her reason for coining the term is 
one of maintaining an atheoretical position with respect to the function of disfluency for the 
speaker. The term interregnum neutrally refers to the period of speech in between repair and 
reparandum without necessarily ascribing an intentional editing state to the speaker as is implied 
by Levelt’s ‘editing phase’. 
According to Shriberg (1994), a speech repair can be segmented into a reparandum (eg. the 
portion of speech to be repaired), an Interruption point (IP), an Interregnum (IR), and a repair. 
 
   
A vertical   IP    uh              a   horizontal  line 
Reparandum   IR------       Repair 
Figure 1. An example of substitution 
   
 
In Figure 1 above, the reparandum (‘a vertical’) is interrupted at the Interruption Point (IP), thus 
beginning the Interregnum stage (IR).  The Interregnum in the above example contains a filled 
pause ‘uh’ and a silent pause of unspecified length.  Immediately following the interregnum, the 
repair (‘a horizontal’) begins and the utterance continues with ‘line’.  It should be noted that the 
term ‘Interregnum’ is consistent with the ‘disfluency interval’ in Nakatani and Hirschberg (1994). 
In Figure 1, the speaker began by describing a line as vertical, but then altered his description 
to ‘horizontal’.  The term horizontal was substituted for the term vertical and so one could 
classify such a repair as a substitution.  If the speaker had said: 
 
It’s....                IP          it’s a bit down from the dead tree 
Reparandum < IR--->  Repair 
Figure 2. A repetition disfluency 
   
where the pronoun + copula combination is repeated in two tokens before the utterance continues,  
one could label the repair a repetition as distinct from a substitution.  Clearly, since a speaker can 
repair an error in a number of ways, some sort of labelling schema is required to distinguish 
disfluency form by categories which operate consistently across all speakers and all potential 
speech repairs.  Two such approaches will be discussed in Chapter 2, namely Levelt’s (1983) 
cognitive theory of repair as devised on a corpus of Dutch speech and Lickley’s (1998) speech 
repair classification system as employed in the HCRC Map Task corpus (Anderson et al., 1991; 
Lickley, 1998). 
 
1.2 Models of Dialogue 
 
Disfluencies occur frequently in spontaneous conversations between individuals everyday. 
Sometimes the speaker will be aware that they have been disfluent and they will rephrase the 
disfluent utterance, most often they will reprhase it immediately after making it (Nooteboom, 
1980). How does the speaker recognize that s/he has made a disfluency in the first place? 
According to Levelt, (1983, 1989), the language production system of a speaker is equipped with 
an internal monitor loop which allows the speaker to monitor their own speech and detect 
disfluencies in the output.  The speaker then amends the disfluencies and the dialogue continues 
normally. 
According to the Principle of Optimal Design, speakers monitor their listeners during a 
dialogue also and formulate utterances for the listener (Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983).  In 
other words, speakers must coordinate with the listener in order for a successful dialogue. As any 
one who has ever taken dancing lessons might know, coordination with another person requires 
some skill. For dialogue, Clark (2002) suggests that speakers use a variety of signalling devices to 
indicate their actions.  One of these signalling devices is disfluency (Clark, 2002; Clark & 
Wasow, 1998; Fox Tree & Clark, 1997).  If the speaker encounters difficulty during language 
formulation, Clark and colleagues suggest that speakers use disfluencies as a ‘collateral signal’ to 
indicate to the listener when s/he expects to be ready to utter the next portion of speech. For 
example, if a speaker said ‘You want to turn ri- …eh left at the corner’, the fragment ‘ri-‘ 
(presumably ‘right’), the short pause and the ‘eh’ would all be signals that the speaker intended to 
halt speech, delay for a short while and eventually resume speaking (Clark, 2002; Clark & Fox 
Tree, 2002; Fox Tree & Clark, 1997).  
Why do speakers go to all this trouble to signal their intentions to their listener?  According to 
Clark and colleagues, when a speaker engages in conversation, the speaker strives for the ideal 
delivery (Clark, 2002; Clark & Wasow, 1998). Ideal delivery requires firstly, that the speaker 
engages the listener’s attention at just the right moment and secondly, that the speaker’s utterance 
is well-formed. Participants assume a sort of joint responsibility in designing utterances that are 
optimal for the current circumstances. Pursuing the ideal delivery requires that the speaker and 
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the listener are synchronised. A speaker will generally begin an utterance once they know that the 
listener is looking at him/her (Goodwin, 1981).  Once they have the listener’s attention, the 
speaker will then try to speak in a fluent manner, with a model of the listener in mind. If an error 
should occur, the speaker will still attempt to speak in a continuous manner by retracing an 
utterance from the point at which they left off (e.g. ‘If you have a-…, If you have a green car’) 
(Clark & Wasow, 1998).   
The Principle of Optimal Design is based on the theory that during collaborative dialogue, 
interlocutors attempt to develop ‘common ground’ with each other (Brennan & Clark, 1996; 
Clark, 1996; Clark & Carlson, 1982a, 1982b; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Clark et al., 1983; 
Pickering & Garrod, 2004).  Common ground refers to the knowledge, beliefs and assumptions 
that two interlocutors might share. Interlocutors determine what constitutes common ground with 
the aid of three types of information: community membership, linguistic evidence and perceptual 
evidence from their immediate surroundings (Clark & Marshall, 1981). By referring to the 
common ground between them, interlocutors can work out what constitutes mutual knowledge. 
The theory of Mutual Knowledge is a much discussed topic in a wide range of literature 
(Austin, 1962; Grice, 1957, 1968, 1989; Johnson-Laird, 1982a, 1983; Smith, 1982; Sperber & 
Wilson, 1987, 1995).  The term ‘mutual knowledge’ refers to the fact that in order for something 
to be fully mutually known by another person, that person must also recognize that the speaker 
intended for the person to know this (Grice, 1957, 1968, 1989). As pointed out by many, attaining 
full mutual knowledge require an infinite number of recursive steps, which presents problems 
when considering the rapid nature of dialogue (Clark & Carlson, 1982a, 1982b; Johnson-Laird, 
1982b, 1983; Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Smith, 1982; Sperber & Wilson, 1987, 1995). For 
example, in a conversation between two people discussing a dress, when the speaker refers to ‘the 
dress’ she has made some assumptions that the listener knows which particular dress is being 
discussed, and further more the listener must know that the speaker knows which dress they are 
discussing and so on (Schober & Brennan, 2003).  
Since true mutual knowledge is difficult to obtain, a number of other researchers have 
suggested that perhaps speakers do not require full mutual knowledge in order to sustain a 
successful conversation. According to the Principle of Least Collaborative Effort, as proposed by 
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986), individuals involved in a dialogue have a joint responsibility to 
make sure that any contribution to the conversation has been mutually understood by the other 
participant. If Angelina says to Bryce, ‘Which dress should I wear to the party, the blue or the 
green one?’ If while deciding Bryce realises that Angelina actually owns two green dresses, then 
it is his responsibility to clarify by asking something like ‘Which green dress?’ According to this 
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view, it is not solely the speaker’s responsibility to ensure that the listener has fully understood 
his contribution. Rather, speakers and listeners share in the responsibility.  
Clark and colleagues have suggested that speakers will attempt to model their listener’s 
perspective when they can. There are others who have argued that modelling the other listener is 
a cognitively costly and demanding task, given the real-time nature of dialogue and the 
processing demands on a speaker during dialogue (Barr & Keysar, 2002; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; 
Horton & Keysar, 1996). I will refer to this view as the Cognitive Burden View in this thesis. 
According to this view, the speaker does not need to rely on a model of the speaker because s/he 
can instead rely on his/her own perspective of the conversation to formulate an utterance.  
According to the Cognitive Burden View, a disfluency is considered to be an unintentional 
sign of cognitive difficulty on the part of the speaker (Bard et al., 2001).  This differs quite 
noticeably from the view proposed by Clark and colleagues that disfluency is a strategic signal.  
Clark and colleagues suggest that disfluency occurs while the speaker is encountering difficulty 
(Clark & Wasow, 1998), but elsewhere in the literature Clark (e.g. Clark, 1996, 2002) does 
suggest quite clearly that disfluencies “are genuine signals – collateral signals – that speakers 
design and produce with skill” (Clark, 2002, p. 13). As it stands then, there seem to be two 
answers to the question Why does disfluency happen? The first suggests that disfluency is not 
under the volitional control of the speaker, but is merely the error of an overburdened system 
(Bard et al., 2001). The second theory suggests, according to the Principle of Optimal Design, 
that disfluencies are strategic signals and speakers design them as careful solutions to problems in 
dialogue (Clark, 2002).  
What is the nature of the evidence to support the Optimal Design and the Cognitive Burden 
views? There is support from the philosophy of language (Austin, 1962; Grice, 1957, 1968, 1989; 
Sperber & Wilson, 1995), conversational analysis (Schegloff, 1996; Schegloff, Sacks, & 
Jefferson, 1977) and some support from  psycholinguistics (Clark, 1996; Haywood, 2004; 
Haywood, Pickering, & Branigan, 2005; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Horton & Keysar, 1996) for 
both theories, although traditional psycholinguistic models of language tend to avoid research on 
dialogue (Haywood et al., 2005; Pickering & Garrod, 2004). The evidence within these fields, 
with the exception of psycholinguistics, has tended to be descriptive in nature.  As far as studies 
of disfluencies and dialogue are concerned, researchers have conducted corpus studies to discover 
how disfluencies occur in natural dialogue and then describe their occurrence (e.g. Clark, 2002; 
Clark & Wasow, 1998; Fox Tree & Clark, 1997). For the most part, corpora are a very valuable 
and enlightening tool.  There is, however, a need for experimental studies since they are an online 
test of the speaker’s ability (Schober & Brennan, 2003). Task-oriented experiments provide the 
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experimenter with easier access to the speaker’s intentions since the task helps to constrain the 
possible range of intentions (Brennan, 2004; Schober & Brennan, 2003). Therefore, I will argue 
that there is a need for task-oriented experiments that manipulate difficulty and speaker attention 
in dialogue to determine whether speakers really attend to their listeners fully and signal their 
intentions through disfluency. Conducting such an investigation is my primary goal in this thesis. 
 
1.3 Investigations in this Thesis 
 
The lack of literature on disfluency and difficulty in dialogue is the main motivation to report 
the results in this thesis. As explained in Section 1.2, theories of dialogue tend to differ in terms 
of whether speakers model their listeners and therefore use disfluencies as collateral signals, or 
whether listener modelling is cognitively taxing and unnecessary, and therefore disfluencies are 
merely an output error of an overburdened system.  In order to determine whether speakers use 
disfluency as signals, I will test the speaker’s cognitive load during a dialogue task and 
investigate their disfluency patterns in conjunction with their gaze patterns at visual feedback 
from a listener, their partner in the task.  Previous experimental paradigms to test shared 
knowledge have used tasks that are not tricky enough to simulate a real-world task (i.e. 
tangrams1, simple naming of objects in a grid). For this reason, I will use the Map Task 
(Anderson et al., 1991; Brown, Anderson, Yule, & Shillcock, 1983) as my experimental 
paradigm: it allows speakers to have a quasi-spontaneous and natural dialogue, yet it is more 
complex in nature than simple shape description so one might actually expect speakers to 
encounter cognitive difficulty. 
 
Figure 3. An example of a tangram shape 
 
8/5/078/5/07                                                          
1 An example of a tangram is shown in Figure 3. In experiments using tangram tasks, participants are often 
asked to describe what the shape looks like to a partner 
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In the Map Task corpus, originally developed by (Brown et al., 1983), participants were asked 
to reproduce the route from one participant’s map onto the map of the other participants. For the 
HCRC Map Task Corpus (Anderson et al., 1991), one participant was designated as the 
‘Instruction Giver’ and the other was assigned the role of ‘Instruction Follower’. The Instruction 
Giver was given a map with cartoon landmarks (labelled with names) and a pre-drawn route. It 
was the job of the Giver to describe this route to the Instruction Follower, who could only see a 
similar map that did not have a pre-drawn route on it. Givers and Followers saw similar maps 
which shared some landmarks but differed for others: some landmarks were present on the 
Follower’s map that were not present on the Giver’s, some landmarks were labelled with different 
landmark names but were in the same location, some landmarks occurred twice along the route on 
the Giver’s map but only once on the Follower’s map and finally, some landmarks had a 
contrastive pronunciation feature (i.e. ‘Green Bay’ vs. ‘Crane Bay’). In addition to landmark 
accessibility, Anderson et al. controlled for the familiarity of participants (i.e. participants were 
either friends or had never met) and the ability to make eye contact (i.e. eye contact versus none). 
The advantages of analysing a map task experiment are that such a corpus provides spontaneous 
speech and task-oriented dialogue. As mentioned previously, Schober and Brennan (2003) 
suggest that a task-oriented dialogue constrains the number of possible intentions that the speaker 
could have entertained and thus makes it more amenable for determining whether speakers are 
using disfluencies as intentional signals or out of difficulty, as predicted by the Strategic-
Modelling and Cognitive Burden Views respectively.  The Cognitive Burden View predicts 
disfluency will arise when the speaker is under cognitive load and therefore in order to test 
difficulty, a task that is suitably difficult is required. The map task is perfect for this type of 
experiment because it requires that speakers guide listeners around a route that they have not 
seen. Furthermore, since their maps are not perfectly matched, difficult periods of 
misunderstanding are almost guaranteed. For these reasons, I will report the results of the 
MONITOR Project, described in further detail in the next section, in this thesis. 
Before any analysis can be done to address why disfluency occurs, we need an understanding 
of what a disfluency is and the classification systems developed for disfluency. Chapter 2, the 
literature review, begins by differentiating disfluencies from speech errors, explaining disfluency 
classification systems so that the reader can understand the perspectives in the field. I then discuss 
the issue of disfluency terminology and the fact that there appears to be some terminological 
confusion in the field. Next, I introduce fully the hypotheses of collaborative dialogue tested in 
this thesis and their predictions for why disfluency occurs. Included in these sections is a review 
of the literature from the fields of Speech Technology and Phonetics, perception of disfluency, 
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and intentionality to understand when disfluency might occur, when listeners can perceive it and 
what is meant by an intentional signal. Finally, Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the role of eye 
gaze in dialogue. Chapter 3, the first experimental chapter, is focussed on establishing a baseline 
experimental paradigm of visual feedback in a Map Task dialogue. Chapter 3 also begins to 
address the questions of when, where and why disfluency occurs. Chapter 4 tests both the 
baseline visual feedback paradigm with the addition of verbal feedback in order to discern 
whether one type of feedback has more of an impact on the speaker. Chapter 4 further 
investigates the when, where and why of disfluency in addition to how a speaker copes with 
additional cognitive load. Finally, Chapter 5 asks whether the speaker’s behaviour can be 
changed if a speaker is offered additional motivation. In this way, Chapter 5 is a true test of 
speaker commitment because one might predict that the speaker who is more committed to 
producing an ideal delivery and to helping their listener, would signal this fact by signalling more 
often with disfluencies. 
 
1.4 MONITOR Project 
 
This thesis was not written in a vacuum and the experiments reported in it were by no means 
of my own creation. As previously mentioned in the Acknowledgements, I received financial 
support from the EPSRC in order to pursue my PhD. This support was part of the MONITOR 
Project, a collaborative EPSRC grant held by Dr. Anne H. Anderson at the University of Glasgow 
and Dr. Ellen Gurman Bard at the University of Edinburgh. During the course of the project, a 
number of Research Associates and Programmers have run experiments, developed XML tools, 
transcribed speech, coded eye-gaze data, analysed data and written special-purpose computer 
programmes. Table 1 below shows which analyses and work were conducted by other individuals 
and which were conducted by the author.  I also benefited from MONITOR Project meetings, 
mainly with Dr. Anne H. Anderson, Mr. David Kenicer, Dr. Marisa Flechá-Garcia, Dr. Yiya 
Chen, Ms. Catriona Havard, Ms. Sara Dalzel-Job and Mr. Jim Mullin. Under the auspices of the 
MONITOR project, I have published previous papers about disfluency and eye-gaze: Nicholson 
et al. (2003) and Nicholson et al. (2005). Copies of these papers can be found in Appendix A.
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Table 1. Distribution of work on the MONITOR Project 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2A & 2B  Experiment 3 
Experimenter Mr. David Kenicer 
David Kenicer and Catriona 
Havard 




Mr. Jim Mullin Mr. Jim Mullin Mr. Jim Mullin 
Gaze Coding 
David Kenicer and 
Catriona Havard 
Catriona Havard Alex Fulton 
Gaze Analysis David Kenicer 
Catriona Havard, Alex 
Fulton and Sara Dalzel-Job 






Garcia and trained 
coders 
Dr. Yiya Chen and trained 
coders 
Hannele Nicholson, Gabriel 




Garcia and Dr. Yiya 
Chen 
Dr. Yiya Chen 





(with training from 
Dr. Robin Lickley) 
Hannele Nicholson Hannele Nicholson 
Disfluency 
Analysis 
Hannele Nicholson Hannele Nicholson Hannele Nicholson 
XML 
Assistance 
Dr. Jean Carletta, Dr. 
Henry Thompson and 
Dr. Ruli Manurung 
  
Programming Joseph Eddy Joseph Eddy Joseph Eddy 
Note: Dr. Anne H. Anderson and Dr. Ellen Gurman Bard oversaw all elements of the project.
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CHAPTER 2  - Literature Review 
 
 In this chapter, I review the literature which bears on what constitutes a disfluency, where 
disfluencies occur and why they occur during dialogue. To address the question of what can be 
considered a disfluency, I review recent disfluency models within the literature. To answer where 
and when disfluency occurs, I turn to the field of speech recognition and automatic detection of 
disfluencies. Answering the question of why disfluency occurs is not straight-forward, and for 
this reason I review models of collaborative dialogue, speech production, intentionality in speech 
and models of self repair. I also outline the current experimental research on gaze during dialogue 
with emphasis on what has been discovered since the advent of eye-tracking in order to motivate 
the need for further experiments investigating disfluency and eye gaze during collaborative 
dialogue.  
 
2.1 Disfluency Classification Systems 
2.1.1 Cognitive models of Speech Production and Self-Repair 
 
In order to understand why, when and where speech errors or disfluencies occur, we need an 
understanding of how the speaker is thought to detect and correct mistakes in his or her own 
speech during dialogue.  This question will be the focus of this section.  Three major proposals 
have been put forth within the literature.  Laver (1980) defends an account of error detection in 
speech production that incorporates error detection on a neuromuscular level.  Levelt (1983; 
1989) proposes that error detection occurs via an auditory-feedback loop and internal monitor.  
Finally, MacKay (1987) outlines the node structure theory, a connectionist model in which node 
activation leads to speech production and possibly to disfluencies. In this section, I will briefly 
summarise and compare the three accounts. For a more extensive review, refer to Postma (2000). 
Laver (1980) argues for a distributed editing theory of error detection which employs 
propositional logic and feed-forward links at various stages throughout the production process to 
detect errors.  Before speech production can occur, the message must proceed from the Ideation 
phase on to an abstract phase of linguistic programming, on to an abstract phase of motor 
programming and from there to the conversion of abstract planning into neuromuscular 
commands.  Articulation occurs at this stage, after which there is a period of post-articulatory 
monitoring.  Errors may only be detected after post-articulatory monitoring and only then it is 
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possible to loop back for correction.  Laver (1980) shows that it is possible to assign errors of 
different kind to different phases of this system. For example, if a speaker were to say ‘Ralebais’ 
when they meant ‘Rabelais’, (error recorded by (Fromkin, 1971)).  This error could be attributed 
to a malfunction in the motor programming section because there has been an error in the serial 
ordering of the abstract motor program such that segments [l] and [b] were exchanged (Laver, 
1980 p. 297). Not all errors involving whole segments arise in the motor programming section, 
however. A spoonerism, or phrase involving an exchange of two sounds, like ‘a kice ream cone’ 
(Fromkin, 1971) that involves segmental exchange is more likely to be formed during the 
linguistic programming phase because the exchanged segments cross morphophonemic 
boundaries (Laver, 1980). On the other hand, a ‘linguistically unorthodox’ error like ‘he behaved 
as like a fool’, a blend of ‘like a fool’ and ‘as if/though he were a fool’, crop up during the 
linguistic planning phase and are verified later through a postutterance monitoring function 
(Laver, 1980).   
Although the production-based approach of Laver (1980) employs an external mechanism in 
order to detect errors, connectionist theories traditionally utilise only entities within their own 
system.  This is the case for node structure theory of MacKay (1987) in which language 
processing and language comprehension are brought about via the same structure of hierarchical 
layers of interleaving nodes.  Nodes may either be shared or specific to production and 
perception.  Mackay’s node layers include but are not limited to ‘propositional nodes’, ‘muscle-
movement nodes’, ‘phonological nodes’, ‘syllable nodes’ and ‘sensory-analysis nodes’.  Any of 
these node types may be primed in either the output or input direction.  The node with the most 
priming is the one to be activated for inclusion in a particular phase of either perception or 
production.   
According to node structure theory, an error may be detected through backward-priming 
(Mackay, 1987).  For example, suppose that a particular node is activated by mistake.  This 
activated node would submit a signal to the next conceptual node in the network, thus activating it 
and creating perceptual awareness of the flaw.   Corrective action may then commence, though 
MacKay does not provide the specifics of this process.   The node activation system in node 
structure theory is developed especially to capture MacKay’s belief that the perception of one’s 
own speech errors differs from the perception of other’s speech errors.   MacKay compared 
Nooteboom’s (1980) 75 percent self-correction rate for phonological errors versus Tent and 
Clark’s (1980) much lower rate of phonological correction of other’s speech errors.  
According to Mackay, should a node be activated wrongly, an error will occur and the speaker 
will be aware of it. A central tenet of the node structure theory is that once a node has received 
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enough activation to be uttered, the speaker is aware of this activation (Mackay, 1987). This 
claim is contested by anecdotal evidence provided by Laver (1980) and experimental evidence 
from Postma & Noordanus (1996) that in fact speakers are not consciously aware of every error 
they utter. Furthermore, as Postma (2000) argues, Mackay’s (1980) node structure theory lacks an 
external monitoring loop and, thus, predicts that the same number of errors should occur in a 
silent or noise-masked speech condition as in normal speech since errors are created via node 
activation. When speakers were asked to report their own errors in either a silent, noise-masked or 
normal auditory feedback condition by pressing a button, they reported fewer errors if they did 
not have auditory feedback (Postma & Noordanus, 1996). Similar results have been reported by 
Dell and Repka, (1992) and Postma and Kolk (1992). In the light of such evidence, the 
assumption of no external loop in the node structure theory is highly suspect. 
Levelt (1989) disputes such results arguing that the self and other-error data sets should not be 
compared and that monitoring for errors in the speech of others is highly dependent on context.  
Levelt (1983; 1989) proposes and defends the perceptual loop theory of self-monitoring, which 
posits that the process of perceiving one’s own errors is equivalent to that of perceiving another’s.  
To capture this effect, the editing component of speech is coupled with the comprehension 
mechanism in a double-loop device.  The first phase of speech production is “conceptualization”, 
where the speaker realises an intention to convey information. During the conceptualization 
phase, the speaker can refer to a discourse model, or record of what was said previously in the 
dialogue, and a situational model, or model of the physical world around him and the objects in 
it, in order to make his or her own contribution relevant to the conversation. The speaker can also 
monitor his or her own speech, whether it is overt or internal. By doing all of these things, the 
conceptualizer produces a preverbal message, which passes to the formulator for grammatical 
encoding. 
During the formulation phase, the abstract conceptual structure of what the speaker intends to 
say is mapped onto a linguistic structure (Levelt, 1989). First, the message must be grammatically 
encoded, or mapped onto an appropriate syntactic structure.  The formulator has access to a store 
of lemmas, or units of lexical meaning.  For example, the concept behind the verb to buy requires 
that one person spend money in order to obtain ownership of a particular object.  A lemma also 
provides the speaker with syntactic information about the lexical item.  For example, buy is a verb 
which requires a subject performing the action, a direct object that is bought and an agency from 
which the item is bought.  Levelt uses the terms surface structure for messages that have been 
grammatically encoded. 
Next, the surface structure, or syntactically acceptable string or organized lemmas, is 
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phonologically encoded.  Each lemma also comes with a phonetic or articulatory plan for how to 
pronounce the word, which is devised during the phonological encoding phase.  Also, during this 
phase the phrasal stress for the whole message is determined.  The end-product of phonological 
encoding is the articulatory plan.  Levelt (1989) views this representation as internal speech and 
with it assumes a certain degree of attention to it by the speaker (McNeill, 1987). However, if the 
speaker doesn’t attend carefully to the articulatory plan, an error might occur because failure to 
attend to the plan causes an error to go unnoticed. 
A speaker can attend to his or her own speech via the monitor. Levelt (1989) posits two loops 
with his model of speech production. One loop, which travels from the phonetic plan (Figure 4) to 
the speech comprehension system, is utilised to monitor internal speech, and thus makes it 
possible to prevent errors from being pronounced (see Section 2.1.1 for a description of a ‘covert’ 
repair).  The other loop is a route which enables the monitor to detect errors occurring in overt 
speech via the auditory loop and the language comprehension system.  The advantage of such a 
system is that no other editing devices have to be stipulated; either overt speech or the phonetic 
plan for the predetermined articulations will suffice. 
Since the error detection and correction processes can be extremely rapid, the purpose of any 
theory must be to capture this effect.  Laver (1980) claims that the entirely feed-forward design of 
his system explains the rapid repair process.  Furthermore, Laver suggests that the perceptual 
system may be preset and thus accelerate the perception process (pg. 301).  Laver is not explicit 
about how the perceptual system is preset or in what way. Both Laver and Levelt (1989) predict 
that replanning of the utterance will occur after the cut off point in an overt error. Due to its 
distributed nature, the node structure theory is capable of detecting an error at any point in the 
production process (Mackay, 1987).  Postma (2000) points out that this capability is a definite 
strength.  He cites a study by Oomen and Postma (2000) in which speech rate and error-to-cut-off 
and cut-off-to-repair rate are examined. When the speech rate accelerates, the rate at which the 
errors are perceived and repaired also increases (Oomen & Postma, 2001a, 2001b) . 
This finding supports either the production-based theories of Laver (1980) or the node 
structure theory but causes problems for the perceptual loop theory because the perceptual loop 
theory fails to account for the fact that repair rate increases with speech rate as shown by Oomen 
& Postma (2001a).  The perceptual loop theory of Levelt (1983) relies upon the auditory channel 






Figure 4. A copy of Figure 1.1 from Levelt (1989) showing the speech production and perception 
system 
 
There is no particular reason for perception to speed up at faster speech rates. Hartsuiker and 
Kolk (2001) designed a computational simulation to test the perceptual loop theory in light of 
Oomen and Postma’s (2001a) claims.  A simulation of faster speech rates confirmed that the 
perceptual loop theory could account for error detection in accelerated speech.  The perceptual 
loop theory employs both production and comprehension via its inner and outer loops. Hartsuiker 
and Kolk incorporated this scenario into their simulation and found that comprehension speed 
increases in parallel with production rate or that the comprehension constant is small.  





























thought to detect and correct speech errors: the production-based account of Laver (1980), the 
perceptual loop theory of Levelt, (1983) and node structure theory as proposed by MacKay 
(1987).  Henceforth, I will more or less adopt the view proposed by the perceptual loop theory 
because this hypothesis stands out as the sole hypothesis to incorporate retrospective processes 
and error awareness.  Levelt proposes that speech error correction is a ‘marginal form of 
executive control’, meaning that the speaker must expend energy in order to complete it (Levelt, 
1989, p. 22). A speaker may be aware that an error or a disfluency has occurred but that does not 
mean the speaker has used the error or the disfluency strategically. As explained in Chapter 1, 
speech errors and disfluencies are not the same phenomena  
In his perceptual theory of monitoring, Levelt (1983; 1989) devises a categorisation system to 
classify repairs based on the reasoning behind the repair.  According to this view, a potential 
repair is detected because speech production incorporates an internal monitor.  Once an error is 
detected, the appropriate corrective action is taken.  Examples are shown in Figure 5 as reprinted 
directly from Levelt (1983). 
 
REPAIR TYPE TRANSCRIPTION 
D-REPAIR We beginnen in het midden met … in het midden van het papier met 
een blauw rondje 
 
 We start in the middle with…in the middle of the paper with a blue disc 
 
A-REPAIR We gaan rechtdoor offe….We komen binnen via rood, gaan dan 
rechtdorr naar groen 
 We go straight on or…We come in via red, go then straight on to green 
E-REPAIR Een eenheed, eenheid vanuit de gele stip 
 A unut…Unit from the yellow dot 
C-REPAIR En aan de rechterkant een oranje stip, oranje stip 
 And at the right side an orange dot, orange dot 
Figure 5. Levelt's (1983) four major cognitive categories of repair 
 
The first type of repair occurs when the speaker notices that s/he could have formulated the 
most recent utterance in a more efficient manner.  In other words, the speaker makes a D-Repair 
when s/he utters something “different” from the original intention, for example when the speaker 
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decides to say “of the paper” before saying “with the blue disc”.  D-Repairs contrast with A-
Repairs because as the example in Figure 5 shows, the speaker attempts to provide more 
contextual information for a listener “We come in via red...” who may require it to understand the 
best way for proceeding to the green dot.  A-Repairs are commonly known as ‘Appropriateness 
Repairs’ where the speaker is monitoring for the applicability of the information in the given 
context and not for error. Appropriateness repairs differ from D-Repairs in that an 
Appropriateness repair will never co-occur with an editing term such as ‘er, I mean, oops’, but a 
D-Repair can (Levelt, 1989). 
During an E-Repair, or Error-Repair, on the other hand, a speaker has monitored for error and 
found something to repair.  In the example in Figure 5, the error was phonological in nature as the 
speaker mispronounced the word “eenheed”. This sort of repair corresponds directly to the sort of 
repair considered in the next section (2.1.2.) and also in most of the literature.  Levelt (1983) 
divides E-Repairs into separate categories depending upon their linguistic nature: lexical repairs 
(EL-Repairs), Syntactic Repairs (ES-Repairs) and Phonetic Repairs (EF-Repairs).  For present 
purposes, these sub-types are not relevant. 
The fourth sort of repair type, C-Repairs or Covert-Repair, occur when the speaker has made a 
repair, but has done so in a covert fashion, as shown in example (4) above when the speaker 
simply repeats “orange dot, orange dot”.  In this case, the monitoring loop caught the repair in 
enough time so that the speaker did not overtly pronounce the error that he or she was in the 
process of monitoring for at the time.  Since there is no overt, surface evidence of either error or 
repair, I leave a more in depth analysis of C-Repairs for future research because I am 
predominantly interested in investigating whether a speaker used disfluency to signal to the 
listener or whether disfluency merely displays that the speaker encountered trouble.  Until we 
know more about the intentionality of disfluency, this investigation requires overt errors that the 
listener could have heard.  Finally, Levelt (1983) posits an R-Repair group (‘R’ for ‘Rest’) to 
classify all the anomalous examples which didn’t fit into any other categories. 
Clark and Wasow (1998) do not develop a classification system of disfluencies per se but they 
do ascribe a cognitive function closely related to Fox Tree and Clark’s (1997) findings for 
repetitions in collaborative dialogue.  Clark and Wasow analyse only repetition disfluencies from 
the Switchboard and London-Lund corpus. It is their view that disfluencies (or speech repairs as 
they refer to them) have a strategic function to perform in signalling speaker difficulty to the 
listener.  Repetitions are the focus of analysis because similarly to Fox Tree and Clark’s findings 
they signal a speaker’s commitment to a particular utterance.  A speaker retraces a portion of the 
reparandum in order to signal their difficulty in planning and indicate that the previously uttered 
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portion will undergo repair. The term ‘Self Management’ (SM) or in a later article ‘Own 
Communication Management’ (OCM) is used by some researchers to refer to disfluencies 
(Allwood, Nivre, & Ahlsén, 1990).  
Allwood et al. argue in a similar manner to Clark and Wasow (1998) and Schegloff et al. 
(1977) that disfluencies can fulfill a pragmatic function in speech. According to their hypothesis, 
OCMs are a natural part of the linguistic system and its complex rota of turn management and 
utterance planning.  The main thrust of the argument is possibly to provide defense against 
Chomsky’s (1965) claim that disfluencies (or OCMs) are outside the traditional notions of 
‘langue’ and therefore not worthy of linguistic study.  Allwood et al. (1990) set out to show that 
this is incorrect by devising an entire classification system from speech collected in different 
social situations. OCMs are the speaker’s way of managing their own communication, and as 
such can either signal ‘choice’ or ‘change’ (Allwood et al., 1990). A speaker signals ‘choice’ 
through filled pauses, repetition or silent pauses; using these items signals that the speaker needs 
to stop “to gain time for processes having to do with the continuing choice of content and types of 
structured expression” (Allwood et al., 1990, p. 10). Allwood et al refer to filled pauses as ‘simple 
self-management expressions’ and silent pauses as ‘pauses’. Otherwise, an OCM can signal 
‘change’ by deleting, reordering, inserting or substituting words; the function of a signal for 
change is to enable the speaker, on the basis of various feedback processes (internal and external), 
to change already produced content, structure or expressions. The term ‘disfluent’ is inappropriate 
to refer to such phenomena since according to Allwood et al. (1990) such hesitations are a fluent 
part of conversation and are under the speaker’s control. Allwood et al. do not discuss whether 
they consider ‘tip of the tongue’ states to be a fluent part of conversation that is under the 
speaker’s control. 
To conclude, both Clark and Wasow (1998) and Allwood et al. (1990) suggest that the process 
of correcting an error or disfluency is under the direct control of the speaker and, furthermore that 
both speaker and listener are somehow capable of incorporating this information into the intended 
message during the rapid-fire speech production process. Both studies tend to focus on the role of 
the speaker and speaker’s strategic intent during speech production.  This view is problematic 
when the assumption of strategic intent becomes the norm rather than a potential deviation.  
Could strategic intent ever really be the norm and if so, what reasons would a speaker have for 
mispronouncing words and making their utterances difficult to understand? I will address this 
issue further in Section 2.1.2 and in subsequent experimental chapters. 
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2.1.2 Structural speech repair classification schemes 
 
In contrast to Levelt’s cognitive theory of disfluencies, Shriberg (1994) develops a preliminary 
disfluency classification system based on speech from three corpora, ATIS (Dahl et al., 1994; 
MADCOW, 1992), SWITCHBOARD (Godfrey, Holliman, & McDaniel, 1992; Wheatley et al., 
1992) and AMERICAN EXPRESS/SRI (Kowtko & Price, 1989).  The aim of the study is to 
develop an atheoretical categorization system for disfluencies. She does not investigate 
disfluencies (or speech repairs) that cross speaker turn boundaries; a disfluency begins and ends 
within the same turn and is initiated only by the speaker making the correction.  Shriberg’s 
motivations for her classification system are subjective with respect to the discourse history of a 
referent.   For example, if a speaker makes an error while describing a network of nodes (‘move 
the block … the green block’), this error could be classified as either an error repair or an 
appropriateness repair in Levelt’s (1983) system.  The classification is dependent on the speaker’s 
model of the listener and whether the speaker believes the listener understood block or 
specifically green block the first time around (Shriberg, 1994, p. 13).  This classification system 
was designed to be subjective since in most cases it is not possible to determine the nature of the 
speaker’s model of the listener, or indeed whether there even was one.  Additionally, Shriberg 
states that disfluency rate depends on cognitive variables such as the complexity of the utterance 
under preparation and its linguistic structure.  Her classification system incorporates eight types 
of disfluencies (see Table 2, page 39). 
Both Shriberg (1994) and Lickley (1994; 1998) categorise disfluencies according to an 
atheoretical structure.  Lickley’s (1994) examples come from a corpus of casual conversations.  
 
REPAIR TYPE TRANSCRIPTION 
Repetition Right there’s a ….there’s a line about a quarter of the way down 
Substitution a vertical | a horizontal line 
Insertion two | about two centimetres above from the bottom of the page 
Deletion on no what | the line stops at the flagship 
Figure 6. Lickley's (1998) disfluency categorisation system 
 
Their five types are based partially on the word-level adaptations made during the repair and 
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partially on the psycholinguistic aspects of repair.  Examples, taken directly from Lickley (1998), 
are presented below for exposition. Reparanda are denoted in bold and IPs are represented with a 
horizontal bar. 
As shown in Figure 6, the speaker repeats the phrase there’s a once before describing the line 
in question.  Repetitions are always instances of exact repetition, with no additional words.  
Unlike Page (1999), who presents a disfluency taxonomy for medical transcription, Lickley 
allows repetitions to consist of either full word or word fragments (eg. The ben-  the bench), on 
the grounds that the difference is as likely to be a perceptual illusion as a real difference in many 
cases.   
Substitutions are detectable when one word or string of words is replaced by another, as occurs 
in Figure 6 above.  Notice, however, that the indefinite article ‘a’ occurs in both the reparandum 
and the repair.  As Shriberg (1994) and Lickley (1998) point out, substitutions may contain 
occurrences of repeated words.  The repeated word can often be an anchoring device for detecting 
the disfluency.  Similarly, insertions, as shown in Figure 6, may also contain repeated words.  The 
defining characteristic of an insertion is the fact that a word that did not appear in the reparandum 
has been added to the repair.  In Figure 6, we see this exemplified with the addition of about in 
front of the original two centimetres.  Substitutions and Insertions would usually be classed 
among Levelt’s (1983) A-Repairs, as they tend to modify the original utterance to contain more 
accurate or precise information. 
Finally, deletions occur when the speaker has interrupted herself but has not repeated or 
substituted any portion of the reparandum for another in the repair.  For example, “on no what … 
the line stops at the flagship” as shown in Figure 6.  In a sense, a deletion is a covert repair 
because the disfluency analyst has little overt knowledge of what error the speaker monitored for 
during the repair.   
Page (1999) developed a disfluency classification system to recognize and remove disfluency 
patches of speech in medical dictations so that the fluent portions can be automatically 
transcribed.  Savova (2002) employed this system in her thesis.  According to this system, 
disfluencies can be exact repetitions (with a…with a), exact substitutions (five correction seven), 
repetition and substitution (does not…did not), repetition and insertion (to clean...to try to clean) 
and repetition with deletion (no spotting dysuria or abnormal … correction no spotting or 
dysuria).  Lickley’s (1998) definition of deletion differs from that of Page.  According to Page’s 
disfluency classification system, deletions must contain repeated words in both the reparandum 
and the repair.  Page’s system does not consider deletions without repetition as deletions, and so 
Page would have no way to classify the example of a deletion given by Lickley in Figure 6. This 
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fact might account for the scarcity of deletions reported in Page (1999) for medical transcription 
data.  
Following Nakatani and Hirschberg’s (1994) disfluency description system, Heeman (1997) 
devises a statistical model for detecting disfluencies in conjunction with discourse markers (DMs) 
and boundary tones.  His approach is similar to the approach used by Hindle (1981) in that both 
divide their repair taxonomy into three types: fresh starts, abridged repairs and modification 
repairs.  Heeman argues that the solution to finding disfluencies, or speech repairs as he calls 
them, is intrinsically linked to the solution to finding the other two (cf. Wang and Hirschberg, 
1992 for information on detecting tones in conjunction with repairs; Hirschberg and Litman 
(1993) for information on detecting DMs in conjunction with repairs). Furthermore, Heeman 
(1997) views part-of-speech tagging (POS tagging) as integral in detection of all three phenomena 
and so he implemented this into his model.  Heeman’s (1997) view on disfluency detection is 
rooted in a desire to design a computational model that can be implemented in speech recognition 
systems, and thus provides valuable insights to both discourse processing and speech recognition.   
A fresh start corresponds to Lickley’s (1998) deletion or Hindle’s (1981) restart, in that the 
speaker abandons a turn and starts again anew.  For example, a speaker might say I need to send 
… let’s see, how many boxcars can one engine take to use Heeman’s own example (pg. 11) where 
I need to send is the reparandum, let’s see is an editing term, and how many boxcars can one 
engine tak’ is the alteration or repair.  
In the next type, an abridged repair, the reparandum is viewed as null or empty. Instead, it 
contains only an interruption point and editing term.  To use Heeman’s own example once again: 
We need to um…manage to get the bananas to Danville more quickly (pg 13).  Here, the 
interruption point occurs just after we need to, the editing term is the filled pause um, and manage 
to get begins the continuation. There is no correspondence between this type of repair and 
anything in Lickley’s (1998) classification system.  Heeman points out the difficulty in telling 
whether terms like let’s see or well are editing terms, since they could also be construed as DMs.  
These terms are only considered to be part of an abridged repair when they occur mid-utterance 
and seem as if they weren’t intended as part of the utterance.  Furthermore, he points out that it is 
sometimes tricky to say whether phrases like manage to are not instead intended as substitutions 
for need to as in the following example of a modification repair. 
Finally, the third type of repair in Heeman’s (1997) system is a modification repair, where 
there tends to be a strong similarity between reparandum and repair. The reparandum material can 
be repeated verbatim, as Lickley’s (1998) repetition, or partially as in Lickley’s (1998) 
substitution: You can carry them both on…tow them both on the same engine. As Heeman points 
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out, Hindle refers to this type as a restart. Heeman admits that it can be difficult to discern 
whether something should be classified as a modification repair or a fresh start, although filled 
pauses tend to co-occur with modification repairs while editing terms like I’m sorry tend to occur 
with fresh starts. 
Heeman (1997) tested his model on The TRAINS corpus collected at the University of 
Rochester. With 34 speakers arranged into 25 different pairs, it is most similar to the HCRC Map 
Task corpus (Anderson et al. 1991).  Participants were asked to discuss a circuitous train route 
with five cities on it.  They were provided with information about how many engines and boxcars 
were available from each city and the location of various factories and warehouses.  One person 
played the role of the system while the other played the role of the user and together they solved 
fictional problems presented to them.  The participants saw similar but not identical maps: the 
system map contained more information about route time between destinations.  Participants sat 
in the same room but did not have visual contact. 
Overall, Heeman’s model can detect and correct 65.9% of all speech repairs with a precision 
of 74.3%, before any syntactic processing has occurred. The full model, which uses POS tags to 
find DMs, is capable of identifying 97.3% of all DMs with a precision of 96.3%. The model can 
identify 71.8% of all turn-initial intonational boundaries with a precision rate of 70.8%.  
This section has explained six separate disfluency classification systems to explain the 
differences between cognitive classification systems and structural classification (Allwood et al., 
1990; Heeman, 1997; Levelt, 1983; Lickley, 1998; Page, 1999; Shriberg, 1994).  As can be seen 
by studying any one of these disfluency classification systems, disfluencies are not speech errors.  
Disfluencies occur when a speaker has changed his or her mind and revised a portion of an 
utterance. Speech errors can go unnoticed or changed.  As explained by Levelt (1983), the same 
mechanism in language production, the monitor, is used to detect both disfluencies and speech 
errors in speech. Just as there is a terminological difference between disfluencies and speech 
errors, there is a terminological difference between the terms used to describe disfluency. As 
shown in this section, different researchers approach disfluency with different methodologies and 
theoretical purposes in mind. In the next section, I will explain how these approaches can affect 
disfluency terminology and defend the terminology used in this thesis.  
 
2.2 Disfluency Terminology 
 
As Eklund (2004) points out, the terminology used to refer to the phenomenon under 
investigation in this thesis is a subject in its own right.  This section will investigate the 
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motivations for particular terms in various disciplines and eventually clarify and define the terms 
used in this thesis. 
 
2.2.1 Disfluencies, Hesitations and Speech Repairs 
 
In Chapter 1, I explained the differences between disfluencies, stuttering and speech errors. 
This section will review the literature with respect to disfluency terminology while asking the 
question ‘Does disfluency depend on the ear of the beholder?’  For each of the studies reviewed, I 
will consider each work according to: 
 
1. corpus type 
2. discipline of research (Computational, Pragmatic, Psycholinguistic) 
3. the structure of the disfluency classification system 
4. disfluency types within the classification system 
5.   the role of speakers and listeners 
 
Knowledge of the corpus type under analysis is of importance because as Shriberg (1994) points 
out, disfluency frequencies and types tend to vary across corpora. For example, a corpus 
consisting of dialogues is much more likely to contain what Schegloff et al. (1977) term “other-
initiated repairs” where a corpus of a news broadcast is more likely to contain more self-
corrections.  
Likewise, knowing which discipline the researcher came from can tell the reader something 
about the researcher’s ultimate goals in approaching disfluency. A computational linguist 
interested in building an effective means of detecting disfluencies is likely to have very different 
views and methods from a sociologist studying the ways in which people use disfluencies in 
interaction. Both of these researchers are also likely to differ from the psycholinguist cum 
phonetician who is likely to be interested in the potential cues listeners employ in perception or 
the mechanisms causing disfluency in language production. 
By knowing the disfluency structure and disfluency types considered in each classification 
system, one becomes aware of how inclusive and thorough the system is. This allows the reader 
an opportunity to classify disfluencies according to a particular system and thereby see how 
effective and reliable a classification system is.  One can also compare different classification 
systems using the same data for an understanding of the frequencies of disfluency types and the 
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relationships between different types of disfluencies, for example how Levelt’s (1989) A-Repair 
corresponds to a structurally coded disfluency like a substitution or insertion in Lickley’s (1998) 
system.  
Finally, as indicated in Chapter 1, there is considerable disagreement in the disfluency field 
about the ‘why and how’ of disfluency. Proponents of the Strategic-Modelling view suggest that 
disfluency is a strategic signal to a listener, while proponents of the Cognitive Burden hypothesis 
suggest that disfluency is merely an indication of difficulty in language production. For this 
reason, knowledge of the role of speakers and listeners according to a disfluency model will 
reveal if the approach implies a motivation for disfluency. Are speakers seen as being in control 
of their errors and if so how does that impact on the implications of the research? Are listeners 
responsible for attending to (or even capable of perceiving) the speaker’s potential cues? 
Roughly, the disfluency community can be divided into two groups: those who view 
disfluency as a means of correcting oneself (Heeman, 1997; Levelt & Cutler, 1983; Lickley, 
1994; Shriberg, 1994, 1999) and those who view disfluency as a natural part of conversation, 
often with a pragmatic or communicative function (Allwood et al., 1990; Clark & Wasow, 1998; 
Schegloff et al., 1977).  Those who attribute a pragmatic or communicative function to 
disfluencies tend to use terms like speech repair, hesitation, other-repair, self-repair or own 
communication management. Such terms imply a communicative function rather than simply just 
a discontinuity in the speech stream.  Those who, like Lickley (1994) and Shriberg (1994), use the 
term disfluency do so primarily only to refer to the speech stream and nothing more; a disfluent 
patch of speech is one that contains rewordings, filled pauses, hesitations and the like. A neutral 
term is used precisely because no communicative intent is assumed on the part of either speaker 
or listener or because communicative intent was irrelevant. 
As evident from Table 2, the ‘error-correction taxonomists’ (eg. Lickley, 1994; Shriberg, 
1994; Heeman, 1997; Savova, 2002) tend to come from a computational or phonetic community, 
and those who view disfluency as a conversational tool are generally members of the 
psycholinguistic, sociological or pragmatic fields (Allwood et al., 1990; Clark & Wasow, 1998; 
Schegloff et al., 1977).  There of course can be division within a field as is the case within 
psycholinguistics as will be further explained in Section 2.3. In general, error correctionists seek 
to develop a method for automating elimination of unwanted text from the preliminary form of a 
document.  Those who study dialogue concentrate on the ways in which interlocutors align (i.e. to 
show that they have understood what their partner meant) and view disfluency as part of this 
process.  The question to ask is: are these different theoretical ends fundamentally opposed to one 
another or can they be reconciled?  Are there simply two ways of describing the same thing? Are 
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disfluencies by any other name still representative of the same phenomenon?  
 
2.2.2 Roles of Speakers and Listeners in Disfluency Literature 
 
Table 2 describes to some extent how the literature reviewed within this section seems to 
characterize the roles of speakers and listeners during conversation.  When reviewing disfluency 
terminology, it is important to be mindful of this distinction because usually disfluencies are 
analysed as a means for understanding how conversation and speech production operate. 
Although researchers were grouped into categories according to the discipline their study 
largely came from, there are exceptions to this classification when considering only the roles of 
speakers and listeners.  Roughly, researchers within the fields of pragmatics or sociology tend to 
portray disfluencies as a communicative part of conversation (Allwood et al., 1990; Schegloff et 
al., 1977).  In both cases, conversation is viewed as something to manage and control.  When an 
error occurs, both the nature in which it is repaired and the identity of who does the repairing is 
focused upon.  According to Schegloff et al. (1977) speakers may correct themselves or this task 
may be left up to the listener.  Both Allwood et al. (1990) and Schegloff et al. (1977) claim that 
disfluencies are intentional strategizing on the part of the speaker. 
As an alternative to this view, Lickley (1994; 1996), Shriberg (1994) and to some extent 
Savova (2002) consider speech primarily from the perception or listener’s perspective and as such 
are not primarily interested in how or why the disfluency arose.  Lickley’s (1994) thesis drives 
him to examine how a listener recovers the speaker’s meaning by examining how soon a 
problematic area of speech can be detected.  In both cases, the speaker makes a mistake for some 
reason, and if an understanding is to be achieved, it is the listener’s goal to process this error. 
Shriberg (1994) handles disfluencies from the perspective of a computer system by requiring 
disfluent patches of speech to be removed from the output text.   
Clark and Wasow (1998) hypothesize differently by emphasizing the role of the speaker in 
their model of disfluency.  Clark and Wasow view disfluency as a strategic signal to the listener 
of the speaker’s commitment to the utterance (and therefore that the listener should not interrupt).  
This view assumes the listener’s ability to perceive the signal in addition to the speaker’s ability 
to produce such an accurate signal given the rapid pace of conversation.   
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Table 2. Breakdown of disfluency researchers, their corpora, disciplines, disfluency structure, disfluency types and 
perceived role of speakers and listeners 
Author Corpus Type Discipline Disfluency 
Structure 
Disfluency Types Roles of Speakers 
and Listeners 















Part of dialogue 
management; self 
vs. other repairs 
Levelt (1983 Dutch description of a 
network of lines and 
nodes 
Psycholinguistic  D-Repair, C-Repair, A-




Shriberg (1994)  ATIS/ 
SWITCHBOARD 





insertion, deletion, filled 
pauses, editing terms, 
word fragments, extra 
discourse markers 
Neutral with 
respect to intention 
Lickley (1994) Conversations Psycholinguistic / 
Phonetic 





insertion, deletion, filled 












repetitions, filled pauses, 
hesitations 
Speakers use 
disfluency as signal 
to listener 
Heeman (1997) TRAINS corpus Computational; 
Statistical 
Modelling 





fresh starts, modification 
repairs, abridged repairs 
Neutral with 
respect to intention 






exact repetitions, exact 
substitutions, repetition 
and substitution, 
repetition and insertion, 
repetition and deletion 
None – but 
implements 
reliable prosodic 
cues in spoken 
speech for a 
computer “listener” 
Allwood, Nivre 
and Ahlsén 1990 
Swedish corpus of 













Furthermore, it assumes that speakers depend not only on a model of what s/he intends to say 
but also on a model of what the listener has understood from the previous conversation.  As 
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Pickering and Garrod (2004) argue, it is resource intensive for the speaker to maintain both a 
model of his or her own perspective and a model of the listener during speech production. 
Clark and Wasow (1998) hypothesize differently by emphasizing the role of the speaker in 
their model of disfluency.  Clark and Wasow view disfluency as a strategic signal to the listener 
of the speaker’s commitment to the utterance (and therefore that the listener should not interrupt).  
This view assumes the listener’s ability to perceive the signal in addition to the speaker’s ability 
to produce such an accurate signal given the rapid pace of conversation.  Furthermore, it assumes 
that speakers depend not only on a model of what s/he intends to say but also on a model of what 
the listener has understood from the previous conversation.  As Pickering and Garrod (2004) 
argue, it is resource intensive for the speaker to maintain both a model of his or her own 
perspective and a model of the listener during speech production. 
In Levelt (1983), it is possibly more difficult to ascertain just what sort of function speakers 
and listeners play.  This is largely because Levelt (1983; 1989) asserts that speech production 
makes collateral use of an internal monitor that interlocutors possess. This internal monitoring 
loop shares at least part of the perceptual unit which processes incoming speech, as a listener.  In 
the event that the interlocutor speaks disfluently, then the same mechanism that perceives errors 
in another person’s speech is also responsible for perceiving errors made during his or her own 
speech.  In a sense, speakers are listeners of their own speech.  Although Levelt (1983) also 
establishes a criterion for classifying disfluencies according to their cognitive motivations, he also 
explicitly states that speakers have little or no access to the speech production mechanism.   
Throughout this section I have used the controversial term disfluency to refer to the span of 
speech under investigation where disfluency means a section of speech is not fluent.  By using 
this term, I have not assumed any sort of global communicative function implicit in the error 
correction process though research by Allwood et al. (1990) and Clark and Wasow (1998) may 
assume such a communicative function.  Since psycholinguistic and cognitive research have yet 
to uncover how much of the speech production process is under our intentional control, it is best 
to suspend such assumptions.  For that reason, the remainder of this thesis will employ the 
atheoretical disfluency surface classification system of Lickley (1998) and will continue to use 
the term disfluency to refer to these regions.  This is done out of an attempt to remain theory-
neutral and to allow the experimental data to depict the phenomenon appropriately. 
 
2.3 Psycholinguistic Models of Collaborative Dialogue 
  
Within the psycholinguistic research community there is considerable debate between at least 
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two separate hypotheses about collaborative dialogue.  The two theories are divided with regard 
to the amount of effort a speaker puts into modelling the listener during the course of the 
conversation.  According to the first hypothesis, speakers employ intentional tactics during 
conversation and constantly check a listener model, or a model of what the listener could know, 
during speech production (Clark, 1994; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986).  This hypothesis will be 
referred to as the Strategic-Modelling view here.  According to the second hypothesis, the 
Cognitive Burden view, the process of intentionally modelling a listener and adapting utterances 
to the listener is taxing (Horton & Keysar, 1996).  Speakers may choose to ignore cognitively 
taxing feedback during a conversation, if the effort is too great (Horton & Keysar, 1996).  
Both hypotheses have been the subject of considerable experimental research using a variety 
of techniques.  As this research has progressed over time, it has become possible to outline the 
ideal profile of a speaker as viewed by the two theories of collaborative dialogue.  In subseqent 
sections, I will outline these ideal profiles as portrayed in experimental results obtained in the 
field. 
 
2.3.1 Strategic-Modelling View 
 
Throughout this thesis, I will refer to the view that speakers regularly model their listeners as 
‘strategic-modelling’. In actuality, the Strategic-Modelling View is an amalgamation of 
hypotheses, most of them originally proposed by Clark and colleagues. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
Clark et al. (1983) propose the Principle of Optimal Design which suggests that speakers form 
their utterances by referring to a mental model of the listener.  To resolve the ‘Mutual Knowledge 
Paradox’, Clark and Marshall (1981) suggest that speakers do not require full mutual knowledge 
but instead can rely on common ground information based on their physical, linguistic, and 
community copresence with their listener.  In order to share common ground with a listener, 
however, the speaker must have a model of the listener. The speaker refers to this model of the 
listener when designing utterances or ‘collateral signals’ during dialogue (Clark, 2002).  
In an alternative view, Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) propose the Principle of Least 
Collaborative Effort to suggest that dialogue is a joint activity in which speakers and listeners 
share responsibilities to ensure the success of the dialogue. According to this principle, speakers 
and listeners should try to minimise the effort required to establish an understanding. This is 
taken to mean that speakers are fully capable of attending both visually and auditorily to their 
listener’s feedback throughout the entire dialogue. If the speaker encounters difficulty during the 
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course of the dialogue, it is the responsibility of both participants to resolve the conflict. To do 
this, speakers may also ‘signal’ his or her intentions to the listener and may mean something by 
their choice of signal (Clark, 1996, Chapter 6).  
 
“The logic here is based on a principle of choice: Whenever speakers have more than one 
option for part of a signal and choose one of the options, they must mean something by 
that choice, and the choice is a signal. ” (Clark, 1996, p. 261) 
 
Grice (1957) distinguished between non-natural meanings (e.g. A glance at a watch which in a 
certain circumstance means ‘We’re late’) and natural meanings (e.g. red spots on the skin meant 
that Brad had the measles). Clark uses the term signal to refer to what Grice calls non-natural 
meanings and the term symptom to refer to Grice’s natural meaning. That is, a symptom has a 
natural meaning while a signal is used by a speaker to mean something in the current 
circumstance (Clark, 1996). Signals may be linguistic (Paul saying ‘I’m hungry’ to mean that he 
is hungry and wants to eat some food) or non-linguistic (Angelina points to a bowl with food to 
mean that Paul can eat the food in the bowl) in nature. As Clark states, a signal does not have a 
meaning behind it unless a speaker uses it to accomplish a conversational goal; nor can a speaker 
utter anything meaningful without using some sort of linguistic or non-linguistic signal. 
Clark (1996) outlines three strategies that the speaker may pursue during the discourse. 
Speakers who employ the stop-and-continue strategy will present their utterances phrase by 
phrase and may pause between phrases in order to formulate the next chunk.  Speakers may also 
use the commit-and-repeat strategy which involves initiating an utterance before it is fully 
formulated, stopping to finish the formulation, and then upon resuming begin by repeating the 
previously uttered word for two reasons: 1) to show commitment to the utterance and 2) to 
provide continuity for the listener. Alternatively, the speaker may employ the commit-and-repair 
strategy if she changes her mind about what to say mid-utterance. In this case, the speaker would 
substitute one word for another, insert a new word, or delete a word and start afresh. By doing 
this the speaker once again signals to the listener that she is attending to both the listener and the 
utterance (Clark, 1996; Clark & Krych, 2004; Clark & Wasow, 1998; Fox Tree & Clark, 1997). 
The most important thing according to the strategic-modelling view is that there must be 
coordination between speaker and listener so that any disruptions are efficiently handled. This 
requires that the speaker must pay attention at the critical moment, when the listener needs 
attention most. For this reason, speakers constantly monitor their listeners and send collateral 
signals of this attention. Speakers who cannot monitor their listeners at all are predicted to 
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encounter difficulties during the dialogue (Clark & Krych, 2004). 
The theory of audience design, or the notion that utterances are designed for the listener, has 
been further developed in work by Brennan and colleagues (Brennan, 2004; Brennan & Clark, 
1996; Brennan & Schober, 2001; Kraljic & Brennan, 2005). Although Brennan’s work tends to 
differ in its conclusions from Clark’s conclusions, I will classify the notions of joint action and 
audience design as part of the Strategic-Modelling View. A major difference, however, is that 
Schober and Brennan (2003) describe some processes in dialogue as automatic, and therefore not 
under the intentional control of the speaker whilst other processes do seem to be strategic. As an 
example of a strategic process, speakers establish “conceptual pacts” with their listeners over the 
course of the dialogue (Brennan & Clark, 1996). When establishing a conceptual pact, either the 
speaker might behave in an egocentric manner and require the listener to adopt this perspective as 
well or the speaker might behave altruistically and refer to items according to the listener’s point 
of view. As an example of an automatic process, Bard and Aylett (2001) showed that while 
speakers adapted the definiteness of their referring expressions, their articulation (measured in 
terms of phonetic duration) did not change upon second mention. Likewise, Kraljic and Brennan 
(2005) find that prosodic lengthening does not seem to be part of audience design: a speaker’s 
choice to lengthen at a prosodic boundary seemed to depend on the speaker’s processing of the 
syntactic structure, rather than on the listener’s needs. 
Brennan (2004) reports the results of an experiment done without eye-tracking. In this 
experiment, she asked subjects to participate in a ‘car parking task’, where subjects moved icons 
around a computer screen with their mouse. In a visual evidence only condition, subjects could 
see their partner’s icon as well as provide instructions verbally; in a verbal-only condition, 
subjects could not see the other icon and could only give verbal instructions. Brennan found that 
subjects were most efficient in the visual-only condition: fewer words were required to 
accomplish the task in the visual condition compared to the verbal-only condition. As evidence of 
mutual responsibility, subjects who had visual feedback would sometimes interrupt their own 
utterances (e.g. “And park right in Memor-…right there, that’s good”) if they could see that the 
icon had already reached the desired location (Brennan, 2004; Brennan & Lockridge, 2004).  
Interruptions like these present an interesting case to watch out for since a purely structural 
classification of disfluency might necessarily classify them as disfluent.  
While reporting the results of their experiments, Brennan and Clark (1996) and Schober 
(1993) discuss how lexical entrainment can be used as evidence for conceptual pacts. Lexical 
entrainment is the use of a single name or style of name in the expressions which refer to an entity 
over the course of the conversation. An experiment in which interlocutors were assigned a card-
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matching task found that referring expressions were used based on their recency, or what the 
expressions referred to the last time around (cf. Garrod & Anderson, 1987), frequency and 
informativeness in the discourse (Brennan & Clark, 1996). In Brennan and Clark’s card-matching 
task, speakers were given cards with pictures of everyday objects (i.e. shoes, dogs). In each set of 
cards, there were often more than one type of shoe (penny loafer, high heel, tennis shoe) or dog 
(Scottish terrier or cocker spaniel). Speakers referred to objects by using the same referring 
expression they had used in a previous trial about 81% of the time (Brennan & Clark, 1996) 
showing that recency does have an effect on lexical entrainment. As Brennan and Clark (1996) 
show, referring expressions simplify with frequency of use: speakers used more specific terms 
(pennyloafer)  69% of the time, significantly more often, after a series of four trials than they did 
after only a single trial.  These results are in line with other experiments which have shown that 
interlocutors develop routines in collaborative dialogue for selecting items from the discourse and 
that over time these referring expressions simplify with the frequency of mention (Ariel, 1990; 
Bard et al., 2000; Bard, Aylett, & Bull, 2000; Bard & Aylett, 2001; Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark 
& Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993; Krauss, Vivekananthan & 
Weinheimer, 1968; Krauss & Weinheimer, 1966). 
Haywood (2004) tested audience design by asking participants to describe to a confederate a 
sequence of cards, organized by either pattern first and then colour or vice versa, to a confederate.  
According to this study, speakers were capable of recalling a conceptual pact (i.e. the upside 
down T) when using referring expressions in a tangram description task with previous partners if 
doing so would help the success of the dialogue. In further experiments, Haywood showed that 
speakers are capable of designing their descriptions of the cards in a helpful manner (i.e. optimal 
design) after a period of being the addressee. In subsequent experiments, however, Haywood 
showed that syntactic priming effects were stronger than a speaker’s tendency to participate in 
audience design. Overall, Haywood concluded that speakers are capable of participating in 
optimal design by adjusting the word order, referring expressions and syntactic forms of their 
descriptions according to the listener’s needs. Optimal design is a complex process, however, and 
involves establishing a balance between what the speaker can easily produce and what will be 
easy for the listener to understand according to Haywood (2004).  
In two early experiments, Krauss and Weinheimer (1964; 1966) studied concurrent feedback 
and confirmation in dialogue. Concurrent feedback is defined as feedback from the listener that 
occurs simultaneously with the speaker’s utterance. Confirmation is defined as the listener’s 
behaviour as a result of the speaker’s message. Krauss and Weinheimer predict that by restricting 
the amount of feedback the speaker receives from the listener, one can shorten the length of 
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referring expressions that the speaker uses to refer to objects in the display. In Krauss and 
Weinheimer’s experiments, subjects described novel graphic shapes present on cards to listeners 
who were seated in another booth. Listeners had the same cards as the speaker and had the task of 
determining which card the speaker was describing. In the ‘concurrent feedback’ (CF) situation, 
the listener could provide verbal feedback as in an everyday conversation. In the ‘nonconcurrent 
feedback’ (NCF) situation, the speaker described the card over an intercom and the listener 
indicated the choice of card by pressing a button on a box. The listener provided confirmation in 
both situations by pressing a button, which appeared as either a correct or incorrect on the 
speaker’s box after experimental manipulation. Speakers either received 50% correct 
confirmation or 100% correct confirmation. From this experiment, Krauss and Weinheimer 
observed that speakers shortened their referring expressions in the CF condition. Referring 
expressions were also shorter in the 100% confirmation condition than in the 50% confirmation 
condition. Thus, Krauss and Weinheimer conclude that both concurrent feedback and 
confirmation affect the speaker’s planning of the utterance. 
Following Krauss and Weinheimer, a number of studies have found that the establishment of 
conceptual pacts seems to be a joint action (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986; Haywood, 2004; Metzing & Brennan, 2003; Schober & Clark, 1989; Wilkes-Gibbs & 
Clark, 1992) and furthermore that conceptual pacts are formed in a gradual process (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996; Metzing & Brennan, 2003). In an experiment performed by Schober (1993), 
speakers were assigned the task of describing the location of objects to a listener positioned at 
different angles from themselves.  Schober controlled for time-pressure, the angle of separation 
between listener and speaker, and whether or not speakers were participating in a monologue or a 
dialogue.  When partnered with a listener, speakers tended to adopt the perspective of the listener 
and solo speakers took only an egocentric perspective.  Time-pressure had no significant effect on 
accuracy of the object description; speakers did not adopt a different perspective or describe 
locations more precisely when under time-pressure compared to when they had unlimited time 
allotted to the task (Schober, 1993). Other research has shown that interlocutors develop routines 
in dialogue (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Brennan & Clark, 1996; Bard & Aylett, 2001).  
As with any theory, the Strategic-Modelling View seems to vary in its strength. The strong 
version of the Strategic-Modelling View supported by Clark (2002), Clark and Fox Tree (2002), 
Clark and Krych (2004) and Fox Tree and Clark (1997) suggests that speakers design utterances 
and disfluencies as collateral signals for their listener. A weaker version supported by Brennan 
(2004) and Lockridge and Brennan (2002) suggests that speakers engage in audience design for 
some processes (e.g. referring expressions) but not for others (e.g. articulation and prosodic 
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lengthening).  This notion has been proposed before by Bard et al. (2000), Brown and Dell (1987) 
and Horton and Keysar (1996). Where does disfluency fall with respect to these two theories? I 
address these issues in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 along with a comparison of the Strategic-Modelling 
View and the Cognitive Burden View. 
2.3.2 Disfluency as Signal 
  
As part of the Strategic-Modelling View, Clark and Wasow (1998) propose the Commit-and-
Restore Model of speech repair.  This model takes the view that Levelt’s (1983) model of repair is 
limited in scope and following Schegloff et al. (1977) argue that repair is an interactive process 
brought about through mutual participation of both participants. Here ‘interactive process’ means 
that speakers are jointly present and provide feedback in an attempt to communicate effectively.  
Plauché and Shriberg (1999) extend Clark and Wasow’s (1998) proposal by presenting prosodic 
evidence of strategy in repetitive repair. 
Schegloff et al. (1977) analyse disfluencies, or speech repairs as they refer to them, in 
conjunction with turn-taking in conversation.  According to Schegloff et al., a repair can be 
initiated by the speaker (i.e. a ‘self-repair’) or by the listener (an ‘other repair’); in both cases, the 
initiator seeks to correct the ‘trouble source’.  Typically, repairs are performed as soon as possible 
in the span of the dialogue.  If the speaker initiates the repair, it is usually within the same turn, as 
observed by Schegloff et al. If the other person initiates the repair, the repair usually occurs in the 
turn after the trouble source and no earlier. A self-repair usually contains cut-offs (a.k.a. word 
fragments), sound stretches (a.k.a. prolongations) and uhs (a.k.a. filled pauses). Other repairs 
typically contain a Wh-question about the trouble source or a repeat of the ‘trouble source’, with 
or without an added question word.  Schegloff et al. observe that generally self-repair in speech is 
the preferred method of correction for both participants because other-repair generally requires 
more turns to complete and therefore more work for both participants.   
Repetition repairs are by far the most frequent type of repair in dialogue (Lickley, 1999; 
Shriberg, 1994), a fact which makes them interesting to study.  Fox Tree and Clark (1997) 
conducted a study on one particular type of repetition, the repetition of the determiner the. In 
English, the word the can be pronounced in two ways as either thiy or as thuh. Fox Tree and Clark 
(1997) hypothesise that speakers can consciously choose which pronunciation they use. Moreover 
Fox Tree and Clark hypothesise that when a speaker says thiy, this choice is a signal that the 
speaker is encountering difficulty in speech production and is signalling this to be considerate of 
the listener. Fox Tree and Clark analysed 461 tokens of thiy and a matched set of 461 tokens of 
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thuh to determine whether or not thiy was a signal when made during a repetition repair. Results 
showed that thiy preceded a suspension of speech 81% of the time whereas thuh only preceded a 
suspension of speech 7% of the time. Thiy also preceded more filled pauses, silent pauses and 
speech repairs than thuh did. From this evidence, Fox Tree and Clark (1997) conclude that thiy 
signals a major problem whereas thuh signals a minor problem. Fox Tree and Clark argue that 
speakers are conscious of their choice of thiy versus thuh in the same way that back channel 
commentaries like uh-huh and yeah are signals. 
The Commit-and-Restore model posited by Clark and Wasow (1998) extends the views of 
both Fox Tree and Clark (1997) and Schegloff et al. (1977) and applies them specifically to 
repetition repairs.   According to Clark and Wasow, the basic insight of the Commit-and-Restore 
model asserts that a repetition repair occurs either because of a) some problem pertaining to the 
grammatical complexity of the utterance, b) the speaker’s desire to maintain continuity or c) out 
of an attempt to uphold a prior syntactic commitment.  Repairs that result from grammatical 
complexity are accounted for under the ‘complexity hypothesis’ which suggests that a speaker is 
more likely to suspend the flow of speech prior to a grammatically complex unit.  Clark and 
Wasow measure complexity via ‘grammatical weight’ which is calculated in terms of the number 
of syntactic, word and phrasal nodes (Wasow, 1997; Hawkins, 1994).  Clark and Wasow present 
evidence in support of the complexity hypothesis by comparing the frequency of function words 
with the frequency of content words per thousand words.  Content words were repeated only 2.4 
times per thousand while function words were repeated 25.2 times.  Furthermore, a function word 
was reiterated more frequently if it appeared in a more syntactically complex NP (i.e. in topic 
positions) than if it appeared in a less complex NP (i.e. the object of a preposition). From such 
evidence, Clark and Wasow (1998) argue that one can gauge the likelihood that a particular word 
will be repeated by referring to its word type (eg. content vs. function status) and its syntactic 
position in the sentence.  Speakers hesitate prior to constructions with greater grammatical weight 
that cause uncertainty and as such tend to repeat the function words leading into these 
constructions, at the points of greatest complexity when the lexical words are being chosen. A 
similar result was presented by Maclay and Osgood (1959). 
In addition to the complexity hypothesis, Clark and Wasow (1998) posit the continuity 
hypothesis to explain why speakers repeat error words in a verbatim restart rather than simply 
commencing from the trouble source.  It is important to note the similarity of repetitive restarts to 
the C-Repairs of Levelt (1983); Figure 5 (page 29) shows that the example C-Repair from 
Levelt’s corpus appears as a repetition on the surface. Levelt suggests simply that restarts might 
signal the presence of a C-Repair, a notion to which Clark and Wasow present objections.  
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Creation of a C-Repair does not explain why the speaker chooses to restart rather than start from 
the trouble spot.  Instead, as Clark and Wasow go on to suggest, a speaker repeats a portion of the 
utterance in an attempt to maintain continuity between the reparandum and the beginning of the 
repair.  Analysis of the location of filled pauses (um, uh, ah) in relation to determiners (the, a) 
from the Switchboard corpus provides evidence in support of the continuity hypothesis 
predictions that speakers will be more likely to pause prior to a constituent than after, that 
repetition is more likely to occur when a constituent has been more severely disrupted and finally 
that once a disruption has occurred, a speaker should strive to maintain continuity.  As evidence 
for these claims, Clark and Wasow note that filled pauses in the Switchboard corpus occurred 
before the determiner (um the) 64 times per thousand as compared to a significantly higher 198 
times per thousand times after the determiner (the um) .  
Finally, the third hypothesis of Clark and Wasow (1998) proposes that speakers make 
commitments to their utterance at major phrase boundaries.  The commitment hypothesis attempts 
to explain why a speaker might interrupt an utterance to which he or she is committed.  Clark and 
Wasow argue that speakers make a preliminary commitment to an utterance with the full 
expectation of suspending it later. They claim that temporary suspensions can be tracked in the 
prosody of the phrase. Selkirk (1995) states that frequently mono-syllabic function words are 
cliticized or attached onto a content word that follows it, unless the function word was intended to 
be spoken in isolation or occurs at the end of the phrase.  Therefore, Clark and Wasow continue, 
one can detect a ‘phonological orphan’, a case of non-cliticized function words, when adjacent 
function and content words are not resyllabified into one phonological word.  To take Clark and 
Wasow’s example, one would normally expect a speaker to syllabify I’m employed as 
I.mem.ployed, where the coda consonant of I’m is pronounced as the onset of the following word.  
A phonological orphan, evidence of preliminary commitment, is exemplified in the pronunciation 
of the same phrase as Im.employed where a pause occurs between the function word and the verb 
form.  Clark and Wasow contrast phonological orphans with fragments. Clark and Wasow 
suggest that phonological orphans like Im.employed constitute evidence of a syntactic 
commitment: the speaker has interrupted on a syntactic level and has made a commitment to 
continue on a syntactic level: 
 
“When a speaker interrupts themselves on the syntactic level, as in ‘Im.employed’, they 
are making preliminary commitments both to the words themselves (I’m) and to the 
constituents they initiate.” (Clark and Wasow, 1998, p. 227) 
 
Clark and Wasow contrast this example of syntactic commitments with articulatory 
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commitments, or interruptions on a phonological or articulatory level, commonly evidenced by 
word fragments (eg. The ma-). In an articulatory commitment: 
 
“They are committing themselves to going on with their speech … [creating] the illusion 
of a continuous delivery” (Clark and Wasow, 1998, p. 231) 
  
Articulatory commitments occur because the speaker interrupted on a phonological level; 
Syntactic commitments occur because the speaker interrupted on a syntactic level. Syntactic 
commitments occur to indicate the speaker’s intention to utter a certain phrase or clause. 
Articulatory commitments occur as means of indicating the speaker’s intention to speak in a 
continuous fashion.  
Similarily to Fox Tree and Clark (1997), Clark and Fox Tree (2002) propose a signalling 
function for English filled pauses uh and um.  According to Clark and Fox Tree, there are three 
views surrounding filled pauses. The first view, the filler-as-symptom view, proposes that filled 
pauses are automatic items used in speech that are not under the voluntary control of the speaker 
(Levelt, 1989; O’Donnell & Todd, 1991). According to the second view, the filler-as-
nonlinguistic-signal view, filled pauses are a signal to listeners that the speaker wishes to hold the 
floor while they think of what to say next. This view was originally proposed by Maclay & 
Osgood (1959). Finally, according to the filler-as-word view, the third view, filled pauses are 
equivalent to interjections like oh or well.  Clark and Fox Tree go on to develop the filler-as-word 
view to suggest that filled pauses like um and uh can be considered lexical items with their own 
meanings. They hypothesise that um signals that speaker expects a major delay before he or she 
can continue speaking while uh signals that a speaker expects a minor or shorter delay before 
resuming speech. Clark and Fox Tree test these hypotheses by analysing corpus evidence from 
the London-Lund corpus (Svartvik and Quirk, 1980), the Switchboard corpus (Godfrey, 
Holliman, and McDaniel, 1992), an answering machine corpus and the Pear stories corpus 
(Chafe, 1980). Pause duration following filled pauses for the majority of their data is measured by 
trained coders in perceptual units, not in terms of any temporal duration. A unit consists of “one 
stress unit” and a brief pause (0.5 units) consists of “one light foot” (Clark and Fox Tree, p. 80). 
Clark and Fox Tree find support for their hypotheses about um and uh: um occurred more often 
before a longer delay than uh did (61% > 29% of the time). Um (0.68 units) also occurred prior to 
significantly longer pauses than uh (0.25 units) did. 
To investigate whether speakers actually plan their filled pauses, Clark and Fox Tree (2002) 
analyse three prosodic locations where planning loads differ to determine whether speakers delay 
for the same amount of time at each location. As shown in the example below taken from Clark 
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and Fox Tree (p. 94), location (I) is at the prosodic boundary, location (II) is after the first word 
and location (III) is later in the sentence. 
 
and then uh somebody said, [I] but um – [II] don’t you think there’s evidence of this, in the  
twelfth [III] and thirteenth centuries? 
 
At location (I), the speaker has to plan what they want to say, plan the syntax and create 
appropriate prosody. Speakers are therefore predicted to pause the most in location (I). Speakers 
should have less need to pause in location (II) because they’ve already planned their message and 
its syntax and prosody. Speakers should pause the least often in location (III) because they have 
completed most of the processing by that point. After analysing the corpora, Clark and Fox Tree 
found that speakers used um more often in location (I) compared to the other locations. This 
finding is used to support the claim that filled pauses are planned like other words during speech. 
Clark and Fox Tree conclude that filled pauses uh and um should be considered words in a 
prosodic, syntactic, and semantic sense. Prosodically, uh and um can be cliticized onto other 
words (e.g. an.duh, bu.tum) and this would not be possible if they were non-linguistic sounds. 
Syntactically, uh and um are used to predict upcoming delay and the following speech.  
Semantically, the meaning of uh differs from that of um: um denotes a major delay where uh 
denotes a minor delay. Finally, Clark and Fox Tree conclude that speakers are able to plan their 
preparation of uh and um just as they are able to plan the rest of language production. 
O’Connell and Kowal (2005) provide empirically measured evidence refuting Clark and Fox 
Tree’s (2002) claims. O’Connell and Kowal used Praat software to measure the duration of 
pauses surrounding uh and um in radio and television interviews of Senator Hilary Clinton by 
well-known individuals (Television: Barbara Walters, David Letterman, Katie Couric, Larry 
King; Radio: Juan Williams and Terry Gross).  O’Connell and Kowal used instrumental methods 
to measure pauses because they argue that the perceptual method used by Clark and Fox Tree is 
highly suspect. Research by Spinos, O’Connell and Kowal (2002) found that while 85% 
(206/241) of the filled pauses in the London-Lund corpus were perceptually coded, there was a 
false positive rate of 25% (51/206) suggesting a low reliability rate from perceptual coding.  
According to O’Connell and Kowal’s instrumental results from the Senator Hilary Clinton 
data, 44% of all uhs and 33% of all ums ranged from 0.12 to 0.24 seconds in duration. Goldman-
Eisler (1968) would have considered these data to be fluent because they fell beneath her 0.25 
second minimum pause duration. Only 3% (4/147) of all uhs and 14% (9/69) of all ums were 
longer than 0.77 seconds. As O’Connell and Kowal admit, this finding does offer some support to 
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Clark and Fox Tree’s claim that ums precede longer delays but um can hardly be considered a 
reliable signal of impending delay since the mean duration for all pauses following um was 0.44 
seconds, only 0.12 seconds longer than the mean duration of all pauses following uh (0.32 s). 
Furthermore, Clark and Fox Tree relied on perceptual measurements of pauses and not 
instrumental measurements.  
O’Connell and Kowal also argue against Clark and Fox Tree’s conclusion that uh and um 
should be considered interjections in their own right.  Interjections are used with an emphatic 
sense and can constitute a conversational turn on their own. Uh and um, on the other hand, are 
non-emphatic and are rarely used as a turn. Clark and Fox Tree support the notion of filled pauses 
being like interjections because it lends support to their theory of ideal delivery in dialogue. As 
Blackmer and Mitton (1991) observed people can plan their speech while they are talking without 
using silent pauses after a filled pause.  O’Connell and Kowal conclude in line with Maclay and 
Osgood (1959) that filled pauses help sustain fluency but they are not signals of major and minor 
delays according to instrumental measurements. 
The theories of disfluencies reviewed in this section have presented arguments which suggest 
that disfluency is used as a signal to a listener.  Clark and Wasow (1998) present evidence for the 
Commit-and-Restore Model which advances three hypotheses about repetitive repair as a 
strategic signal.  The problem with such a theory is that it is based only on ambiguous linguistic 
evidence which could also be used to support the cognitive burden hypothesis.  Recall from 
Chapter 1 that the Cognitive Burden hypothesis of collaborative dialogue views disfluency and 
speech repairs as errors of a taxed production system.  Clark and Wasow suggest that function 
word repetitions are evidence that the speaker is undergoing planning difficulties prior to a 
grammatically correct object.  The fact that the speaker has a difficulty prior to a complex object 
is in line with the cognitive burden view which argues that psycholinguistic resources must 
compete for time. During the repetition of content words, the speaker could simply be 
reapportioning cognitive resources or stalling for more time. Moreover, the fact that a speaker 
consistently repeats words verbatim in a restart does not automatically entail that the speaker 
intends the action for the benefit of the listener.  As argued by Barr and Keysar (2002), all mutual 
knowledge for both participants is also knowledge for a single participant. It could, therefore, be 
the case that repetition helps the speaker get back on track.  Because Clark and Wasow’s evidence 
is always composed of linguistic forms, it does not show that the speaker actually attends to the 
presence of a listener or intends his or action as a signal.  It is merely assumed to be the case.    
Clark and Wasow (1998) and Clark (2002) have suggested that a speaker employs disfluencies 
as a signal and indeed designs them for the listener.  Underlying this proposal is the assumption 
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that a listener is able to reliably detect disfluency in speech and furthermore that the listener is 
capable of detecting the speaker’s intention.  In the next section, I will review the literature for 
how one can detect a disfluency, that is what cues do speech technologists and phoneticians use to 
determine whether disfluency has occurred. Following that, I will review perceptual 
psycholinguistic literature about whether listeners are always capable of detecting genuine 
disfluency in speech.  Finally, I will explain the theory of intentionality in speech to understand 
what is implied by the notion ‘intentional signal’.  
 
2.3.2.1 Modelling and Automatic Detection of Disfluencies  
 
The answer to the question ‘How do you know when a disfluency has occurred?’ depends on 
the definitions of the word when in the field that poses the question.  In phonetics and speech 
technology, emphasis is largely on those acoustic or prosodic characteristics of reparandum and 
repair which can be detected prior to the recognition of the linguistic string.  To answer this 
question, we turn first to a review of the literature in automatic disfluency detection.  
Disfluencies create numerous difficulties for engineers and researchers working in the 
automatic speech recognition (ASR) field for a number of reasons. A major goal behind many 
ASR applications is to produce error-free reports or transcriptions without a lot of extra manual 
editing. Disfluencies, where the speaker repeats or restructures the utterance, can create a problem 
for the ASR system because the naïve machine cannot tell what to edit and what to keep, if the 
system actually was able to recognize the often garbled and abruptly cut off speech in the first 
place (Pakhomov, 1999).  In order to develop better automatic speech recognition systems, a great 
deal of research has been dedicated to disfluency detection (Bear, Dowding, & Shriberg, 1992; 
Bell et al., 2003; Hindle, 1983; Liu, Shriberg, Stolcke, & Harper, 2005; Oviatt, 1995; Oviatt, 
MacEachern, & Levow, 1998; Plauche & Shriberg, 1999; Shriberg, 1994, 1995, 2005).  Some of 
these studies have focused solely on acoustic properties to detect disfluency (Plauche & Shriberg, 
1999; Shriberg, 1995) whilst others have used one or more sources of knowledge, such as 
acoustic information, part-of-speech tagging, Hidden Markov Models or specific language 
models, to aid the search (Bear et al., 1992; Hindle, 1983; Liu et al., 2005; Shriberg, 2005). Still 
others have conducted studies of human-computer interaction to detect disfluencies (Oviatt, 
1995).  
In one paper focused on the prosodic aspects of speech, Plauché and Shriberg (1999) classified 
repetition disfluencies in which the speaker repeats the (the…the). Repetitions in this work were 
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classified into three groups based on their prosodic attributes. Plauché and Shriberg (1999) 
examined pause length, word duration, the presence of non-modal (i.e. ‘creaky’) voicing, and 
pitch patterns. Each of these prosodic cues was then normalized and ‘binned’ according to their 
values. For example, the fundamental frequency of the first repeated word could be classified as 
either a falling, rising or complex pattern. Three clusters of repetitions emerged from this 
operation and each cluster was assigned an independent role, either as a retrospective repetitions 
or prospective repetitions as defined by Hieke (1981).  A retrospective repetition acts like a 
connecting bridge between utterances while a prospective repetition allows the speaker to stall 
during lexical retrieval (Hieke, 1981; Plauché & Shriberg, 1999).  In Set A repetitions like (1), the 
first token is often characterized by a longer than fluent duration (denoted with ‘+’), a rising 
intonation, a long pause in the interregnum, and no pause after the second token of the.  
 
(1) ([pause] making all of the + + [long pause] the family [pause] things work)  
 
The prosodic cues for Set A repetitions were found to correspond to the authors’ judgment of a 
canonical repetitions with a retrospective function. Set B repetitions, as shown in (2), are 
characterized with tokens that are both slightly longer than usual in duration and a falling 
intonation. Instead of a pause in the interregnum, there was often creaky voice or glottalization on 
the end of the first token.  
 
(2) (I I think [pause] the + [creaky] the +  thing is though, I I guess)  
 
The prosodic cues to Set B repetitions were labelled covert self-repairs by the authors. The first 
token of Set C repetitions were characterized by a slightly longer than fluent duration while the 
second token was much longer than fluent. Both Set C repetition tokens had a falling intonation. 
A possible pause could occur in the interregnum between the tokens.  
 
(3) ([pause] don’t have the + [pause] the+ + + special tools or [pause])  
 
The prosodic cues to Set C repetitions were classified as prospective or stalling repetitions 
(Plauché & Shriberg, 1999).  According to this research, prosodic cues offer speech applications 
some insight into the speaker’s strategy during the dialogue. The implications of this research are 
limited, since Plauché and Shriberg looked exclusively at repetitions of the first person pronoun 
(I) and the definite article (the) in English; in order to claim definitively that speakers employ 
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such strategies one would want to extend the results to other repeated tokens first. Moreover, one 
would want to pursue other psycholinguistic or perceptual tests to confirm that the speaker’s 
strategy was actually conveyed to a human listener before claiming that a certain set of prosodic 
cues signal a certain type of repair.  
Prosodic cues such as fundamental frequency, duration and glottalization have assisted in 
disfluency detection (Plauché & Shriberg, 1999; Shriberg, 1995; Shriberg, Bates, & Stolcke, 
1997). The majority of studies, however, have concluded that disfluencies are best detected by 
applying a variety of approaches including language models, part-of-speech tagging, prosodic 
cues and even semantic features (Baron, Shriberg, & Stolcke, 2002; Bear et al., 1992; Liu, 
Shriberg, & Stolcke, 2003; Liu et al., 2005; Savova & Bachenko, 2002; Shriberg, 2005).  Liu, 
Shriberg and Stolcke (2003), for example, find that their disfluency prediction model works best 
when it uses a specially designed language model, prosodic cues and a corpus tagged for part-of-
speech. In contrast, Liu, Shriberg, Stolcke, and Harper (2005) compare the performance of an 
HMM (Hidden Markov Model) to a CRF (conditional random field model). In an HMM, a 
disfluency is predicted by looking at the surrounding independent words or states. In a CRF, the 
probability of a disfluency is predicted for a particular sequence of words in a conditional state. 
The results indicate that the CRF model detects the disfluency without the use of rules as required 
by the HMM. The CRF model uses part-of-speech tags and information about a speaker’s turn 
(i.e. whether or not the turn has ended) as cues to detecting disfluency. For example, the CRF will 
be detect that two first person pronouns have occurred in I I have to go and use this as a cue to 
detect disfluency. 
Other work on human-computer interfaces has found that a very reliable indicator that 
disfluency will occur is the length of the utterance (Bard et al., 2001; Oviatt, 1995).  In Oviatt’s 
(1995) study, utterances tended to be longer when the presentation format was unconstrained and 
when the speaker had to impose their own structure. Disfluency seems to be indicative of 
planning difficulties (Bard et al., 2001; Bell et al., 2003; Clark & Wasow, 1998; Gregory, Joshi, 
& Sedivy, 2003) so speakers can be predicted to produce increased numbers of disfluencies 
whenever they are under cognitive load. Yet, at the moment, the speech recognition and multi-
party dialogue system fields have limited knowledge about what causes a speaker to be placed 
under stress. For the time being then, we turn to a complete review of the prosodic cues to 
disfluency in order to understand what sorts of cues speakers employ and whether these cues are 
at all likely to be used consciously and systematically by speakers. 
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2.3.2.2 Prosodic Cues to Disfluency: Fundamental Frequency 
 
Plauché and Shriberg (1999) are not the only researchers to suggest that prosodic cues to 
speech repair exist.  Hindle (1983) claims that a computational algorithm for deterministic 
parsing in a repair editing system should be able to distinguish between fluent and disfluent 
utterances on the basis of “phonetic evidence”.  Following Hindle’s claim, Lickley, Shillcock, and 
Bard (1991) conducted a gating experiment to repeatedly elicit listeners’ perceptual judgments 
about whether a disfluency had occurred while presenting incrementally enlarged chunks of the 
utterance.  Listeners did not perceive a single phonetic cue, but rather seem to attend to a variety 
of prosodic cues in order to detect disfluency.  In fact, there is a substantial literature dedicated to 
the detection of prosodic cues to repair.  It is the goal of this section to review this body of 
literature. 
The status of fundamental frequency as a cue to repair has been the subject of much debate.  
There is evidence which suggests that f0 might be reset when a repair begins (Lickley, 1994; 
Savova, 2002), further evidence which suggests f0falls over the course of a repair (Shriberg, 
1995) and rises (Nakatani & Hirschberg, 1994; Stifelman, 1993). Therefore no conclusive simple 
claim can be made. Arguing in support of f0 fall, Shriberg (1995) suggests that it is possible to 
distinguish between prospective and retrospective repairs (cf. (Hieke, 1981)) with reference to f0.  
Retrospective repairs exhibit a tendency towards falling f0values at the reparandum offset, while 
prospective repairs tend to exhibit a continuous f0 fall throughout the repair (Plauché & Shriberg, 
1999; Shriberg, 1995).  Hieke (1981) suggests that retrospective repairs fill a ‘bridging function’ 
to connect the repair with the reparandum after the interruption of fluency. Prospective repairs 
were predicted to fill a ‘stalling’ function to gain additional time for the speaker. 
Shriberg (1995) finds evidence for falling f0, but both Nakatani and Hirschberg (1994) and 
Stifelman (1993) report evidence for a rise in fundamental frequency.  A small reliable rise of 
+4.1 Hz was detectable for the absolute f0 of the nucleus of the last accented syllable in the 
reparandum as compared to the first accented syllable of the repair (Nakatani & Hirschberg, 
1994).  Stifelman reports that average f0 values tend to increase also by about +4.1 Hz for exactly 
repeated words. For partially repeated words, however, she observes only a 1% increase in f0 
values (Stifelman, 1993). While such results might aid automatic detection of disfluencies, it is 
unlikely that human speakers are capable of perceiving such discrete changes in speech because it 
is such a small change and is likely to happen rapidly.  
Finally, Lickley (1994) tests the Reset hypothesis (Levelt & Cutler, 1983; Pike, 1945), which 
holds that speakers reset the f0 value of the repair so that it matches that of the reparandum prior 
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to the interruption point. Pike (1945) proposed that normal intonational downdrift is stalled if a 
disfluency occurs and it should be possible to excise the reparandum portion of the disfluency and 
create a fluent sounding version of the original utterance.  Since the speaker will begin the repair 
at a normal sentence-initial intonation, Pike (1945) predicts that the repair onset will have a 
slightly higher pitch than the onset of the reparandum.  Lickley extracted f0 values from both 
before and after the interruption point.  Though he does not find a significant difference between 
the pre-IP and post-IP onset portion, the Reset Hypothesis cannot be dismissed, because repair 
type could have been a confounding factor.  Partial support of f0 reset is observed for false starts 
but f0 patterns differently for repetitions, i.e. most of the repetitions exhibited the same f0 pattern 
on both tokens but in some cases f0 was lower and in one token there was an f0 fall (Lickley, 
1994).  Savova (2002) also finds only partial support for the Reset Hypothesis: repair onsets were 
higher than reparandum onsets but repair onset values depended on the values of the reparandum 
offsets. 
Since there is so much variation within the literature, one cannot conclude anything at all 
about f0 as a cue to repair.  Further investigation that controls for repair type, reparandum length 
and syntactic structure might clarify the situation. Lickley (1994) conducted a perceptual study of 
repair on low-pass filtered stimuli and concludes that the cue to repair is likely to be prosodic in 
nature because listeners were capable of detecting disfluencies in low-pass filtered speech.   
 
2.3.2.3 Prosodic Cues to Disfluency: Duration 
 
A somewhat more reliable cue, duration may manifest itself as cue to repair in two 
prosodically different ways.  Overall word duration on can be used to compare identical words 
occurring on either sides of the IP (Bard & Aylett, 2000; Bear et al., 1992; Shriberg, 1999; 
Stifelman, 1993) or in the event that identical words do not exist, an overlong duration compared 
to a ‘standard’ token (i.e. prolongation) may serve as cue (Eklund, 2001).   Although not a 
distinguishing characteristic of disfluencies, the first token of a repetition is often much longer 
than the second repair token (Bear et al., 1992; Clark & Wasow, 1998; Shriberg, 1999; Stifelman, 
1993). The same observation has also been made for fluent speech to signal ‘new’ and ‘given’ 
information in referring expressions (Bard et al., 2000; Fowler & Housum, 1987). Bard et al. 
(2000) and Fowler and Housum (1987) find that the second mention of a referring expression 
(e.g. the parked van) was shorter in duration than the first mention.  
Counterevidence against the general trend of longer disfluent first tokens is reported by both 
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Plauché and Shriberg (1999) and Nicholson, (2002). Plauché and Shriberg (1999) find that during 
a stalling repetition (i.e. Set C repetitions: [pause] don’t have the [pause] the special tools) the 
second token is longer than the first.  Their definition of a stall, however, is left somewhat vague.  
According to their description, the speaker is still suffering difficulty during the second token. It 
is possible that this conception of a stalling repair differs for that proposed elsewhere in the 
literature. Nicholson (2002) compared the duration of mispronounced first tokens with their 
satisfactorily articulated second tokens. All mispronounced pairs were carefully controlled to 
ensure that they contained the same phonological segments (i.e. a long vowel in the case of /ðai/ 
versus /ði/.).  She observed that contrary to the general trend, mispronounced first tokens were on 
average 37 ms shorter than the repair versions.  It seems that the speaker spends more time 
amending the second token after unsatisfactorily pronouncing it the first time around.   However, 
as Nicholson (2002) admits, this observation was made on the basis of a small data sample and 
furthermore makes no predictions for other modes of speech such as monologue or other-initiated 
repairs in dialogue.     
Although several studies have compared word durations in repetitive repair, only few studies 
have examined the prolongation of a portion of the word.  Eklund (2001) conducted a 
comparative analysis of disfluent prolongation in Swedish and Tok Pisin.  Tok Pisin is a language 
spoken in Papua New Guinea. As he observed, prolongation may be a language specific trait or at 
least subject to the phonological rules present in the language. Swedish speakers exhibited a 
preference for prolonging word final continuant segments while speakers of Tok Pisin tended to 
prolong word final labial and velar nasal consonants. Although the tendency in both languages 
was to prolong segments more often at the end of a word, the segments differed considerably in 
the degree of lengthening.  
 Lengthened words and segments can also occur in fluent speech.  When studying this 
phenomenon, as Wightman, Shattuck-Hufnagel, Ostendorf, and Prince (1992) note, it is important 
to take the speech rate into consideration.  Wightman et al. (1992) developed a technique to 
analyse normalized durations involving linear scaling in a gamma distribution.  In line with Ladd 
& Campbell, (1991), they demonstrate that pre-boundary lengthening (eg. lengthened segments 
co-occurring with a syntactic boundary) can be used to distinguish among four levels of prosodic 
constituents, namely the foot-initial stressed word, all segments between the foot-initial vowel 
and the last vowel before the boundary, coda consonants before the boundary, and the vocalic 
nucleus before the boundary.  Of these, coda consonants and vocalic nuclei exhibit the greatest 
pre-boundary lengthening (Wightman et al, 1992).  As Wightman et al. (1992) point out it is 
difficult to tell whether this pre-boundary lengthening in fluent speech is under the volitional 
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control of the speaker.  Furthermore, pre-boundary lengthening could be related to some other 
phenomenon, for example discourse prominence.  This suggests that the prosodic phenomena that 
some researchers have labelled as a cue to disfluency, actually occurs in fluent speech: something 
that is perceived as a disfluency effect may just be a prosodic boundary effect. 
This section has reviewed the literature about potential prosodic cues to disfluency and 
discovered that neither fundamental frequency nor duration are exclusive cues to disfluent speech.  
Furthermore, research by Heeman (1997), Lickley, Shillcock and Bard (1991), Nakatani and 
Hirschberg (1994), Savova and Bachenko (2002) and Shriberg (1994) has suggested that there is 
no single “phonetic signal” to disfluency as originally suggested by Hindle (1981).  Instead, it 
seems that disfluency is detected by a combination of prosodic cues, if at all (Heeman, 1997; 
Lickley et al., 1991; Nakatani & Hirschberg, 1994; Savova & Bachenko, 2002; Shriberg, 1994).  I 
have now explained how one might be aware that a disfluency occurred prosodically and in terms 
of automatic detection.  The next section will discuss how well listeners are able to perceive 
disfluency and whether there are any perceptual consequences as a means of evaluating the 
predictions of the Strategic-Modelling View that listeners are capable of this task in dialogue. 
 
2.3.3 Perception and Processing of Disfluency 
 
The Strategic-Modelling View predicts that listeners are capable of perceiving and processing 
disfluencies as a signal from the speaker. The purpose of this section is to review the literature on 
disfluency perception to see whether listeners can perceive disfluencies. By looking at perceptual 
studies of disfluency, one can determine what effect disfluency has on the listener and whether 
this effect is the same as what the speaker might have intended.  This section will also review 
some disfluency processing studies to review whether disfluency is helpful or a hindrance to the 
listener.   
Lickley (1994) investigated the perceptibility of disfluency by conducting gating experiments.  
His stimuli were gathered from a corpus of spontaneous face-to-face casual conversations that 
Lickley himself collected.  Participants in the perceptual experiment heard portions of disfluent 
utterances each one 35ms longer than its predecessor.  At each ‘gate’, subjects were asked to 
report the words they have heard and to decide whether the utterance is about to become (or has 
become) disfluent.  From this study, Lickley observed that listeners were able to perceive 
disfluency before they recognize the first word in the repair.  Subjects were only capable of 
perceiving disfluency after the disfluency had begun; they could not perceive when a disfluency 
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was about to occur. Since listeners are not given the opportunity to listen to normal speech in 
35ms portions, one could conclude that an average listener would not perceive disfluency as 
accurately in everyday dialogue. 
In other related research, Lickley (1995) tested whether or not native Dutch speakers were 
capable of detecting disfluencies in normal spoken Dutch.  Subjects were given a written, edited 
version transcript of a set of spoken instructions describing how to build a house from coloured 
pieces of card.  Disfluencies were edited out of the written transcript.  Subjects were requested to 
mark the transcript at any point when what was said differed from what had been transcribed. 
Subjects were simultaneously asked to follow the instructions and build the house from pieces of 
card.  Lickley observed that subjects perceived filled pauses correctly 55.2% (69/125) of the time 
but were only capable of perceiving single-token repetitions 27% (4.7/16) of the time and single-
word false starts 39.3% of the time (11.4/29).  This research confirms previous observations by 
Martin and Strange (1968) that listeners were very poor at perceiving disfluencies when requested 
to do so in an online task.  Listeners in Martin and Strange’s experiment were better at perceiving 
filled pauses than they were at perceiving false starts.  As Lickley argues, there may be prosodic 
reasons to explain why filled pauses are more easily discernable than other types of disfluencies: 
filled pauses have pitch features that vary across contexts (Shriberg & Lickley, 1993). 
Fox Tree (1995) also conducted a similar experiment to Lickley (1994) in which subjects were 
asked to participate in the identical word monitoring task designed by Marslen-Wilson and Tyler, 
(1980). In this task, subjects keep a word in mind and press a button once they’ve heard it.  
Marslen-Wilson and Tyler showed that subjects were faster at identifying words when the 
utterance was comprehensible and less fast when the utterance was incomprehensible.  Fox Tree 
extends this task to testing word monitoring in two types of disfluent speech: repetitions or false 
starts.  Mid-sentence false starts caused the slowest word identification times, sentence-initial 
false starts the next slowest while repetitions caused no difficulty at all (Fox Tree, 1995). 
In an online study of perception of disfluency from the listener’s perspective, MacGregor, 
Corley, and Donaldson (2005) found that disfluency (in this case, a filled pause) has an 
immediate effect on language comprehension. Listeners heard sentences which either ended in 
predictable or unpredictable words. ERPs (Event Related Potentials) measure the 
electrophysiological response on the scalp to a certain event and have been used extensively in 
psycholinguistic research (van Berkum et al., 2002; van den Brink, 2004; Hagoort et al., 1999). 
When an unpredictable word had been uttered, ERP measurements revealed a N400 effect, 
indicating that the listener was indeed surprised by the word.  However, if a filled pause occurred 
prior to the word, MacGregor et al. observed a reduced effect of the N400 effect suggesting that 
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the filled pause had some effect on signalling the unpredictability of the upcoming word. 
MacGregor et al. report that control materials consisted of both highly predictable and less 
predictable words as determined by a cloze probability pre-test.  Furthermore, half of the 
utterances preceding the un/predictable word were disfluent; half were fully fluent.   
One must wonder though whether it is actually disfluency or just time that causes this effect. 
Other work has suggested that any noise (dog barking, cough, car horn) would achieve the same 
effect (Bailey & Ferreira, 2001). More recent work has corroborated this finding for both native 
and non-native speakers of Japanese: filled and silent pauses behaved in the same manner 
(Watanabe, Den, Hirose, & Minematsu, 2005) suggesting that listeners respond to the extra time 
and there is nothing particular about filled pauses. 
Brennan and Schober (2001) conduct a further perceptual test of how listeners handle 
disfluencies in spontaneous speech.  Listeners were given spoken instructions in which they were 
asked to press coloured squares on a keypad as quickly and as accurately as possible.  The spoken 
instructions consisted of disfluent and fluent controls.  Disfluent stimuli came in three types:  
between word disfluencies (Move to the yellow- purple square), mid-word disfluencies (Move to 
the yel- purple square) and mid-word with filler disfluencies (Move to the yel- uh purple square).  
The reaction time of the listener’s key press was considered to be a measure of the helpfulness of 
disfluency.  Listeners were found to press the correct coloured square fastest after a disfluent 
stimulus with a long edit interval (Move to the yel- uh purple square), suggesting that disfluencies 
contain information which help the listener resolve any processing issues (Brennan & Schober, 
2001).  
Brennan and Schober tested whether the phonological form of the disfluency helped the 
listener or whether the listener was simply aided by additional processing time.  The disfluent 
stimuli (e.g. Move to the yel- uh orange square) in this experiment were electronically replaced 
with a pause so that there were Filler removed (Move to the yel- orange square), Word removed 
(Move to the uh orange square), Disfluency replaced by a pause (Move to the [pause] orange 
square) and Entire Disfluency Excised (Move to the| orange square) versions. A Fluent version 
was used as a control.  Listeners responded in the same amount of time and as accurately when a 
pause replaced the disfluent portion of speech as when the original filler or fragmented word was 
left in tact. From this evidence, Brennan and Schober (2001) conclude that the listener benefited 
only from the additional time and not from any particular phonological cues in the disfluent 
stimuli.  
Bailey and Ferreira (2003a) find similar results to Arnold, Altmann and Tanenhaus (2003) 
after investigating disfluency, gaze and listener perception of ambiguous constituents. Bailey and 
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Ferreira tease apart two theories: Clark and Wasow’s (1998) theory that disfluencies are used in a 
signalling function and a second theory that suggests that any noise (e.g. dog bark, cough) would 
fulfil the same function. As part of the signalling theory, Clark and Wasow predict that a filled 
pause following a definite determiner the would signal that the following noun phrase is the 
subject of the clause rather than the object of the old one. Recall that according to Clark and 
Wasow (1998), a noun phrase in topic position is considered to be ‘grammatically heavier’ or 
‘syntactically more complex’ than a noun phrase in the object position. In contrast to this theory, 
Bailey and Ferreira suggested that any noise, speechlike or not, would fulfil the same function.  
To test these theories, Bailey and Ferreira manipulated sentences that were syntactically 
ambiguous. In a so-called ‘garden path sentence’, for example the horse raced past the barn fell 
there is a temporary ambiguity between a main clause and reduced relative clause reading (Bailey 
& Ferreira, 2003; Pinker, 2000; Trueswell & Kim, 1998).  Bailey and Ferreira (2003a; 2003b) 
showed that both disfluencies and environmental noises affect the time course of ambiguous 
constituent processing. Thus, if the listener hears an interruption, albeit a filled pause or a dog 
bark, when they hear While the man hunted the uh deer ran into the woods, they should interpret 
the deer as the subject of the clause rather than as the object because a disfluency is more likely 
before a syntactically ‘heavy’ constituent. Bailey and Ferreira showed that this prediction is 
indeed met. Listeners judged the sentences grammatical regardless of whether a filled pause or an 
environmental noise interrupted the sentence.  
 In a later article, Bailey and Ferreira (2005) tested a listener’s gaze reaction after hearing an 
ambiguous sentence which instructed them how to move objects in front of them. They found that 
while interpreting these instructions listeners looked at the target object sooner when the presence 
of disfluency (um, uh) biased the participant in that direction. Listeners heard the sentence Put the 
frog on the towel in the box in an ambiguous context when two towels and related distractor items 
were visually present, eg. a frog sat on one towel (target at location), a frog by itself (distractor) 
and another towel in a box (destination at location).  The speaker could be instructing the listener 
to put either the frog that sat on a towel into the box or to place the frog by itself into the box that 
also contained a towel. So, when the filled pause preceded frog (Put [the uh frog on the towel] in 
the box), the listener looked at frog-on-towel sooner. When the listener heard a filled pause before 
towel (Put the frog on [the uh towel in the box]), the speaker looked at the target object (i.e. the 
frog on the towel) later, indicating that s/he was entertaining the modified goal reading.  
Snedeker and Trueswell (2003) show similar results for fluent speech suggesting that it is 
rather a different matter whether the speaker actually intends these cues as a signal to the listener.  
Snedeker and Trueswell (2003) show that speakers employ prosodic cues when they are 
 61
necessary in order to parse an ambiguous sentence (eg. Tap the frog with the flower).  When the 
context was unambiguous for the speaker, the need to signal a distinction disappeared, as did the 
prosodic cues. Thus, the online time course of ambiguous speech processing seems to be sensitive 
to what a speaker might in theory intend by including particular cues. Of course, one cannot even 
be certain that the speaker actually intends to use the disfluency in a strategic manner. If the 
predictions of the cognitive burden view presented at the beginning of this chapter are correct, it 
could also be the case that the listener would assume that the speaker emitted a filled pause 
because he was experiencing cognitive difficulties in producing the utterance. One could certainly 
predict that the results that Bailey and Ferreira (2003; 2005) get would look the same as if they 
plotted the complexity of the referring expression against disfluency.  
This section has presented mixed results on the perceptibility of disfluency.  Lickley (1995) 
and Martin and Strange (1968) suggest that listeners performed poorly when asked to detect 
disfluencies in spoken speech.  In both experiments, the stimuli consisted of genuine disfluencies 
(e.g. filled pauses, repetitions and false starts).  As both Fox Tree (1995) and Lickley (1995) 
observe, subjects had more difficulties with false starts compared to repetitions.  As Lickley 
suggests, this could occur because subjects just did not notice the repetition as easily as the false 
start.  An ERP study by MacGregor et al. (2005) suggested that listeners were less surprised by 
unpredictable words when a filled pause occurred prior to the word.  This result suggests that 
listeners are capable of using at least filled pauses as a signal.  As Lickley (1995) and Martin and 
Strange (1968) point out, listeners are better at perceiving filled pauses than any other type of 
disfluency.  Shriberg and Lickley (1993) find that filled pauses have pitch features which explain 
why this may be so.  Research by Bailey and Ferreira (2001) suggests that listeners responded to 
non-linguistic noises (e.g. dog barking, coughs, etc.) inserted into speech in the same manner they 
responded to disfluent speech noises.  The same finding was observed for Japanese speakers by 
Watanabe et al. (2005) suggesting that all listeners perceive is the extra time and not the 
disfluency itself.  Brennan and Schober (2001) observed that listeners benefited simply from 
having extra time to process the disfluent utterance; there was no specific phonological cue which 
helped them process the disfluency. 
Thus far, the previous section on detection and cues to disfluency suggested that a) there is no 
single cue to disfluency but there may be a combination of cues and b) a number of cues to 
disfluency are also cues to fluent phenomena in speech (e.g. phonological boundaries). The 
current section reviewed whether listeners are capable of perceiving and processing disfluency. 
Lickley (1994) showed that listeners were only capable of detecting disfluency once it had begun. 
It seems that on the one hand that listeners are better at perceiving and processing certain types of 
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disfluencies than they are others.  Moreover, listeners seem to achieve the same benefits by 
simply having extra time to respond when asked to process disfluent stimuli.  If speakers use 
disfluency as a signal, as suggested by The Strategic-Modelling View, then the speaker must also 
intend to make such a signal.  The next section reviews the psycholinguistic and philosophical 
literature on intention in speech for an understanding of what would be entailed by the notion of 
an ‘intentional disfluency’. 
 
2.3.4 Intention and Speech 
 
Section 2.3.1 distinguished between symptoms, or natural meanings, and signals, or non-
natural.meaning. Part of the difference between symptoms and signals has to do with the 
speaker’s intention in speech: a speaker uses a signal, for example the wave of a hand which 
might otherwise not have its meaning naturally, in a certain circumstance to mean the speaker 
wishes to say good-bye. Speakers use signals intentionally to have the meaning that they have.  
Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 discussed the strategic use of repair and potentially intentional cues to 
disfluency. Each of the repair models presented in Section 2.1 assumes that the speakers are at 
least partially aware of their desire to communicate before they begin the speech production 
process. How do speakers devise these plans and what is known about communicative intention 
in speech production? These questions will be the focus of this section. 
Speakers need not be acutely aware of what they are going to say before they say it, but it is 
generally thought within the linguistic and psychological communities that speakers produce 
utterances to fulfil some goal or purpose (Austin, 1962; Grice, 1957, 1968, 1989; Levelt, 1989; 
Levinson, 1983; Searle, Kiefer, & Bierswich, 1980; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). This particular 
goal or purpose is known as a communicative intention (Clark, 1996; Clark & Carlson, 1982a, 
1982b; Grice, 1957, 1968, 1989). For example, a speaker may wish to ask a question about 
something someone else said; they may wish to tell the other person how to do something or they 
may wish to express a feeling about a particular topic. The intended goal of an utterance is its 
illocutionary force (Austin, 1962). According to Grice, a communicative intention differs from an 
intention to inform (or what Sperber and Wilson call an informative intention). In a 
communicative intention, the speaker’s intention is specifically to have their intention to inform 
recognised, that is a speaker wants the listener to know that the speaker wants the listener to know 
something.  Any utterance that a speaker makes that has an illocutionary force is known as a 
speech act (Austin, 1962).  
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Levelt (1989) proposes that the process of realizing one’s communicative intention occurs 
during the conceptulization phase (see Section 2.1.1) of speech production in a phase known as 
macroplanning. During macroplanning, a speaker breaks the communicative intention into 
individual speech acts. During a second sub-phase of conceptualization known as microplanning, 
a speaker will decide upon all the language-specific requirements necessary for producing various 
speech acts. Once these have been determined, the message is then passed on to the formulator 
for grammatical encoding. Levelt (1989) points out that macroplanning need not have entirely 
finished for an utterance before the phase of microplanning can begin. Thus, intentions should be 
linguistically coded at various parts of an utterance at the same time. 
How do speakers know what a valid sort of communicative intention in speech is? 
Philosophers of language suggest that speakers rely upon mutual knowledge in order to 
communicate (Clark & Carlson, 1982a, 1982b; Schiffer, 1972; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Mutual 
knowledge, according to Schiffer (1972), is an infinite regression of interpersonal knowledge that 
two individuals possess and according to some is required by both speaker and listener in order 
for communication to occur (Clark & Carlson, 1982a, 1982b; Clark & Marshall, 1981). For 
example, suppose Angelina and Bryce were in the same room, seated in front of a television. 
Angelina would know that there is a television in the room because she can see it. Bryce would 
also know that there is a television in the room because he can also see it. Angelina would also 
know that Bryce knows that there is a television in the room because Angelina can see that Bryce 
is watching the television. Likewise, Bryce knows that Angelina knows that Bryce knows that 
there is a television in the room because Bryce can sense that Angelina sees Bryce watching the 
television. The list of possible states of knowledge could go on forever without termination. 
Schiffer, a philosopher, suggested that the infinite regression of knowledge is “perfectly 
harmless” (Smith, 1982). According to Clark and Marshall (1981), the human mind cannot 
process such infinite regression during speech. Furthermore, according to Clark and Carlson, 
there is no need for the infinite regression, and so they suggest that a “mental primitive” exists ‘A 
and B mutually know that p’ and then propose a recursive inference rule, If A and B mutually 
believe that p, then: (a) A and B believe that p and believe that (a) stating that only a few 
iterations (i.e. A must know that B knows that A knows and A knows that B intends for A to 
know) are necessary in order to establish mutual knowledge. By stating that only a few iterations 
are necessary, one removes the infinite regression of possible knowledge states. Given this 
inference rule, speakers can inductively infer the mental primitive p and the mutual belief.  Clark 
and Carlson suggest that mutual beliefs can vary in strength from weak to strong. For example, 
suppose Angelina told Bryce that she wanted to watch ‘ER’ at 10:00pm. At 10:01pm, Bryce is 
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still watching a programme on another channel, giving Angelina a reason to suspect that Bryce 
forgot about Angelina’s desire to watch ‘ER’. Thus, the grounds for mutual belief are weak 
between Angelina and Bryce. 
Clark (1996) suggests that there are actually three representations for mutual knowledge: 
Common Ground-iterated, Common Ground-shared and Common Ground-reflexive.  Clark refers 
to the infinite regress of mutual knowledge, already discussed above, as “Common Ground – 
iterated” or “CG-iterated”.  He suggests that humans cannot possibly rely on this type of mutual 
knowledge because human mental capacity cannot process it (Clark & Marshall, 1981; Clark, 
1996).  Instead, speakers can have CG-shared according to Clark (1996). This idea was first 
proposed by (Lewis, 1969) and was called “common knowledge”:  
 
Common Ground (shared basis)
p is common ground for members of community C if and only if: 
1. every member of C has information that basis b holds; 
2. b indicates to every member of C that every member of C has information that b 
holds; 
3. b indicates to members of C that p. 
 
In the proposition above, C represents any community of at least two people and b represents a 
basis for some piece of common ground that proposition p holds (Clark, 1996, p. 94).  To take an 
example, Angelina and Bryce form a community because they are co-present in the same living 
room and can see the same television set.  Therefore, it is common ground to both Angelina and 
Bryce that there is a television in the room. Once Angelina and Bryce have established CG-
shared, they can derive the third type of mutual knowledge, Common ground (reflexive): 
 
Common Ground (reflexive)
p is common ground for members of community C if and only if: 
(i) the members of C have information that p and that i. (Clark, 1996, p. 95) 
 
Note that this type of common ground is reflexive because it contains a reference to itself via the 
proposition (i).  Clark suggests that CG-reflexive allows individuals to derive the belief that they 
both share the same information. Therefore, Angelina and Bryce can deduce that they both share 
the proposition i that they both share the same proposition p ‘there is a television in the room’. 
Clark concludes that CG-shared is the basic form of mutual knowledge (or common ground as he 
 65
refers to it) and that Sperber and Wilson (1987) were wrong to dismiss it because it is a logically 
acceptable form of mutual knowledge that does not require complicated infinite regression.    
Clark proposes the Principle of Least Effort to suggest that people seek efficiency and 
sufficiency in when they act intentionally.  
 
Principle of Least Effort: All things being equal, agents try to minimize their effort in 
doing what they intend to do. (Clark, 1996, p. 224) 
 
 As a corollary of the Principle of Least Effort, Clark (1996) suggests that mutual knowledge need 
only be good enough for current purposes. He suggests that a speaker seeks information that a 
certain act will achieve completion. This proposition is formalized as: 
 
Principle of Opportunistic Closure: Agents consider an action complete just as soon as 
they have evidence sufficient for current purposes that it is complete (Clark, 1996, p. 224) 
 
When deciding that whether an action will achieve completion, Clark suggests that people seek 
evidence that is “valid, cheap and timely enough for current purposes” 
 (Clark, 1996, p. 224) to indicate that an action will achieve completion. He calls this type of 
evidence Holistic Evidence: 
 
Holistic evidence: Evidence that an agent has succeeded on a whole action is also 
evidence that the agent has succeeded on each of its parts (Clark, 1996, p. 225) 
 
An action, for example calling an elevator to take Clark’s example, can be broken down into 
individual parts.  To call the elevator, a person needs to press either the ‘up’ or ‘down’ button.  If 
the button is working properly, it will usually light up and thus provide evidence that the elevator 
has been summoned and is on its way to collect the person. This is evidence that the action of 
summoning an elevator will achieve closure.  If the light is not functioning properly, it won’t light 
up and the person may continue to press the button because people need closure on events.  If the 
elevator arrives or the light does light up, the person can use this as holistic evidence that the 
action has succeeded. This means that the person does not need to verify each of the individual 
actions involved in pressing the button (i.e. extending one’s arm, extending one’s finger, feeling 
the button depress underneath one’s finger, etc.) because the light has turned on or the elevator 
arrived. 
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Above I explained Clark’s proposal for individual actions.  Clark makes the same assumptions 
about individuals behaving in joint actions like conversation: 
 
Principle of Joint Closure: The participants in a joint action try to establish the 
mutual belief that they have succeeded well enough for current purposes. (Clark, 1996, p. 
226) 
 
According to the Principle of Least Collaborative Effort described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 
individuals will pursue the easiest and cheapest method possible in order to complete an event.  In 
conversation, people will look for signs of uptake from their listener that what they have said has 
been understood or accepted.  For this reason, conversations tend to be broken down into local 
projects or adjacency pairs (Clark, 1996; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973). To take Clark’s example:  
 
Adjacency Pairs Example       
1. Summons  Jane:  (rings Kate on the telephone) 
2. Response  Kate: Miss Pink’s office – 
1. Greetings            Hello 
2. Greetings  Jane: Hello 
1. Question           Is Miss Pink in? 
2. Reply  Kate: Well, she’s in but she’s engaged at the moment 
 
By breaking down joint actions like conversation down into two parts, Clark suggests that people 
solve problems in an efficient manner.  The first part of an adjacency pair is usually a signal of 
some type (e.g. Jane ringing Kate’s telephone) and requires uptake of some sort in the second part 
(e.g. Kate answering the telephone).  Clark suggests that people engaged in conversation can use 
communicative acts to fulfil two purposes: 1) simple communicative acts tied to the official 
subject of the conversation and 2) meta-communicative acts which are acts about the 
communicative acts at hand.  To take an example: 
 
Utterance  Communicative Act  Meta-communicative Act
A: it was uh it was a 1. [I assert] it was a lovely 1. [Do you understand this?] 
lovely day  day 
B: yes   2. [I ratify your assertion] 2. yes [I understand that] 
(Clark, 1996, p. 243). 
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In the example above, B says yes not because B is agreeing that Yes, it was a lovely day but 
because B wants to show that she understands what A means by his assertion that it was a lovely 
day. Thus, we have an example of a joint action in conversation.   
Notice that A was disfluent in his assertion it was uh …it was a lovely day. Clark proposes 
that disfluencies, silent pauses and filled pauses can be considered “signals” of the meta-
communicative sort.  Smith and Clark (1993) and Clark and Fox Tree (2002) have suggested that 
speakers choose to say uh when they expect a short delay and um when they anticipate a longer 
delay.  A filled pause is in this way a signal to the listener about how long the speaker expects to 
delay.  A speaker is also sending a signal when they suspend their utterance according to Clark. 
 
“The logic here is based on a principle of choice: Whenever speakers have more than one 
option for part of a signal and choose one of the options, they must mean something by 
that choice, and the choice is a signal. By this logic, [a] word-cut off is a signal: Speakers 
could have chosen to complete the word as formulated. To cut it off is to signal they have 
changed their minds about it.” (Clark, 1996, p. 261). 
 
In the example above, A repeats it was after the suspension and the filled pause. Clark and 
Wasow (1998) suggest that the choice to repeat it was is a meta-communicative act.  According to 
the Commit-and-Repeat Strategy proposed by Clark and Wasow and described previously in 
Chapter 1, a speaker chooses to repeat portions of an utterance in order to maintain a continuous 
utterance that will assist the listener.  In this way, a disfluency can be an intentional signal 
according to Clark and colleagues.  In order for disfluency to be a signal, however, there must be 
mutual knowledge that it is a signal, speaker and listener must be working jointly towards a 
common goal in the most efficient manner possible as described above. 
According to a number of critics, however, mutual knowledge need not necessarily exist 
(Johnson-Laird, 1982a; Sperber & Wilson, 1995) and certainly couldn’t be used reliably by 
speakers and listeners to comprehend a communicative intention. In order for a speaker to 
communicate an intention, he or she needs not only to communicate the simple information in the 
intention It’s cold in here but also what is intended by uttering the sentence in the current context 
(It’s cold in here because the window is open so I really want you to close the window).  In order 
to derive the intended inference, a listener needs to derive an infinite set of assumptions before he 
can know for certain that the speaker wants the window closed, to use the previous example. It is 
of course possible that the listener could derive a different assumption given the utterance It’s 
cold in here. Say for example that the listener knows that the speaker chose to spend the winter 
conducting global warming research in Antarctica. The statement It’s cold in here given the 
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current context and previous knowledge may strike the listener as rather ironic and that compared 
with Antarctica the room is not cold. For the reasons illustrated by the previous example, 
psychologists like Johnson-Laird suggest that there is no way a listener could generate all the 
possible assumptions, and since a listener never needs to generate all assumptions, mutual 
knowledge cannot exist (Johnson-Laird, 1982, pg. 41; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Therefore, 
mutual knowledge is not required for communication as Clark and Carlson (1982a) suggest 
(Johnson-Laird, 1982a, 1982b, 1983), nor can it be relied upon because it is always possible that a 
listener could infer an assumption which the speaker did not intend.  
Sperber and Wilson (1995) propose an alternative to mutual knowledge. They suggest that 
although all human beings exist in the same world, perceptual abilities differ from person to 
person, concepts may differ between cultural and linguistic groups and each person has different 
experiences and memories of those experiences from which to drawn upon during interaction 
with another person. Thus, even though people share the same physical world, their cognitive 
environments differ (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). A cognitive environment is defined as the entire 
set of facts that are manifest to an individual (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 39). They define the 
concept of manifest thus: 
 
([1])   A fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at 
that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or 
probably true. 
 
For something to be manifest, a person only has to be able to perceive or infer it.  In the event that 
two individuals share the same cognitive environment, and the same facts of that environment are 
said to be manifest to both of them, then those facts can be said to be mutually manifest.  
As the reader may observe, the concept of manifestness is similar to but weaker than the 
concept of mutual knowledge. Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue that “it is weaker in just the right 
way” (p.43). Firstly, the concept of mutual knowledge was rejected because it was 
psychologically and cognitively implausible: there is no way the human mind can process the 
infinite regression necessary to say that something, a communicative intention say, is truly 
mutually known. Mutual manifestness does not have this problem because it makes claims only 
about the cognitive environment, not about cognitive processes (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). 
Secondly, if humans really did possess true mutual knowledge, there would be no explanation for 
why misunderstandings and misinterpretations occur at such a frequent rate. Mutual manifestness 
abandons the need to be infallible and correctly predicts that misunderstandings should and will 
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occur naturally during interaction (Sperber &Wilson, 1995).  
This section has examined in brief the philosophical, cognitive and psychological perspectives 
on intention in speech production. For a full appreciation of the debate in the field, see Smith 
(1982) and a peer-reviewed commentary in The Behavioural and Brain Sciences (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1987) .   
Why discuss the issue of mutual knowledge or mutual manifestness in a thesis about 
disfluency in dialogue? Since the Strategic-Modelling view, largely proposed by Clark and 
colleagues, outlined at the beginning of this thesis argues that speakers use disfluency in an 
intentional way, they are in a sense proposing that a disfluency is akin to a special sort of speech 
act. Clark (1996) and Fox Tree and Clark (1997) certainly suggest that a listener will have access 
to enough mutual knowledge to be able to derive the speaker’s intended meaning when the 
speaker utters thee….uh the. If mutual knowledge does involve this indefinite regression of states 
as Schiffer (1972) proposed, then much explanation is necessary by proponents of mutual 
knowledge to explain how a speaker is capable of planning the intention first and foremost in a 
rapid disfluency and secondly in normal fluent speech. I would tend to argue that the predictions 
of Sperber and Wilson are closer to the mark: cognitive environments can be mutually manifest 
where interlocutors have access to information about these environments but that this information 
is not required for planning in speech production.  
In his studies of dialogue, Clark infers that his speakers are using disfluency in an intentional 
manner and furthermore, he infers the intentions of his speakers. Likewise, Sperber and Wilson 
do not explain how one could test empirically whether something is mutually manifest, therefore 
making it as intractable to the experimental purpose of this thesis as testing intentionality.  
Brennan and Schober (2003) suggest that a speaker’s intentions are best reached by conducting 
online experiments where the experimenter performs a role.  For this reason, I will investigate the 
function of disfluencies by first constraining the possible intentions that a speaker could have had 
by asking them to participate in an online experiment.  Later, I will contrast the possible functions 
of structural disfluency types when speakers face different levels of difficulty and are more 
motivated to perform well. 
To summarise this section, Strategic-Modelling View proposes that speakers employ 
disfluencies as intentional signals when they encounter difficulty in speech production and that 
listeners are capable of detecting and correctly processing these disfluencies.  Section 2.3.2 
showed how speech technologists typically employ a number of criteria in order to detect 
disfluencies.  In terms of prosodic cues to disfluency, section 2.3.2 reviewed that some prosodic 
cues are not used only to signal disfluent speech but also fluent speech.  Section 2.3.3 showed that 
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listeners are capable of detecting a disfluency once it has begun. In terms of processing 
disfluency, a number of studies have shown that a listener may simply benefit from extra time 
presented when a speaker pauses or is disfluent and not necessarily a phonological signal in the 
um or uh. Finally, Section 2.3.4 discussed intentionality and what is denoted by this notion in 
dialogue: in order for something to be an intentional signal, interlocutors must be engaged in a 
joint action in which they pursue joint closure. The speaker must design the disfluency according 
to his or her model of the listener and the listener must understand the meta-communicative intent 
of the disfluency.  In the next section, I will review the Cognitive Burden View which argues that 
Strategic-Modelling View is unnecessarily demanding on what is required in dialogue. 
 
2.3.5 Cognitive Burden View 
 
The Strategic-Modelling account states that speech production is taxing but asserts that 
speakers are still capable of using disfluencies as signals of difficulty to the listener. The 
Cognitive Burden view states that speech production is cognitively burdensome and as a result of 
this, speakers are unable to model the listener throughout the entire dialogue so a disfluency is an 
actual error, not an intentional signal. According to the Cognitive Burden view, a speaker not 
only has to decide what needs to be said, he must also plan the utterance in a syntactically correct 
way whilst attending to what the listener is likely to need to know. Because speech production is 
such a complicated process, Brown and Dell (1987) argue, the production system apportions its 
resources to avoid over-burdening itself. The Dual-Process Hypothesis distinguishes between 
costly and inexpensive production processes: low cost processes include the sort of rapid response 
processes like priming whilst more costly processes cover the slower processes like reasoning.  
Listener modelling is thought of as particularly taxing because the speaker must constantly update 
the listener’s model (Bard & Aylett, 2001). For example, a speaker might need to keep track of 
what the listener can see, hear or otherwise has access to during a conversation and keep this in 
mind when designing his utterance. For this reason Keysar et al. (2000), Barr and Keysar (2002) 
and Bard and Aylett (2001) argue that listener-modelling is a cognitively taxing process.  It puts 
an additional and possibly unnecessary burden on the production system. Rather, the amount of 
modelling between listener and speaker that occurs during conversation depends on the available 
resources (Brown & Dell, 1987).  Moreover, as Bard and Aylett (2001) and Barr and Keysar 
(2002) argue, speakers may not even need to model their listeners in order to have a successful 
dialogue. Basic set-theory logic guarantees that mutual knowledge in dialogue is also knowledge 
 71
that the speaker alone knows (Barr & Keysar, 2002).  It could then be the case that speakers often 
formulate referring expressions on the basis of purely egocentric knowledge and hence do not 
need to utilise a listener model at all according to the Dual Process Hypothesis of Bard and Aylett 
(2001).   
Collaborative theories of discourse wishing to prove the importance of mutual knowledge 
should also show that there are occasions on which speakers refrain from using knowledge that is 
not mutual (Barr & Keysar, 2002).  By so doing, one proves that the speaker relies exclusively on 
mutual knowledge. Furthermore, a collaborative theory of dialogue should also examine listener 
expectation, as Barr and Keysar set out to do in a series of experiments involving referring 
expressions and their linguistic precedents. Listeners depended on linguistic precedents, or 
established forms of reference more often when the entity was either unmentioned or 
unconventional; such a result argues that listeners relied upon a precedent only because it was 
available.  One could hypothesize from this that listeners resort to mutual knowledge only in 
periods of difficulty (Pickering & Garrod, 2004).  
In an experiment that tested partner specificity (i.e. a listener’s expectation that the speaker 
will use a referent if that referent is shared knowledge), speaker identity (i.e. whether their 
presence was strongly determined or entirely independent) and partner-independence in a 
referential communication task, Barr and Keysar (2002) found strong evidence that speakers do 
not rely on partner specificity as previously claimed by Brennan and Clark (1996). As with the 
Brennan and Clark experiment, participants in Barr and Keysar’s experiment, i.e. Matchers were 
asked to move objects in an array around until the array matched that of their (confederate) 
partner, the Director.  Barr and Keysar show that although Matchers are able to retrieve 
conceptual pacts established with a partner, they did not rely on this knowledge to establish the 
referent.  Listeners heard instructions from two confederate directors, one Director who arrived 
on time and began the experiment and a second Director who the listener was led to believe had 
arrived late.  Matchers were shown to expect linguistic precedents by fixating on the target object 
when the Director used a precedent (e.g. carnation) even when the listener was looking at basic-
level objects (e.g. a car and a flower). This suggests that listeners expected precedents regardless 
of whether they had shared knowledge with the speaker and even when mention of such a 
precedent was over-informative. This suggests that contrary to the results obtained by Brennan 
and Clark (1996), there is no evidence that linguistic precedents were used in a partner-specific 
manner (Barr & Keysar, 2002; Pickering & Garrod, 2004).   Participation in a dialogue does not 
ipso facto prove there should be less reliance on egocentric knowledge.  One cannot deduce 
simply because speakers interact with their listeners that they therefore depend upon the 
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collaborative representation without with the conversation is doomed to failure.  
In a later experiment, Metzing and Brennan (2003) argue that Barr and Keysar (2002) failed to 
test the condition most likely to determine whether listeners retain partner-specific information.  
Metzing and Brennan tested what happened when the Director abandoned a conceptual pact in 
preference of a new referent. Their results show that listeners were slower to process new 
referents if the speaker had first abandoned a conceptual pact in the process of mentioning the 
new referent. Metzing and Brennan (2003) argue that this is strong evidence that listeners employ 
partner-specific information. 
Bard, Anderson, Chen, Nicholson, and Havard (2004) report the results of the MONITOR 
Project, explained in further detail in Chapter 3.  Subjects in the MONITOR Project participated 
in a map task experiment in which they received either visual, verbal or both visual and verbal 
feedback from a confederate listener.  No feedback trials were used as controls.  If speakers do 
design utterances according to audience design, then one would expect a speaker to attend to the 
listener’s feedback at all times especially if feedback indicated that the listener had difficulties. 
The MONITOR Project simulated this situation by providing sequences of visually ‘correct’ or 
on-route and ‘wrong’ or divergent feedback.  Positive and negative verbal feedback was also 
provided. A record of the speaker’s genuine gaze at the visual feedback was kept. Bard et al. 
observed that speakers did not pay direct attention to their listeners who showed signs of 
difficulty.  Instead, speakers tended to gaze at what was easiest for them: the correct feedback 
which they would have to look at anyway because the feedback hovered over the next landmark 
on the route. Speakers attended more often when negative verbal feedback indicated that the 
listener required assistance.  On the basis of these results, Bard et al. conclude that speakers 
seemed to operate on the principle of joint responsibility (Carletta & Mellish, 1996; Clark & 
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986).  According to this view, interlocutors in dialogue share the responsibility 
for communicating in an effective manner. It is not solely the responsibility of the speaker to 
assist the listener; the listener must also reveal their need for help in a salient manner. 
Bard and Aylett (2001) ask whether referring expressions and articulation cater to the 
knowledge of the listener by manipulating the ‘givenness’ of knowledge in a Map Task 
experiment, or whether the speaker or listener had encountered the object earlier. ‘Newness’ is 
used to describe entities that are novel to at least one interlocutor.  Previous research has shown 
that both the syntactic and articulatory form of a referring expression simplify over time (Ariel, 
1990; Bard et al., 2000; Bard et al., 2000; Gundel et al., 1993). In four experiments, Bard and 
Aylett controlled for the givenness of particular landmarks on a map.  Either both the speaker and 
the listener have said, seen and heard a mention of a particular entity or some one of them lacks 
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some part of that knowledge.  Word duration, a concomitant of articulatory precision, suggests 
that a listener model is not consulted: the amount of reduction on repeated mention depended only 
on what the speaker had heard. However, referential form results demonstrate evidence of listener 
modelling: referring expressions failed to simplify during mention to new listeners even though 
the referent was given for the speaker, unlike word duration which did reduce on repetition even 
if the listener was new. Bell et al. (2003) found that reduction of word duration could be affected 
by utterance position, predictability of the word and whether the word was disfluent or not. 
Horton and Gerrig (1996) argue that listener modelling does not occur simultaneously with 
utterance planning, a process they call ‘Initial Design’ but rather during the monitoring phase 
when speakers assess whether the utterance was correct. This process is termed the ‘Monitoring 
and Adjustment Model’ by Horton and Gerrig (1996). Support was found for this model in 
experiments testing whether speakers referred to objects (for example, picture cards with different 
sized circles on them) in a different manner when speakers and listeners either shared or did not 
share a context (i.e. had privileged contexts) for the object (Horton & Keysar, 1996).  For 
example, in a shared condition, the speaker would describe a picture card with two circles on it, 
where the smaller circle was above the larger circle. In a ‘privileged’ condition, the listener would 
only see one of the circles and not be able to determine the referent “small circle” in this instance. 
Results showed speakers who had no time-limit relied more on the shared context in planning 
their utterances; speakers who were under time-pressure, however, relied on both the shared and 
the privileged contexts to the same degree. As Horton and Gerrig argue the Initial Design or 
Monitor and Adjust Model both account for this data. The Initial Design Model would argue that 
speakers designed their utterances to consider the common ground and thus rely on the context 
more when it was shared rather than privileged. The Monitor and Adjust Model would describe 
these data by arguing that common ground is used only when monitoring and correction have 
occurred. The Monitor and Adjust Model is attested only as an effect of the time-limited case, 
however, while the Initial Design Model argues that time-pressure should not matter.  Thus, 
Horton and Gerrig (1996) conclude that the Monitoring and Adjustment Model makes the best 
predictions and that speakers working under a time-limit treated the shared versus the privileged 
contexts equally because their initial utterance plan did not take common ground into account; 
common ground was brought to bear only later, during the monitoring process. 
The Initial Design Model predicts that speakers access a listener model when designing 
utterances for an audience. This contrasts with the Monitoring and Adjustment Model which says 
that listener modelling is a cognitively costly process and provides convincing evidence to show 
that speakers are not necessarily modelling their listeners, although it may appear that they are. 
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So, the Initial Design Model predicts that speakers rely on a model of the listener and the 
Monitoring and Adjustment Model predicts that they do not. Although not entirely the same, the 
Strategic-Modelling view has similarities with the Initial Design Model in that both suggest that 
speakers rely on a model of the listener during speech production. The Initial Design Model 
differs from the Strategic-Modelling view in that the Initial Design Model makes no predictions 
about whether speakers use disfluencies as strategic signals. Likewise, the Cognitive Burden view 
has similarities with the Monitoring and Adjust Model: both models predict that speakers only 
rely on common ground knowledge in order to make corrections.  The strong version of the 
Cognitive Burden view differs from the Monitoring and Adjust Model by making a more strigent 
claim that speakers never need to rely on listener knowledge during collaboration because 
anything that is deemed common ground is also known only to the speaker (Barr & Keysar, 
2002). 
Horton and Gerrig (1996) raise an interesting point: it may appear as though the speaker is 
modelling the listener when in fact he or she really is not. I propose to address this issue in this 
thesis by comparing the predictions of the Strategic-Modelling view where speakers gaze at a 
listener throughout a dialogue whilst also planning pertinent utterances that cater to the listener’s 
needs with the predictions of the Cognitive-Burden Hypothesis which suggests that glances at a 
listener’s feedback will be tempered by the availability of cognitive resources and that difficulty 
will arise when these resources are not available.  
 
2.3.6 Disfluency as Difficulty 
 
Section 2.3.5 outlined the hypotheses of the Cognitive Burden View.  According to this view, 
a speaker does not need to rely on a model of the listener at any point because the speaker has his 
or her own model of the conversation.  Furthermore, modelling a listener during a conversation is 
a taxing, burdensome process for the speaker who is also engaged in language production.  I have 
shown in section 2.3.1 that the Strategic-Modelling View proposes that disfluency is a signal to a 
listener.  In contrast to this position, the Cognitive Burden View argues that disfluency is an 
indication of difficulty.  This section will review the literature which supports the disfluency as 
difficulty view. 
Bard et al. (2001) conducted an empirical observation on data from the HCRC Map Task 
corpus to determine whether disfluency was induced by difficulty.  As measures of difficulty, 
Bard et al. analysed task difficulty, interpersonal factors, order effects and effects such as length 
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and the number of referring expressions from the prior utterance and effects of the current move 
(i.e. length, number of referring expressions, and proximity to the nearest conversational 
boundary).  Their dependent variable was the number of disfluencies per Conversational Move.  
A Conversational Move is a sub-goal of the dialogue, i.e. an instruction, question or reply (see 
Carletta et al., 1997). Bard et al. predict that if disfluency is affected by difficulty, then there 
should be noticeable similarities between Inter-Move Interval (IMI), or the time between the 
offset of the speaker’s utterance and the other speaker’s reply, and disfluency. Bard et al. (2000) 
found that IMI tended to be longer earlier in the dialogue or at the beginning of an utterance when 
the speaker had a greater planning burden.  IMI can also be affected by interpersonal factors like 
the amount of familiarity between speakers or whether they can make eye contact. Bard et al. 
found that disfluency behaved quite differently from IMI: a multiple regression analysis revealed 
that disfluency was only affected by production processes such as length of the Move, referential 
complexity and the conversational role in the dialogue. Previous research by Clark and Wasow 
(1998) and Oviatt (1995) also observed higher disfluency rates in longer utterances. Unlike IMI, 
disfluency was not affected by interpersonal factors. Somewhat surprisingly task difficulty (i.e. 
IMI) was not a significant predictor of disfluency. Bard et al. suggest that perhaps this indicates 
“a separation rather than sharing of processes” (Bard et al., 2001, p. 100).  
Oviatt (1995) compared two measures of task difficulty to determine whether disfluency was 
associated with planning difficulty. The first measure was the length of the utterance in words. 
The second measure was the structure of the task: subjects received either a constrained task, in 
which the speaker had relatively little to prepare or an unconstrained task, in which the speaker 
had to plan more of their utterance. In the constrained task, the speaker saw a screen which gave 
them detailed instructions about what to say or do. It was predicted that more disfluencies would 
occur in the unconstrained task and that disfluency would be an indicator of difficulty. Results 
showed that utterance length was a clear predictor of disfluency: 77% of the variance for the rate 
of disfluencies could be predicted simply by knowing the utterance length. Oviatt controlled for 
utterance length when determining whether task format (constrained vs. unconstrained) was a 
predictor. She found that even with the control for length, disfluencies were more common in the 
unconstrained task format. In fact, 70% of disfluencies could be avoided simply by asking 
subjects to use a constrained task format. Thus, length of an utterance and asking a speaker to 
speak extemporaneously seem to be clear predictors of disfluency. 
Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 found that according to the Strategic-Modelling view disfluency can be 
indicative of a speaker’s intention to signal commitment to the listener.  In this section, I reported 
results which support the Cognitive Burden View to suggest that disfluency is an indication of 
 76
difficulty and cognitive load.  These issues are at the very heart of this thesis. Can disfluency 
fulfil both of these roles at once? In the next section, I will outline proposals for a middle ground 
and how disfluency would be expected to pattern according to this view. In subsequent chapters, I 
will test these predictions and describe the results and implications. 
 
2.3.7 Can there be a Middle Ground? 
 
In this section, I have reviewed the literature on two theories of collaborative dialogue, the 
Strategic-Modelling and the Cognitive Burden Views.  These views present opposing ideas 
regarding the nature of the speaker’s responsibilities and capabilities during a dialogue. The 
strong version of the Strategic-Modelling View argues that speakers design even disfluencies as 
strategic signals for their listeners by referring to a listener model while the Cognitive Burden 
View suggests that speakers do not need to rely on a listener model nor are they always 
cognitively capable of doing so during dialogue.  In their review of these theories, Schober and 
Brennan (2003) present a middle ground between two extremes, entirely altruistic modelling on 
the one hand and purely egocentric motivation on the other.  
 
“The evidence so far suggests that adaptation doesn’t seem to be an all-or-nothing 
phenomenon at any level: people can be shown to adapt under some circumstances 
and not to adapt under others at virtually every level of language use –from higher 
discourse-level functions to articulation. Thus we propose, the more fruitful 
research agenda is to explore the factors that affect conversationalists’ adaptations 
in particular circumstances – the sorts of tasks, individual ability differences, 
discourse goals, and so on that affect when and how partners can adapt to each 
other.” (Schober & Brennan, 2003, p. 155) 
 
Furthermore, Brennan and Schober (2003) argue that in order to observe dialogue in its natural 
state one must conduct online experimental investigations, rather than simply relying on instances 
from a corpus of spontaneous speech. The reasoning behind this suggestion is that a researcher is 
like a third-party listener on any pre-recorded corpus conversation and will not have access to a 
speaker’s intentions. A task-oriented experiment with a map to traverse or a parking lot to park in 
constrains the possible intentions that a speaker might have had and the pertinent facts that a 
speaker might know, making them more readily accessible to the experimenter. Of course, the 
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experimenter can never be entirely certain of a speaker’s intentions, since they are known only to 
the speaker. Furthermore, the experimenter cannot be sure that the same speaker would behave 
the same way unobserved but the experimenter can still assume that the speaker was using his or 
her normal language faculty when he or she participated in the experiment.   
Chapter 1 and Section 2.3.1 explained the notion of audience design (Brennan & Lockridge, 
2004; Clark, 1994; Clark & Carlson, 1982a, 1982b; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Clark & Wasow, 
1998; Schober & Brennan, 2003).  Studies of audience design, or the process of formulating a 
particular utterance on the basis of mutual knowledge (Brennan, 2004; Clark, 1996; Schober & 
Brennan, 2003), suggest that speakers and listeners have a joint responsibility for achieving a 
successful conversation. Joint responsibility means that each participant has different but equally 
important roles to play during the conversation (Carletta & Mellish, 1996). The speaker is not 
solely responsible for modelling the listener and adjusting his or her utterance contributions to the 
knowledge of the listener. Instead, it is the responsibility of the listener to indicate his or her 
knowledge and needs for clarification. Joint responsibility comes close to the Principle of 
Optimal Design (Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983) and the Principle of Least Collaborative 
Effort (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), which suggest that partners in dialogue should find the 
most cost-efficient means of collaborating. In a map task dialogue, for example, it would be the 
responsibility of the speaker to communicate the route instructions in an understable fashion 
according to the common ground. The listener’s responsibility, on the other hand, is to indicate 
when the instructions don’t make sense or to ask for further clarification. 
Pickering and Garrod (2004) proposed a model of interactive alignment for collaborative 
dialogue. This model is another possible Middle ground view of collaborative dialogue. 
According to this view, a speaker is thought to use a situation model, a model of the listener and 
his knowledge of the common ground when attempting to align with his ‘audience’ or listener; 
any time a speaker does this, he is said to be participating in audience design. Speakers are said to 
align with another when both speakers have the same representation at some linguistic level.  
During a dialogue, a speaker is proposed to have access to a ‘situation model’, or a representation 
of the interaction which encodes space, time, causality, intentionality, and reference to the main 
individuals or objects that are discussed (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Sanford & Garrod, 1981; van Dijk 
& Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998).  The term ‘situation model’ has also been 
described for Semantics by Barwise & Cooper (1991) and Cooper (1992).  Pickering and Garrod 
define ‘interactive alignment’ as alignment which is brought about in dialogue as the result of two 
speakers providing verbal feedback in an attempt to communicate effectively.  Pickering and 
Garrod (2004) propose that during the course of a successful dialogue, speakers will develop 
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aligned situation models, but that by no means is a fully aligned model necessary for 
communication to occur. Nor is feedback always necessary because alignment processes are 
automatic. Horton and Gerrig (1996) found that speakers and listeners do not always attend to 
information presented in feedback. Instead, speakers rely on their own knowledge of the situation. 
The main thrust of Pickering and Garrod’s paper is to argue in favour of an interactive model of 
discourse processing in which speakers align with one another on a number of different levels of 
linguistic knowledge.  
Pickering and Garrod (2004) argue that because speakers develop aligned situation models, 
there is no need for the speaker to ‘model the listener’ during dialogue. Previous research by 
Bock (1986) and Levelt and Kelter (1982) found that speakers show evidence of priming in 
monologue.  Bock (1986) showed evidence of syntactic priming in monologue in an experimental 
setting. Levelt and Kelter (1982) found that when speakers were asked What time do you close? 
in Dutch, they tended to reply with a congruent answer like Five o’clock. Similarly, when they 
were asked At what time do you close? speakers preferred to respond At five o’clock. As evidence 
for their claim that speakers interactively align with one another on a number of linguistic levels, 
Pickering and Garrod cite Branigan, Pickering, and Cleland (2000), as having shown that there is 
clear evidence for syntactic priming or alignment on a syntactic level during dialogue.  Speakers 
consistently responded with appropriately matched syntactic constructions to a confederate 
speaker’s initial description during a picture matching task (Branigan et al., 2000).  Subjects were 
shown a card with a picture of a robber and a ballerina in which the robber was handing a banana 
to the ballerina.  English syntax permits two constructions to describe this action: either The 
robber handing a banana to the ballerina or The robber handing the ballerina a banana. A 
confederate participant presented one of these constructions to the naïve participant (The robber 
handing a ballerina a banana). Branigan et al. found that the naïve participants could be ‘primed’ 
to describe a subsequent card to their partner using the same syntactic construction that they had 
just heard (i.e. The police officer handing the dog a horse).  Pickering and Garrod cite this as 
evidence that interlocutors align on a syntactic level with their partners. 
Alignment also occurs on an articulatory level, as evidenced by Bard et al.’s (2000) study of 
repeated mentions of referring expressions.  Though it is common for articulation to be reduced 
during second mention as shown by Fowler and Housum (1987), Bard et al. (2000) demonstrated 
that the amount of articulatory reduction was as acute whether the original speaker or the 
conversational partner a uttered the expression a second time. This evidence argues directly for a 
‘middle ground’ between the extremes of Strategic-Modelling and the Cognitive Burden View. 
As previously discussed (Section 2.3.1) interlocutors engaged in a dialogue to establish 
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referring expressions, perspectives and a common ground in order to be sure that they are 
working towards a mutual understanding (Barr & Keysar, 2002; Brennan & Clark, 1996).  
However, it is less clear what sort of activity replaces interaction in monologue and what, if such 
a thing exists, the nature of the speaker’s addressee model is like.  As Barr and Keysar (2002) 
argue, it is not guaranteed that interaction in dialogue is an essential prerequisite.  
Section 2.3.1 described the importance of common ground with respect to intentionality. The 
notion of common ground is also a crucial part of determining the differences between dialogue 
and monologue.  In dialogue, one goal might ostensibly be to agree on what constitutes the 
common ground and model the amendments to this common ground over time. The goals of a 
monologue might simply be to inform an unknown audience (listening at an unknown time) about 
a particular state of being or topic.  The goals of the separate speech modalities (i.e. dialogue and 
monologue) differ as do the method by which the goals are processed.  A monologue speaker 
does not need to (in fact, cannot in some cases) respond to visual and verbal feedback from any 
members of the audience whereas a speaker engaged in a dialogue has this opportunity. Pickering 
and Garrod (2004) differentiate these goals from the goals of a dialogue speaker.  Instead, the 
monologue speaker is forced to devise her production plan based on what knowledge she believes 
her audience to hold.  Schober (1993) asked subjects to describe a spatial arrangement to an 
imaginary listener and that they could do anything necessary to get the task done. They were told 
nothing else about their imaginary listener. Evidence from Schober (1993) suggests that 
monologue speakers were more likely to take a listener’s spatial perspective than they were their 
own frame of reference.  However, this might be an artefact of Schober’s experimental task: 
speakers were always told the spatial orientation of an imaginary listener and therefore had 
something specific to crosscheck against.  It is as yet unclear what perspective a speaker without 
such specific listener information would take during a monologue.  
Pickering and Garrod (2004) argue for an interactive dialogue account partially on the basis 
that when alignment of situation models does not occur, there is a frequent occurrence of 
repetition speech repairs.  Instead of constantly modelling a listener at a high production cost, a 
notion presented as controversial in Section 2.3.6, speakers refer to a listener model only when 
the speaker suspects a misunderstanding.  This is done in two stages: first the interlocutor checks 
to see whether the input matches his or her own representation and second, if this check fails, the 
interlocutor will reformulate the utterance in order to re-establish the common ground (Pickering 
& Garrod, 2004).  The same process is argued to occur when the interlocutor is checking for 
whether incoming information is new or given.  Pickering and Garrod propose that repairs of 
unaligned representations commence when the speaker checks the other interlocutor’s 
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understanding of the discourse and continue with a modification of the original utterance.  
Interactive alignment in dialogue is crucial at the point of the greatest difficulty and quite possibly 
worth the production costs.  Schegloff et al. (1977) have proposed a similar notion as previously 
mentioned in Section 2.1.1.   According to this view, either a speaker or a listener can initiate a 
repair but typically self-repair is the preferred method for both speakers and listeners because it 
requires fewer turns to complete and therefore less work by both participants. 
In this sense, the Interactive Model of Alignment and the view of Joint Responsibility propose 
similar predictions as far as disfluencies are concerned. According to the Interactive Alignment 
Model, disfluency is symptomatic of an unaligned dialogue. By being disfluent, the speaker is 
fulfilling their responsibility to re-align and redirect the collaboration. Since these views make the 
same prediction for disfluencies, there is no need to test between them. I will henceforth refer to 
this notion at the Middle Ground view of disfluency.  
The Middle Ground view of disfluency differs in some respects from the Cognitive Burden 
view in that the Cognitive Burden view suggests that disfluency implies the speaker encountered 
difficulty and an error occurred as a result. On the other hand, the two views make similar 
predictions in that neither predicts that disfluency is under the intentional control of the speaker. 
In this respect, the Cognitive Burden and Middle Ground view make similar predictions. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to test between all three models, namely the Strategic-Modelling, 
Cognitive Burden and the Middle Ground views. Rather, one can test between the Strategic-
Modelling view and the Cognitive Burden view by devising a collaborative experiment that 
makes it possible to analyse the functions that structural disfluencies play during dialogue. If the 
speaker uses disfluency in a signalling function, then there is support for the Strategic-Modelling 
view. If the speaker uses disfluency during periods of difficulty, then this could be an indication 
of cognitive burden overload. If neither or both of these scenarios eventuate, the one has support 
for a view somewhere in the middle of these two views.  
In order to determine the function of disfluency, the experimental paradigm must be as 
controlled and yet as interactive as possible. By incorporating eye-gaze tracking technology into 
the paradigm one has a time-stamped record of the speaker’s gaze which can be cross-referenced 
with the speech record. The focus of the next section will be to review the findings of 
collaborative dialogue and eye-gaze experimentation. 
 
2.4 Collaborative Dialogue and Eye-Gaze 
 
Apart from the words and silences that occur during a dialogue, interlocutors have other 
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sensory tools which they can use to learn things about their other interlocutor and the world 
around them. One such tool is eye-gaze. This section will review what is known about the use of 
eye-gaze in collaborative dialogue experiments. For a complete review of the state of language 
production and gaze research, consult Griffin (2004). 
 With the advent of eye-tracking technology a number of psycholinguistic studies have been 
run which tend to show that people tend to gaze at the objects they talk about (Griffin, 2004; 
Meyer, Sleiderink & Levelt, 1998) or consider talking about (Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, 
Sedivy, & Tanenhaus, 1995; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard & Sedivy, 1995). 
Moreover, gaze is a powerful social tool since people have been shown to be sensitive to the 
direction of another person’s gaze (Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000) and tends to take this as 
evidence of what the other person is thinking about (e.g. Goodwin, 1981).  
Typically, psycholinguistic studies have employed the eye-tracking techniques in studies 
known as the ‘visual world paradigm’. The visual world paradigm typically involves an array of 
ordinary objects placed in a grid and an eye-tracker which keeps a record of the participant’s 
gaze. The visual world paradigm has been used to study the form of referring expressions 
(Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, In Press; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 
1995), and object naming (Griffin, 2005; Griffin & Bock, 2000).  In studies of dialogue, the 
visual world paradigm has been used to test theories of common knowledge and audience design 
(Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, In Press). Dialogue studies involve 2 interlocutors, a Director and 
a Matcher, whose goal it is to move the objects to different locations in the grid. Typically, one or 
more items may be visible only to the Director of the task.  
According to the Monitoring and Adjustment view put forth by Keysar, Barr, and colleagues, 
speakers are egocentric from time to time when planning a referring expression in a dialogue with 
another individual (Hanna, Tannenhaus, & Trueswell, 2004; Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar, 
Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000). Evidence from face-to-face conversations suggests that speakers 
avert their gaze when engaged in cognitively taxing processes (Glenberg, Schroeder, & 
Robertson, 1998). Further research by Keysar et al. (2000) used the visual world paradigm in a 
referential communication task where the subject had to retrieve a named object. Speakers gazed 
at privileged objects visible only to them when considering possible references made by other 
participants.  Occasionally, participants even grabbed for an occluded object, thus committing an 
error. Keysar et al. (2000) suggest that while there is a cost associated with taking the egocentric 
perspective (because this sometimes led participants to grab the wrong and occluded referent), 
there is also a cognitive cost associated with using mutual knowledge. Thus, there was a trade-off 
between the cost of taking an egocentric perspective and possibly choosing the wrong object and 
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the cost of constantly modelling the perspective of the other participant. Keysar et al. (2000) 
conclude that occasionally speakers find the cost of mutual knowledge too high and instead take a 
risk and consider an egocentric perspective. Hanna et al. (2003) ran a similar study which in part 
replicated the findings of Keysar et al. (2000) in finding that speakers did not tend to ignore 
salient objects even though these objects were occluded from the other participant’s view.  Hanna 
et al. (2003) suggest that while participants do employ egocentric knowledge, they failed to find 
evidence that participants ever ignored knowledge of the common ground as predicted by the 
Monitoring and Adjustment view. For this reason, Hanna et al. (2003) propose that perhaps 
viewing common ground as a constraint-based model is the most parsimonious approach. 
According to their view, while participants are capable of using their cognitive resources to 
monitor another participant closely, this strategy may not be the ordinary one.  
Alternatively, Clark and Krych (2004) provide a “bilateral account” of collaborative dialogue, 
suggesting that speakers do indeed monitor other participants during interactive dialogue. In this 
view, bilateral accounts of dialogue in which speakers complete a joint act, contrast with 
“unilateral” accounts in which speaking and listening are argued to be autonomous processes. 
Clark and colleagues note that speakers monitor their listeners’ faces (Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & 
Mullett, 1986) and gaze direction (Argyle & Cook, 1976; Goodwin, 1981; Langton, Watt, & 
Bruce, 2000) in order to establish common ground (Clark & Krych, 2004; Clark, 1996). Clark and 
Krych set out to determine how speakers monitor listeners for both vocal and gestural 
information. They predict that speakers who cannot monitor listeners “should make more errors2, 
take longer or both” than speakers who can monitor listeners. In order to test this prediction, 
Clark and Krych recorded participants who were engaged interactively in a Lego assembling task. 
The videos of their joint actions were then analysed for instances of gestural and deictic 
references both when participants could see each other’s faces and when they could not. Since 
participants were interacting face-to-face, it was not possible to track their gaze. Results showed 
that although participants did attend to gaze and head gestures, the overall success of the task did 
not depend on these cues. An increase in performance was found if speakers could see the 
listener’s workspace. Speakers used more deictic references (e.g. this, that, here, there) if the 
workspace was visible than if it was hidden from view.  
In terms of hand gestures, Clark and Krych identified four distinct types of gestures: 
exhibiting, manifest actions, postponement, and negative manifest actions. The participant who 
was assigned to build the Lego model would often hold up the block in an exhibit gesture. A 
8/5/078/5/07                                                          
2 Here Clark and Krych seem to refer to actual errors, not speech errors or disfluencies. 
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manifest action occurred when the builder positioned a block or somehow moved the block in a 
way that was visible to the speaker. In a postponement, the builder held the block in mid-
movement and often waited for confirmation from the speaker that s/he was moving the correct 
block. Finally, a negative manifest action is when the builder detaches a block that they’ve 
placed, perhaps incorrectly, onto the model. Results showed that most of the gestures were also 
jointly construed as signals between speaker and builder. Clark and Krych conclude that 
conversation is a jointly orchestrated act in which conversationalists attend to a host of gestural, 
vocal and facial cues in order to ground the utterances of the other speaker. 
Argyle (1990) has argued that speakers tend to look no more than 50% of the time at their 
partner during conversation. Kendon (1967) showed that speakers gazed for short periods of time 
at a listener while they were speaking. Gaze levels did not rise about 22% of total conversation 
time in Kendon’s study.  Similarly, Watts and Monk (1996) found that participants in a video link 
conversation gazed at the listener less than 25% of the time. Anderson, Bard, Sotillo, Newlands, 
& Doherty-Sneddon (1997) found that subjects who participated in a map task experiment 
matched the mutual gaze levels of other studies (Argyle, 1990; Argyle & Cook, 1976; Kendon, 
1967): subjects made mutual gaze with their listeners on roughly 2.7% of all words. Furthermore, 
Anderson et al. (1997) suggest that having access to another person’s mutual gaze may have had a 
detrimental effect on task performance.  They conducted a measure of intelligibility, defined here 
as ”the proportion of listeners able to identify the word token correctly over all the experiments in 
which it was used”, in a condition with and without gaze (Anderson et al., 1997, p. 588). 
Anderson et al. examined whether intelligibility was changed between first and later mentions of 
the same landmark name (e.g. site of the forest fire). Intelligibility loss, or the proportion of 
correct identifications when the speaker changes from the citation form to a spontaneous instance 
of the same word, in the condition without gaze was 10%, a significantly smaller figure compared 
to the intelligibility loss for the condition with gaze (23%). From these results, Anderson et al. 
conclude in line with Argyle, Alkema, and Gilmour (1972), Argyle and Graham (1977) and 
Krantz, George, and Hursh (1983) that when an object is involved in conversation, subjects will 
spend more time looking at the object than they will making eye contact. The results from 
Anderson et al. also show that speakers pronounce spontaneous words much less intelligibly 
when a partner’s face is visible. 
 Anderson, Bard, Dalzel-Job, & Havard (submitted) and Bard et al. (2004) report the results of 
gaze at a simulated visual feedback in the MONITOR Project.  As explained in Chapter 1, 
Section 1.3 subsequent chapters of this thesis will report additional findings on disfluency and 
gaze from the MONITOR Project. The MONITOR Project used a simulation of a “listener’s” 
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gaze in a map task experiment.  As with previous map task experiments (Anderson et al., 1991; 
Brown et al., 1983), subjects performed the role of an ‘Instruction Giver’. In the MONITOR 
Project, subjects were asked to provide route descriptions on the map to an ‘Instruction Follower’, 
whose gaze in this case was actually represented by simulated visual feedback in the form of 
gaze.   Anderson et al. (submitted) found that while speakers did respond to the visual cues given 
by the simulated feedback, speakers tended to avoid gazing at the visual feedback when it showed 
that the listener did not follow the route instructions (i.e. the listener went to a ‘wrong’ landmark).  
Subjects did not alter their gaze patterns at visual feedback when presented with added time-
pressure. Instead, the addition of verbal feedback caused speakers to gaze more often at their 
listener as did increased task motivation to perform well.   
Vertegaal and Ding (2002) tested whether subjects were more likely to speak in a) a ‘sync’ 
condition in which a partner synchronised their gaze at the speaker to co-occur with the speaker’s 
turns or b) a random condition in which the partner gazed randomly at the speaker but with the 
same overall frequency as in the sync condition.  Participants participated in a collaborative 
language puzzle task in which each subject was given a fragment of the same sentence (3 
fragments made one sentence). Subjects were asked to collaborate to think of as many 
syntactically permissible permutations of the sentence as possible (6 correct answers for each 
sentence). Each permutation had to be grammatically correct, meaningful and subjects were not 
allowed to change the order of words within a sentence fragment. Vertegaal and Ding observed 
that while task performance was 46% higher in the sync condition, overall results showed that 
subjects were no more likely to speak when gaze was synchronised with their turns than when 
gaze was random.  Subjects spoke more often when they received more gaze.  Thus, Vertegaal 
and Ding conclude that models of conversational agents or avatars which employ random gaze 
will suffice in situations where task performance is not critical. 
In a further study, Monk & Gale (2002) divide human gaze awareness into three separate 
groups. They use the term Full gaze awareness to denote a person’s ability to discern what object 
another person is gazing at.  This contrasts with partial gaze awareness or a person’s ability to 
discern in what direction another person is gazing. Mutual gaze awareness is a person’s ability to 
know when another person is looking at them in the eyes.  Mutual gaze is only possible when 
both individuals make direct eye contact.  Historically, mutual gaze has been difficult to achieve 
over video link conversations because of problems presented with the positioning of the camera.  
In order to make eye contact with the other person, an individual must gaze directly into the 
camera. If the individual does this, however, it appears to the other person that the individual is 
gazing at his or her abdomen because of the position of the camera.  Buxton and Moran (1990) 
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devised a method known as a ‘video tunnel’ to overcome this problem.  A video tunnel uses half-
silvered mirrors to put the camera in the same position as the monitor, thus making mutual gaze 
between the two participants possible. Monk and Gale developed a ‘full gaze awareness’ display 
which used a video tunnel arrangement to provide mutual gaze but also provided both participants 
with an actual size version of the object.  As a control, subjects also experienced a ‘video-tunnel 
only’ condition and an ‘audio only’ condition. In the video-tunnel only condition, subjects could 
monitor each other’s faces, make mutual gaze and see a version of the receiver’s display but they 
only saw a reduced version of an expert’s display.  In the audio only condition, subjects only 
heard verbal feedback from their partner; they did not have full gaze awareness or the ability to 
make mutual gaze. Results suggested that it was less important for participants to have mutual 
gaze and more important that participants see what they were meant to be discussing. Monk and 
Gale observed a reduction in the number of turns required to complete the task in the full gaze 
awareness display condition compared to the other two controls. This corroborates previous 
results found by Doherty-Sneddon et al. (1997).  Doherty-Sneddon et al. tested participants in a 
video-mediated condition that enabled mutual gaze and a condition that did not.  When mutual 
gaze was available, participants made more turns and overlaps than in the control condition.   
Thus, according to both Monk and Gale (2002) and Doherty-Sneddon et al. (1997), there is 
substantial evidence that participants do not benefit from mutual gaze in video-mediated 
conversations.  Instead it seems to be the case that participants tended to gaze at the object of 
discussion rather than at the other person in a face-to-face situation (Anderson et al., submitted; 
Anderson et al., 1997; Argyle et al., 1972; Argyle & Graham, 1977; Krantz et al., 1983). Face-to-
face studies of conversation have suggested that while gaze is an important tool in conversation, 
speakers do not monitor their listeners any more than 50% of the time (Argyle, 1990; Kendon, 
1967; Watts & Monk, 1996). This speaks directly to the predictions of the Strategic-Modelling 
View which suggest that speakers will constantly monitor their speakers for signs of uptake 
during conversation.  These results also suggested that one does not necessarily need an 
experimental paradigm which supports mutual gaze in order to guarantee effective dialogue 
because a) subjects tend to gaze at the object in task-oriented dialogues more often than at their 
partner and b) subjects only make limited use of mutual gaze and c) some studies have observed 
that subjects “over-gaze” when provided with the novelty of mutual gaze in a video-mediated 





2.5 Disfluency and Gaze  
 
Studies of collaborative dialogue have used eye-tracking techniques to study the relationship 
between gaze and disfluency. Such studies have focussed on listeners’ perception of disfluent 
speech and what may be occurring in the speaker’s mind when a disfluent utterance is produced. 
 
2.5.1 Gaze in Perceptual studies of Disfluency 
 
For fluent speech, Dahan, Tanenhaus, and Chambers (2002) observed that pitch accents used 
to signal new from given referring expressions can be used in real-time processing.  Dahan et al. 
showed that subjects were sensitive to the discourse status (focussed or non-focussed) as well as 
mention (new vs. given) when interpreting de-accented or accented referents. De-accented 
referents were associated with previously mentioned and focussed entity and accented referents 
were associated with previously mentioned but unfocussed entities.   For disfluent speech, gaze 
research has shown a relationship between the time course of disfluent speech and listeners’ gaze 
immediately following a filled pause (Arnold, Altmann, & Tanenhaus, 2003; Arnold, Fagnano, & 
Tanenhaus, 2003; Arnold, Tanenhaus, Altmann, & Fagnano, 2004). Arnold et al. (2003) found 
that during comprehension of disfluent speech listeners looked at old information following a 
fluent introduction, thus providing support for previous research (Dahan et al., 2002). Following 
disfluent speech (i.e. a filled pause), listeners tended to gaze more at new objects in a visual 
display (Arnold et al., 2003; Arnold et al., 2004).  Arnold and colleagues suggest that these results 
show that disfluency is used as a cue to signal new information.  Previous work has shown that 
speakers may signal the difficulty of uttering an upcoming constituent by inserting a filled pause 
(Clark & Fox Tree, 2002; Fox Tree & Clark, 1997).  Arnold et al. (2003) and Arnold et al. (2004) 
hypothesise that speakers signal the difficulty of uttering the name of a new object (the salt 
shaker), as compared to a given object (the grapes), in the same way, by inserting a filled pause.  
Since listeners gazed more at new objects, as compared to given objects, following a filled pause, 
this suggests that listeners are sensitive to this information and can utilize it while processing an 
utterance (Arnold et al., 2004). Arnold et al. propose this prediction based on the fact that 
speakers did tend to insert a filled pause more often prior to the name of a new object (thee uh 
candle) (Arnold et al., 2003) and based on the reasoning that a speaker will require more lexical 
search time in order to name a new object than a given one. 
We have already reviewed the results found by Bailey and Ferreira (2005) in Section 2.3.3: 
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listeners who hear a filled pause prior to an ambiguous garden path are biased towards looking at 
the target object because a filled pause prior to a noun phrase is likely to be interpreted as the 
subject of the clause rather than the object of the clause. Such a result is similar to the results 
found by Arnold et al. (2003).  When the listener heard a filled pause before towel (Put the frog 
on [the uh towel] in the box), the speaker looked at the target object (i.e. the frog) later, indicating 
that s/he was entertaining the modified goal reading (Bailey and Ferreira, 2005). Thus, the online 
time course of ambiguous speech processing seems to be sensitive to what a speaker might intend 
by uttering a filled pause.   
The perceptual studies of disfluency reviewed here and in Section 2.3.3 suggest that listeners 
are capable of processing disfluencies as an indication of difficulty (Arnold et al., 2003, 2004; 
Bailey & Ferreira, 2003a, 2005; Brennan & Schober, 2001; Brennan, 2004; MacGregor et al., 
2005).  These results are in line with the Strategic-Modelling View which suggests that speakers 
use disfluencies as signals.  Most of the studies who suggest that listeners are capable of using 
disfluencies as signals only tested filled pauses or prolongations as disfluent stimuli and did not 
test genuine disfluencies ‘in the wild’ (i.e. repetitions, deletions and substitutions).  Thus, it could 
be the case that listeners would find processing complicated disfluencies like repetitions and 
deletions more difficult as studies like Fox Tree (1995) and Lickley (1995) seem to indicate for 
false starts.  Moreover, as previously mentioned, a number of studies have suggested that listeners 
benefit only from additional processing time and not from the actual phonological form of a 
disfluency (Bailey & Ferreira, 2001; Brennan & Schober, 2001; Watanabe et al., 2005).  
 
2.5.2 Gaze in Production studies of Disfluency 
 
Although the results from studies of listener perspective tend to favour the Strategic-
Modelling view, results of speakers’ gaze during the production of disfluent speech suggest an 
association with cognitive difficulty.  Gaze aversion in face-to-face dialogues during periods of 
difficulty is a well-documented phenomenon (Anderson et al., 1997; Glenberg et al., 1998; 
Griffin, 2005; Griffin & Bock, 2000). Female speakers who had access to their partner’s eye 
contact in a map task were found to be less disfluent than when the speakers could not make eye 
contact with their partners (Branigan, Lickley, & McKelvie, 1999).  Branigan et al. (1999) argue 
that since females are generally more socially aware, the absence of eye contact incurred great 
difficulty, thus causing disfluency. 
Griffin (2005) found that when a speaker makes a substitution error, the speaker tends to look 
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at rather than talk about the objects they intend to speak about.  As Griffin (2005) shows, speakers 
gaze at items that they name correctly for the same amount of time as they look at objects they 
name disfluently. This result is important because it shows that errors stem from purely linguistic 
problems rather than the extralinguistic factor of how much time the speaker gazed at the object 
prior to naming it. Speakers have been found to look at objects for less time before fluently 
uttering the name of the object than before disfluently naming an object (Griffin & Bock, 2000). 
Speakers also tend to gesture more often when disfluent (Beattie & Shovelton, 2003; Kendon, 
1967). Beattie and Shovelton (2003) specifically found that hand gestures seemed to coincide 
with gaze aversion, disfluency and mental effort. Although one might predict that disfluent 
regions of speech would coincide with gestures in the eye region (i.e. blinks, eyebrow raises, 
changes in direction of gaze), so far there is no support for this prediction (Yasnik, Shattuck-
Hufnagel, & Veilleux, 2005).  
Other work done in the area of gaze and disfluency production suggests that disfluencies have 
a strategic role in buying the speaker time (Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, In Press). Speakers 
who didn’t notice the size contrast between large and small objects were more disfluent, 
suggesting that disfluency was one way to buy the speaker additional time.  This is in line with 
other work suggesting that disfluencies are associated with planning difficulties (Gregory et al., 
2003). Gregory et al. asked subjects to move items which contrasted in colour, material or scalar 
property.  Only the eye-gaze of the speaker was recorded. Gregory et al. found that subjects 
produced more disfluencies (e.g. silent or filled pauses and repetitions) prior to or following a 
scalar adjective than they did surrounding a colour or material adjective.  Since subjects had to 
compare objects in order to produce a scalar adjective (i.e. to denote a size contrast), Gregory et 
al. argue that scalar adjectives are more difficult to produce than colour or material adjectives, 
and therefore that disfluencies are associated with production difficulty. Both Brown-Schmidt and 
Tanenhaus and Gregory et al. used pairs of naïve subjects and only recorded eye-gaze of one 
subject (i.e. the speaker).  Subjects did not have gaze awareness of where their partner was 
looking. If speakers had had gaze awareness, they would have been aware of the fact that their 
partner had or had not noticed the size contrast, and thus, this knowledge might have affected the 
speaker’s tendency to produce disfluent referents when a size contrast was present. 
 
2.6 Summary of Literature Review 
 
As has been demonstrated in this chapter, studies of collaborative dialogue have dedicated 
abundant research to common ground, spatial and conceptual perspective-taking, referring 
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expressions and disfluency (Bard & Aylett, 2001; Clark & Wasow, 1998; Lickley, 1994; Schober, 
1993). Two competing psycholinguistic hypotheses have emerged.  One view explains interaction 
in dialogue as an intentionally strategic process during which the speaker updates a model of the 
listener (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark & Wasow, 1998; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Lickley, 
1994; Schegloff et al., 1977; Schober, 1993). The other hypothesis argues that speech production 
is a cognitively burdensome task and that the amount of interaction that speakers can engage in is 
decided based on the available resources (Bard et al., 2000; Bard & Aylett, 2000; Brown & Dell, 
1987).   
According to the proponents of the Strategic-Modelling View, an ideal speaker will establish 
conceptual pacts with their listeners (Brennan & Clark, 1996) and adopt the spatial-perspective of 
their interlocutor (Schober, 1993). An ideal speaker will also signal their commitment to both the 
utterance and the listener during a repetitive repair (Clark & Wasow, 1998; Fox Tree & Clark, 
1997). Clark and Krych (2004) suggest that attentive speakers will monitor their interlocutors’ 
faces (Bavelas et al., 1986) and direction of gaze (Gale & Monk, 2000) in order to establish 
common ground. The speaker will be capable of doing all of this whilst planning the upcoming 
utterance (Clark, 1996). 
The Strategic-Modelling View predicts that listeners will be able to reliably detect disfluency 
in spontaneous speech during a dialogue in order to employ them as signals. In Section 2.3.2, I 
reviewed the literature on disfluency detection in speech technology and phonetics in order to 
determine whether there are any reliable cues to disfluency.  Word duration, fundamental 
frequency, pause duration, glottalisation and coarticulation are all potential cues to signal the 
presence of an error (Eklund, 2001, 2004; Howell & Young, 1991; Lickley, 1994; Nakatani & 
Hirschberg, 1994; Plauché & Shriberg, 1999; Shriberg, 1994, 1999).  The problem remains that 
each potential prosodic cue is not restricted only to disfluent speech. Prolongation (eg. segment 
lengthening) is a common process before a syntactic boundary (Local, Kelly, & Wells, 1986; 
Wightman, Shattuck-Hufnagel, Ostendorf, & Price, 1992).  Speakers may routinely glottalise a 
segment prevocalically or when their air supply is low in fluent speech (Lickley, 1996).  
Fundamental frequency, which is an inconsistent cue to disfluency, exhibits falls, rises and resets 
in fluent speech as well.  Over the course of a fluent utterance, the pitch level commonly 
decreases in the downtrend and downstep phenomena (Liberman & Pierrehumbert, 1984).  
However, when listeners were put to the task of predicting whether disfluency was about to occur 
in a word-gating task, their performance suggested that they could not reliably predict an 
upcoming disfluency (Lickley, 1994). 
Within psycholinguistics, considerable research has been dedicated to determining whether 
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hearing a disfluency affects a listener’s language comprehension in any measurable way (Arnold 
et al., 2003; Arnold et al., 2003; Arnold et al., 2004; Bailey & Ferreira, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 
2005; Lickley, 1994, 1995, 1996; Lickley, McKelvie, & Bard, 1999; Lickley et al., 1991; 
Nicholson et al., 2005; Nicholson et al., 2003). After hearing a filled pause, listeners exhibited 
sensitivity by gazing earlier at target objects (Bailey, 2003b) or at new objects (Arnold et al., 
2003) or by showing a reduced ERP affect after hearing an unpredictable word (MacGregor et al., 
2005). While it is certain that prosodic cues exist and that listeners are capable of utilising 
prosodic cues in both fluent and disfluent speech, it is less clear that listeners do this all the time 
or that they can access what the intentions of the speaker might be (Lickley, 1994; Snedeker & 
Trueswell, 2003).  Bailey and Ferreira (2001), Brennan and Schober (2001) and Watanabe et al. 
(2005) show that there did not seem to be anything particular about the phonological form of a 
disfluency which aided listeners: listeners seemed to be sensitive only to the fact that there was a 
delay. Thus, it is uncertain whether listeners can really utilise disfluencies as signals as the 
Strategic-Modelling view suggests. 
The alternative view, the Cognitive Burden View argues that an ideal speaker will avoid 
attending to information when the cognitive cost of attention is high (Horton & Gerrig, 2005; 
Horton & Keysar, 1996).  Keysar et al. (2000) found that speakers occasionally opted for an 
egocentric perspective, when the demands of gazing at mutual information were too high. In 
terms of responsiveness, speakers are predicted to respond according to their own needs and not 
as the result of modelling their listener.  Evidence for this claim comes from Anderson et al. 
(1997) who demonstrated that speakers who had the ability to make eye contact during a map task 
did so rarely.  As reported in Section 2.4, studies of gaze in object-oriented dialogue have found 
that when an object pertinent to the task is present, speakers will look at the object more often 
than at the person.  In terms of disfluency, proponents of the Cognitive Burden view argue that 
disfluency is classifiable simply as the output error of an overburdened system (Bard et al., 2003; 
Bard et al., 2001; Nicholson et al., 2005; Nicholson et al., 2003).  Therefore, an ideal speaker 
according to the cognitive burden view will avoid gazing at the interlocutor when information is 
costly and will only respond when cognitive resources permit. 
Barr and Keysar (2002) argue that it is insufficient to provide only positive evidence of 
interaction when studying collaborative dialogue. Studies should also attempt to give negative 
evidence to show when certain processes (eg. Inference on the basis of either mutual or individual 
knowledge) do not take place.  As such, it seems that there is much to be learned about the 
potentially intentional processes occurring in dialogue by actively engaging in a comparative 
study of monologue. Pickering and Garrod (2004) point out some of the ways in which 
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monologue differs from dialogue in their proposal of an interactive model of alignment.  
According to this model, it is only necessary to model the listener when the alignment process has 
been derailed.  Interactive repair alignment occurs automatically out of the overlap in knowledge 
between speaker and listener (Pickering & Garrod, 2004).  In monologue, however the solo 
speaker is unable to align to with an interlocutor and as such has no recourse to develop a routine 
of checking that the message is being understood.  Schober (1993) reports that monologue 
speakers tended to adopt the perspective of their hypothetical listener but that this process was 
costly. Thus, it could be the case that speakers only implement costly inferential processes in 
times of difficulty (Pickering & Garrod, 2004).   
A variety of research has been dedicated to common ground, referring expressions, disfluency 
and how such things pattern in collaborative human dialogues. Of these, disfluency is an 
interesting avenue for further research because it is unclear whether the speaker intentionally 
caused the disfluency to happen or whether it was simply an error of an overburdened system. For 
this reason, the function of disfluency is a valuable metric when testing two competing 
hypotheses within psycholinguistics, the strategic-modelling view on the one had and the 
Cognitive Burden View on the other. A substantial amount of research has investigated whether 
listeners respond to filled pauses as a cue (Arnold et al., 2003; Arnold et al., 2003; Arnold et al., 
2004; Bailey & Ferreira, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2005). However, as it is still unclear what the 
intentions of the speaker might be (Lickley, 1994; Snedeker & Trueswell, 2003), more effort 
should be directed at observing the speaker and the instances in which she or he is disfluent 
during a collaborative dialogue task.  
Accordingly, I propose to investigate why disfluency occurs, that is, when it occurs and for 
what reason. What other dialogue behaviours or gaze patterns did the speaker exhibit when she 
was disfluent? If one knows what the speaker was gazing at during disfluency, one can determine 
whether this situation induced disfluency because of its difficult nature or whether the speaker 
could have used disfluency as a signal. Knowledge about the type of utterance that caused the 
speaker to be disfluent is important because it tells us what sort of dialogue goal the speaker was 
trying to fulfil when s/he became disfluent.  Was the speaker more disfluent when giving simple 
route instructions or when attempting to interact directly with the listener by providing a 
clarification or acknowledgment?  
In order to specifically address the outstanding questions between the Strategic-Modelling and 
Cognitive Burden Views, I propose to analyse the speaker’s eye-track record in order to 
determine whether the speaker attends to their interlocutor’s feedback or not.  If speakers are 
strategically modelling their listeners and signalling their commitment, then speakers should gaze 
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at the listener throughout and particularly when the listener is lost and needs assistance. If 
speakers are suffering a cognitive burden on the other hand, then speakers should only gaze when 
it is feasible to do so and avoid looking during times of difficulty in their task. If speakers are 
doing either both or neither of these things consistently, then we have a possible case for the 
Middle Ground view, that is the Joint responsibility view and Pickering and Garrod’s (2004) 
model of interactive alignment.  
Since gaze has been shown to have social implications (i.e. it is considered rude to stare at 
someone for too long) (Argyle & Cook, 1976) which could interfere with a controlled 
experiment, I will use a simulation of gaze, rather than face-to-face eye contact between listeners. 
Anderson et al. (1997) showed that when speakers are engaged in a map task and they have full 
view of their partner’s face, they tend to gaze more at the map and less at the partner’s face. By 
using a simulation of gaze in conjunction with real gaze from the speaker, one can also time align 
the speech record with the gaze record and from this data have a finely detailed account of the 
disfluency event and the speaker’s attention. Finally, interlocutors will perform a map task in 








Studies of disfluency in dialogue have suggested that speakers may be disfluent for strategic, 
communicative and even intentional reasons (Fox Tree & Clark, 1997; Clark & Wasow, 1998). 
According to these accounts, when a speaker produces a repetition disfluency, she or he wishes to 
signal commitment to listeners and to utterances (Clark, 2002; Clark & Wasow, 1998; Fox Tree 
& Clark, 1997).  In Chapter 2, I attributed these predictions to the Strategic-Modelling View. In 
contrast to this view, the Cognitive Burden View proposes that listener modelling cannot be 
carried out in a consistently altruistic manner.  Instead it competes with the demands of language 
production so that speakers’ altruism is limited by the available cognitive resources (Anderson et 
al., submitted, Bard et al., 2004; Horton & Keysar, 2004).  According to this prediction, 
disfluency is associated with a cognitive cost for producing speech under cognitive load (Bard et 
al., 2001).   
Hence, there are at least two possible predictions for the sources of disfluency. The Strategic-
Modelling view, supported by Fox Tree and Clark (1997) and Clark and Wasow (1998), suggest 
that disfluency originates out of speaker modelling and strategizing during dialogue. The 
Cognitive Burden view, on the other hand, describes disfluency as the result of an overburdened 
system (Bard et al., 2001; Horton & Keysar, 1996; Pickering & Garrod, 2004). Further testing of 
these hypotheses is necessary and it will be the focus of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 to report three 
experiments which address this issue. 
 
3.2 Rationale & Predictions 
 
One aim of this thesis is to investigate why disfluency occurs. I will approach this issue by 
attempting to tease apart two explanations already extant in the literature for the origin of 
disfluency: the Strategic-Modelling and the Cognitive Burden view. If disfluency is the result of 
strategic modelling, one possible prediction is that disfluency will increase in the presence of 
feedback from a listener. The Strategic-Modelling View may predict speakers will be more 
disfluent in an interactive setting because a speaker is more likely to signal commitment in the 
presence of a listener.  Fox Tree and Clark (1997) argued that repetitions fulfil a specific function 
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in speech: the speaker repeats to signal that they are having difficulty finding a word but are 
committed to the noun phrase they’ve started and to preserving continuity for the listener. 
Similarly, Clark and Fox Tree (2002) predict that filled pauses fulfil a specific signalling 
function. The filled pause uh signals a minor delay while um signals a major delay is to follow.  
Accordingly, the Strategic-Modelling View may instead predict no change in disfluency rate 
when feedback is present because filled pauses and repetitions fulfill such specific functions. 
Thus, there are two possible predictions for the Strategic-Modelling View alone and to be able to 
rule out one prediction, we need to be sure that the manipulation of feedback used in this 
experiment permits the speaker to do at least two things. Firstly, speakers must have a task which 
allows them to make complex noun phrases so that they can ostensibly stop and repeat function 
words while performing a lexical search in the manner described by Fox Tree and Clark (1997). 
Secondly, speakers must have the opportunity and a reason to choose between minor and major 
delays in their language production, if filled pauses are indeed signals in the manner suggested by 
Clark and Fox Tree (2002). 
According to Barr and Keysar (2002) and Horton and Keysar (1996), feedback from a listener 
may make dialogue more difficult because the speaker has to manage both speech production and 
occasionally monitor the listener. According to Pickering and Garrod (2004), dialogue is easier 
than monologue precisely because the speaker can align with a listener. Therefore, there are two 
possible predictions for the Cognitive Burden view as well. If feedback makes the dialogue more 
difficult, then we would predict an increase in disfluency rate when feedback is present. If on the 
otherhand, the speaker is facilitated by feedback, then one would predict a rise in disfluency rates 
only when the feedback itself is difficult, that is when it shows signs that the listener is lost or 
confused.  
Since both theories make two of the same predictions, namely that disfluency rates will rise in 
the feedback condition, the difference between a feedback and a no feedback situation is not 
sufficient to pinpoint the source of disfluency. Another factor is necessary. The Cognitive Burden 
hypothesis predicts that under the pressure of time, a speaker will be less capable of modelling the 
listener (Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Horton & Keysar, 1996). In contrast, the Strategic-Modelling 
view makes no predictions about time pressure: a speaker who is capable of monitoring a listener 
should be capable of doing so under varying circumstances or deadlines as long as dialogue can 
be conducted at all. Thus, the Cognitive Burden view predicts that when the level of difficulty 
increases, so too will the cognitive cost and, therefore, one would predict higher rates of 
disfluency in interactive, time-limited trials than in interactive, time-unlimited trials or in non-
interactive trials regardless of time pressure. As it makes no predictions about time-pressure, the 
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Strategic-Modelling view predicts roughly the same disfluency rates in timed versus untimed 
trials.  
It has long been known that repetitions are the most common type of disfluency (Shriberg, 
1994; Lickley, 1994; Maclay & Osgood, 1959).  For this reason, Clark and Wasow (1998) 
attempted to determine why speakers retrace or repeat a portion of an utterance rather than simply 
resuming where they left off.  According to their continuity hypothesis, speakers repeat 
themselves in order to maintain a continuous utterance. Clark and Wasow (1998) propose three 
potential reasons to explain why a speaker might prefer a continuous utterance and thus choose to 
repeat rather than just begin from where they left off.  First, repetition may benefit the speaker as 
it may be easier to repeat what one just said from the beginning. Secondly, the speaker may 
strategically repeat an utterance in order to make the task of comprehension easier for the listener. 
Thirdly, a speaker may want to present themselves as a fluent and organized. As Clark and 
Wasow (1998) predict there is no way to distinguish the three potential sources of continuous 
repetition in natural circumstances.  
Nevertheless, if the speaker repeats simply because it is easier to produce an utterance from 
the start, then repetition rates might be equal in an interactive setting and in a trial with no 
feedback as long as the speaker’s needs did not change. An interactive setting is defined for 
present purposes as a dialogue situation where a speaker receives feedback from a listener.  If, on 
the other hand, the speaker repeats for the benefit of the listener or simply to present herself to her 
audience as an organized individual, then presumably one would predict that repetition rate would 
increase in an interactive setting. Thus, the Strategic-Modelling view predicts that repetitions 
could occur for intentional and strategic reasons.  
Since it is primarily a hypothesis about difficulty in speech production, the Cognitive Burden 
hypothesis makes no predictions about particular types of disfluencies in any situation. One 
version of the Cognitive Burden theory does, however, predict higher disfluency rates with 
greater difficulty. If the listener shows signs of misunderstanding or confusion, then presumably 
the speaker has to expend extra effort to re-establish the conversation and this extra effort could 
result in disfluency arising as an indicator of difficulty.  This Cognitive Burden view would 
predict higher disfluency rates associated with such difficult patches in the dialogue, because the 
speaker has had to expend extra effort in re-aligning with the listener. Once again, however, the 
Strategic-Modelling view and the Cognitive Burden hypothesis make similar predictions: just as 
the Cognitive Burden view predicts that higher disfluency rates would arise out of the difficulty 
of realigning with a listener after a difficult period, the Strategic-Modelling view would predict 
that disfluency will arise in these circumstances, as both an indicator of difficulty necessarily and 
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as a strategic signal. Moreover, the Strategic-Modelling view predicts that the speaker should 
have no trouble in constantly monitoring the listener in either a visual or auditory sense. When a 
listener experiences difficulty, the Strategic-Modelling view predicts that the attentive speaker 
will track the listener until the difficulty is resolved. 
 Thus, a number of sub-goals arise out of the simple comparison of the Strategic-Modelling 
view and the Cognitive Burden hypothesis. The first sub-goal is to establish whether speakers 
attend to the simulation of visual feedback in a natural manner.  It is important to investigate the 
associations between disfluency and gaze because it is one way of teasing apart the predictions of 
the Strategic-Modelling and Cognitive Burden Views. Table 3 lists the predictions made for 
speaker gaze at IF feedback with regards to both the Strategic-Modelling and Cognitive Burden 
views. According to the Strategic-Modelling View, speakers will monitor their listeners 
constantly. According to the Cognitive Burden View, speakers will avoid gazing at their partners 
when it is costly to do so.  The advantages of using a simulation of visual feedback are that a) one 
can align this feedback with a record of the speech and the speaker’s gaze and b) one can control 
the nature of the feedback to be either on-track or divergent and by so doing gain insights into 
which type causes more disfluency.  Since the simulation of gaze is slightly unnatural, there is a 
need to ground the current visual feedback paradigm to be certain that it achieves similar effects 
to other face-to-face dialogues. The method used for simulating the visual feedback will be 
described in more detail in Section 3.4 and 3.5.  
A second sub-goal for this experiment is to investigate that the amount of speech produced 
during the experiment.  For example, I will test the number of words per trial because previous 
research by Oviatt (1995), Bard et al. (2001) and Haywood (2004) suggests that lengthier trials 
are associated with difficulty.  If this is the case, then it would be useful to know under which 
circumstances speakers used the most words before the results for disfluency rate per words are 
given.  I will test the number of transactions per trial as a baseline measure of speaker 
responsiveness to the visual feedback simulation of gaze. In addition to an analysis of gaze per 
feedback episode described above, an analysis of Transactions could reveal the responsiveness of 
the speaker by showing how often the speaker bothered to retrieve the visual feedback when it 
went awry. Finally, I will test speech rate and the temporal duration per trial as dependent 
variables as a means of ruling out any possible artefact for the core disfluency rate analyses. One 
could argue that a speaker might be more disfluent simply because he or she was speaking too 
quickly under time-pressure. To rule out this possibility, I will look at speech rate and temporal 
dialogue length per trial.  It should be made clear that these measures of raw speech are not 
included in the predictions listed in Table 3 because their outcome is not centrally linked to the 
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difference between Strategic-Modelling view and the Cognitive Burden view. Rather, I will 
report results as a ‘health check’ of the experimental paradigm to be sure that the central tests of 
disfluency rate do not contain speech-related artefacts. 
 
Table 3. Table summarising the predictions for the Cogntive Burden and Strategic-Modelling Views 
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Next, we can begin to test the central manipulations present in this experiment, namely 
feedback and time-pressure. Both the Cognitive Burden and the Strategic-Modelling hypotheses 
predict increased disfluency rates in the presence of listener feedback.  This means that we can 
not test feedback alone because by itself it does not distinguish between the two theories. The 
Cognitive Burden hypothesis predicts disfluency rate will rise under time-pressure. The strict 
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version of this theory proposed by Horton and Keysar (1996) and Barr and Keysar (2002) predicts 
that disfluency rate should be at its highest when the speaker is under the most cognitive load, for 
example when s/he has both listener feedback and time-pressure.  
Strategic-modelling makes specific predictions about two types of disfluency, disfluencies in 
which repetition has occurred and filled pauses, suggesting that they are signals. Strategic-
Modelling also discusses how ‘self-interruptions’ support the notion that speakers are 
opportunistic and will take advantage of the opportunities that arise during the course of a 
dialogue (Clark & Krych, 2004). According to a structural classification system (e.g. Lickley, 
1998), these self-interruptions would be classified as deletions (i.e. and put it on the right-hand 
half of the- yes the green triangle). The Strategic-Modelling View includes only repetitions, filled 
pauses and deletions in order to support the view that disfluencies occur for strategic reasons.  
Table 3 indicates that the Strategic-Modelling View predicts a higher repetition rate in periods of 
Follower feedback. Since it is difficult to predict when a speaker might be opportunistic, I have 
omitted this prediction from Table 3. I have also omitted any predictions for the Cognitive 
Burden View with regards to disfluency and function because this view makes no specific 
predictions about specific types of disfluencies. 
By testing the effects of different types of disfluency we can distinguish between the 
functions each disfluency type fulfils in dialogue to see whether the Strategic-Modelling View 
makes the correct predictions. Are all disfluency types ‘signals’ in the strategic sense? A test of 
individual disfluency type is needed to answer this question. This will be conducted by 
calculating the rate of individual disfluency types, specifically repetitions, substitutions, 
insertions, deletions and filled pauses, per fluent word to see whether any individual types are 
sensitive to the manipulations of visual feedback or time-pressure tested in this Experiment. Other 
types of disfluencies (e.g. silent pauses and prolongations) will be omitted from this analysis 
because of their relationship to fluent prosodic boundaries (Goldman-Eisler, 1972; Wightman et 
al., 1992). Furthermore, I will not analyse the difference between uh and um because this 
difference has already been disputed by O’Connell and Kowal (2005). Instead, I will investigate 
what the function is for a particular type of disfluency, for example a deletion or repetition. If 
deletions are opportunistic as the Strategic-Modelling View predicts, then one would expect an 
association between deletions and an planning function, for example the movement of the visual 
feedback.  
For an understanding of the functions disfluency plays in dialogue, we need to investigate 
disfluency rate in conjunction with another measure of speaker behaviour. An investigation of 
this sort will reveal the sorts of behaviours the speaker was engaged in when he or she became 
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disfluent, and thus we have an insight into why disfluency occurs. Two measures are available to 
us in the current experiment: Conversational Moves and speaker attention. A Conversational 
Move is a unit of coding that can be applied to a dialogue to classify individual utterances by 
form and goal.  To understand speaker behaviour during disfluent periods, we can analyze 
disfluency rate per Conversational Move for an indication of what sort of goal the speaker was 
trying to fulfil when s/he became disfluent. As shown in Table 3, the Strategic-Modelling View 
makes no specific predictions about the type of Moves in which disfluency will occur because 
this view predicts that speakers signal throughout a conversation to their listener regardless of 
utterance type.  As shown by Lickley (2001), Instruct moves, which require the speaker to utilise 
creativity, planning and to introduce new referencts, were the most disfluent type of move in the 
Map Task Corpus. In conjuction with this finding, the predictions for the Cognitive Burden View 
shown in Table 3 suggest that Instruct Moves will also be the most disfluent move type in the 
MONITOR experiment.  
In addition to disfluency and move type, we can investigate whether speaker attention and 
disfluency are related by measuring disfluency rate per feedback episode. As shown in Table 3 
(page 98), the Cognitive Burden hypothesis would predict that speakers avoid gazing at the visual 
feedback when it is costly and an increase in disfluency during periods of complicated feedback 
(i.e. the square goes to a wrong landmark). Strategic-Modelling predicts that listeners will check 
the square throughout the trial regardless of difficulty and an increase in disfluency rate prior to 




In order to test the Strategic-Modelling and Cognitive Burden Views which make different 
predictions about uptake of visual feedback, Experiment 1 was designed to determine whether 
Instruction Givers respond to visual feedback from an Instruction Follower.  During a trial, an 
Instruction Giver (IG) provided route descriptions of a map to an Instruction Follower (IF) 
located in a separate room. The IF’s purported focus of visual attention was projected on the IG’s 
version of the map. IG’s gaze along the route was genuinely eye-tracked so it was possible to tell 
when IG gazed at the IF gaze focus and when she gazed elsewhere. To test whether speaking to 
an active listener increased the difficulty of the task, this condition was compared to one in which 
the IG did not have access to the IF’s visual feedback in half of the trials. To test whether time-
pressure made the task more taxing for the IG, in half of all trials the IG was subjected to a 1 
minute time limit; in the remaining trials, there was no time-limit and IGs could speak without 
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interruption. 
The results in this chapter describe how Givers do in fact attend to the visual stimulus, a red 
square simulating saccadic gaze fixations, and guide it around the map when it is present. A red 
square was used instead of genuine eye gaze from a live participant because the surrogate makes 
it possible to track the IG’s attention at the square precisely. Recall from Section 3.2 that the 
feedback manipulation must meed certain criteria. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 2.4, 
studies of collaborative dialogue and gaze have found that when engaged in a task-oriented 
dialogue, speakers pay more attention to the task and less attention to their partner’s face. The 
hypothesis that responding to feedback from a listener incurs a cognitive cost is evaluated in the 
light of findings from collaborative dialogue. Of course, any results may be dependent on the 




The four Maps used for this experiment were taken from the HCRC Map Task Corpus 
(Anderson et al., 1991).  Pictures of the maps can be found in Appendix B. As in the Map Task 
Corpus, the Instruction Giver (i.e. the naïve subject) was given a map of a fictional location with 
a pre-printed route that traveled from a ‘start’ point to a ‘finish’ point.  Also on each map were 12 
± 1 labelled cartoon landmarks.  Section 1.3 outlined the design of landmarks and maps in the 
Map Task Corpus. In the HCRC Map Task Corpus, both participants were told that the maps 
would not always match perfectly.  In actuality, the IG might have two occurrences of the same 
landmark on his map, a landmark which only he has or a landmark that is named differently from 
the landmark on the Instruction Follower’s (IF) map.  In the MONITOR Project and the Map 
Task Corpus, IG maps were identical since there was no actual Follower’s map.  The Map Task 
Corpus IF map was used only as a template for the design of the simulated visual ‘IF’ feedback. 
An example of a screenshot during the dialogue is shown below in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. A snapshot of the screen during an ongoing 
dialogue. The black dot represents the speaker’s gaze while 
the box represents the follower’s purported location. 
 
The feedback consisted of the pre-programmed movement of a hollow red square which travelled 
from landmark to landmark according to a schedule based on the original maps. For example, if 
the IF map contained only one Great Viewpoint landmark in the north of the map but the IG map 
contained two Great Viewpoint landmarks, one (the critical one) in the south and one in the north, 
the feedback square would go to the north Great Viewpoint as a real IF would. 
 
3.5 Experimental Procedure 
 
Naïve participants and the confederate were greeted by the experimenter3 and taken into the 
experimental room. The experimenter then explained to the participants in the presence of the 
confederate that s/he would be describing a map route to the confederate, the Instruction 
Follower, in another room, and that in some of the trials they would receive visual feedback from 
the IF.  The IG was told that the IF could see a map similar to the IG’s map. The IG was warned 
in advance that some of the landmarks on his/her map might differ from the landmarks on the IF’s 
map, but was given no indication of how or how often they would differ. Subjects were instructed 
to say whatever was necessary to guide the listener along the route. A copy of the instruction 
sheet and the consent form that the subject was asked to sign is given in Appendix AA. 
8/5/078/5/07                                                          
3 The Experimenter was David Kenicer at the University of Glasgow. 
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In terms of what the IG believed about the IF, IGs knew that the IF could see a map similar to 
the one under discussion for that trial. In visual feedback trials, IGs could see a red square which 
they were told represented where the IF was looking. One might ask whether the IG believed that 
the IF could also see the IG’s gaze and if so, could the IG have tried to use their gaze to direct the 
IF where to go somewhat like a pointing finger. Firstly, when the experimenter explained the 
roles of Instruction Giver and Instruction Follower to the naïve participant and the confederate, 
the experimenter always stressed the fact that the IG could see the IF’s gaze and that the IF could 
not see the IG’s gaze. Secondly, just in case an IG mistakenly believed that the IF could see 
his/her gaze, one might anticipate the use of deictic pronouns (e.g. Look here) or other explicit 
language (It’s right there where I’m looking) to emphasize the use of gaze as a pointer. The 
author examined all of the MPEG videos and the transcripts from Experiment 1 for an indication 
that an IG was using their gaze in a deictic manner. No such indication was found. Finally, 
following the experiment, IGs were questioned about the naturalness of the experiment. None of 
the participants suspected that the IF feedback was actually controlled by the experimenter; if a 
participant did seem suspicious, their data was discarded and a new participant’s data replaced 
theirs.  
Participants were then seated in a lounge chair, from which they could see the map projected 
on a 21” Belinea TFT flat screen monitor 3 feet in front of them. The angle of the chair kept their 
faces at a constant distance from the screen.  The speaker’s eye-gaze was calibrated using a nine-
point display screen set to ‘normal’ strength. Eye-gaze was then recorded with table-mounted 
SMI (Sensory Motor Instruments) non-invasive, infra-red eye-tracking equipment in Iview 
version 2.0 software so that time-aligned gaze and dialogue comparisons could be made. A 
Corioscan PRO scan converter was used to combine video signals from the eye-tracker and the 
subject monitor. These were recorded in MPEG with Broadway Pro version 4.0 software. The 
speaker and the experimenter could communicate via Asden HS35S headsets with microphone 
attachments.  What the speakers said was recorded in mono on a Mackie micro-series 1202 mixer 
and an Aiwa tape deck recorder.   
All experiments reported in this thesis involved visual feedback, which purportedly 
represented the Follower’s eye-gaze. This visual feedback consisted of a 0.5” x 0.5” hollow red 
square which was advanced according to a script from landmark to landmark. In effect, this red 
square was a surrogate for genuine eye-gaze which provided both more information and less 
information than is available in face-to-face interaction. The red square can be said to provide 
more information because Givers can see the precise location of the Follower at any time. 
Likewise, the red square can also be said to provide less information because the Giver cannot see 
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any facial cues or gestures provided by the Follower. These ramifications will be considered in 
the Discussion section 
The experimenter advanced the square by pressing a button after the first mention of each new 
landmark on the route. The movement of the square was scheduled to be either correct or wrong. 
When wrong, the square moved to a landmark that had not been mentioned. When scheduled to 
be correct, the square moved to the landmark named by the speaker. The trial was discarded if the 
experimenter missed the critical timing for one wrong landmark or more than 30% of scheduled 
correct landmarks. The square was also programmed to move in a way that represented realistic 
saccades by a programmer familiar with eye-gaze research: it made brief saccades of random 
extent and direction, centring on a target landmark. Naïve participants were told that the square 
would bounce around the screen (i.e. make saccadic movement) and that this was normal gaze 
behaviour. 
Recall that there is a chance that the Strategic-Modelling view would predict no change 
between a feedback and no feedback trial if repetitions and filled pauses are specific cues in 
dialogue. In order for these specific cues to occur, our feedback manipulation must meet certain 
criteria. Speakers must be able to create spontaneously complex noun phrases during the task so 
that a repetition can occur while the speaker performs a lexical search. Filled pauses um and uh 
are thought to signal different degrees in delay. Accordingly, the feedback manipulation must be 
both challenging and realistic enough so that the speaker can signal a delay while they plan the 
next utterance, if indeed filled pauses are a signal in this fashion. For this reason, using a Map 
task with complex landmark names and directional terms (e.g horizontal, vertical) is one way to 
guarantee that speakers had the opportunity to formulate complex noun phrases, and therefore 
that they could use repetitions in a signalling function, if desired. Although the speaker only had 
visual feedback in Experiment 1, it is theoretically still possible that they could choose a longer 
pause by saying ehm or um and a shorter pause with eh or uh. The possibility that the feedback 
manipulation did not permit repetitions and filled pauses will be reviewed in subsequent sections. 
Twenty four students of the University of Glasgow participated in the experiment and were 
paid £5 per hour. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. All participants 
declared themselves naïve to the purposes of the experiment in a debriefing session. Subjects 
were eliminated if any single map trial failed to meet the criteria for feedback or capture quality. 
The feedback criterion demanded that the experimenter advance the feedback square between the 
introduction of the pertinent landmark and the onset of the following instruction in all cases 
where the feedback was scheduled to be wrong and in 70% of the cases where the feedback was 
scheduled to be correct. The capture criterion demanded that at least 80% of the eye-tracking data 
 104
was intact. The loss rate of the table-mounted eye-tracker required that thirty subjects were run 
before twenty-four remained with valid sessions in all four conditions and with a balanced design 
in total. No subjects were suspicious about the true nature of the confederate feedback and so no 
subjects were replaced for this reason. 
 
3.6 Experimental Design 
 
A 2 x 2 Repeated Measures design crossed Feedback (visual feedback and none) and Time-
Pressure (timed and untimed).  For the Feedback factor, subjects were presented with either visual 
feedback in the form of the Follower’s gaze feedback square or had no feedback. On each map, 
there were 8 scheduled correct landmarks where the simulated visual feedback was designed to 
go to the landmark mentioned by the Giver.  There were 4 scheduled wrong landmarks where the 
visual feedback was designed to ‘skip’ the next landmark on the route when the Giver mentioned 
it and go instead to a different ‘wrong’ landmark.   
Subjects were told either that they had one minute to complete the route in the ‘time-limited’ 
condition or that they had as much time as necessary in the ‘time-unlimited’ condition. The four 
maps were rotated through the trials so that each subject saw a different map in each condition 
and each map was encountered an equal number of times in each condition.   
 
3.7 Data Coding 
 
This section will explain how the data were coded with respect to dialogue units, disfluencies and 
gaze. 
3.7.1 Data Coding – Transactions and Moves 
 
Recorded speech in the MONITOR Project was transcribed4 verbatim and coded for 
Transaction and Conversational Move type (Carletta et al., 1997).   
Transactions are blocks of dialogue corresponding to task subgoals.  Transactions could be 
8/5/078/5/07                                                          
4 Under the auspices of the ESPRC MONITOR project, the dialogues were transcribed and coded by 
undergraduate and graduate students at The University of Edinburgh.  The transcription and coding process  
for Experiment 1 was overseen by Dr. Maria Luisa Flechá-Garcia and in part by Dr. Yiya Chen. 
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labelled as normal, review, retrieval, overview or irrelevant.  During a normal transaction, the 
speaker simply gives instructions on how to get from the current landmark to the next one on the 
route.  In a review, the speaker retraces an earlier portion of the route.  A retrieval transaction 
occurs when the speaker tells IF how to return to the route from a wrong position. In an overview 
transaction, the speaker gives a broad description of the map at large without giving any specific 
instructions of the route.  Irrelevant transactions occur when the IG has to say something to the 
experimenter; for example the IG’s mobile telephone rings. Overall, there were too few overview 
and irrelevant transactions for analysis purposes, so overview and irrelevant will be summed 
together and referred to as ‘other’. 
Table 4. Examples of Transaction types in the MONITOR Project 
TYPE: UTTERANCE: 
Normal “The path then follows the route along the curve of the west lake…” 
Review “Okay, go along the north part of the west lake again…”  
Retrieval “Uh no, no, go down to the other lake … yep, that one there” 
Overview “The map has four quadrants…” 
 
Transactions are subdivided into Moves, which are defined in Carletta et al. (1997) as 
“simply different kinds of initiations and responses classified according to their purposes”.  
Moves can be divided broadly into two categories: Initiating moves and Response moves. 
Initiating moves include instruct, where the speaker directs their partner to do something, usually 
to move along the route.  In an explain move, the speaker spontaneously elaborates on some 
aspect of the route. This is distinct from an align move where the speaker assesses whether their 
partner agrees with what has been said so far. Finally, Initiating moves include query-yn moves 
in which the speaker asks a yes or no question that does not involve aligning with the partner.  
Table 5. Examples of Move types in the MONITOR Project 
TYPE: UTTERANCE: 
Instruct “Go down to the left of the Dead Tree” 
Explain “There’s a Dead Tree by the Forked Stream”  
Align “Right, you’re at the Dead Tree” 
Query-yn “Where you are right now, have you got a waterfall?” 
Acknowledge “Aye, that’s right” 




Table 6. Sample Transaction and Move Coding from the HCRC Map Task Corpus 
Transaction 1 normal startpoint 1 endpoint 2  
GIVER FOLLOWER 
Move 1 align   right neil ?  
 Move 2 reply-y   okay right  
 Move 3 query-w   where are we going ? 
Move 4 reply-w   start   
 Move 5 query-w   where am i starting ? 
 Move 6 explain   oh right i've got it yeah i've 
found the start  
Move 7 query-yn   have you got the 
start ... just above? 
 
 Move 9 reply-y   yeah i've found it uh-huh  
Move 10 query-yn   have you got a 
camera shop below it ... no ? 
 
 Move 11 reply-y   yes  
Move 11.6 check   you have ?  




Response moves include acknowledge moves, during which the speaker signals that s/he has 
understood their partner’s previous move. Finally, speakers may also respond by clarifying on a 
matter of the route or task.  
An example from the HCRC Map Task Corpus in Table 6 shows the relationship between 
Transactions and Moves.   Transactions are completely divisible into Moves.  As the example of a 
real dialogue between two participants from the HCRC Map Task Corpus in Table 6 shows, it 
was possible for the Giver to make a ‘Reply-W’ start in response to the Follower’s Query-w 
Move where are we going.  A Reply Move occurs only when one speaker has been asked a 
question by the other participant.  A Reply-W move indicates that the speaker asked a ‘wh-
question’, that is a question beginning with Who, what, when, where, why or how. This is possible 
because there were two actual people engaged in dialogue.  In the MONITOR Project, there was 
only one naïve participant who responded to purely visual feedback.  For this reason, the 
MONITOR Project used only a subset of the Move types explained in Carletta et al. (1997). 
These Move types are shown in Table 5 (page 106). 
For ease of calculation in the results reported below, Align, Query, Acknowledge, and Clarify 
Moves were all classified as ‘Interactive Moves’.  In an Interactive move, the speaker is not just 
giving instructions or explaining them to the listener.  Instead, the speaker is in some way 
interacting with the listener, usually to be certain that the speaker understands the instructions, to 
clarify the instructions more clearly, to ask for information about the Follower’s location or to 
confirm that the Follower is in the right location. Align, Query, Acknowledge and Clarify moves 
are also grouped together for the purposes of this experiment because they are not expected to 
occur as frequently individually in the current paradigm.  In true monologue, one would not 
expect to see any Interactive Moves because the speaker would have no one with whom to 
interact.  
 
3.7.2 Data Coding – Disfluencies 
 
All monologues were coded for disfluency according to the classification system developed by 
Lickley (1994; 1998).  Coding was conducted using Xwaves/Entropic and Xlabel software which 
makes it possible to refer to spectrograms, insert labels at specific time points, and replay each 
disfluent area as many times as necessary.   
Common disfluency tags included repetitions, substitutions, insertions and deletions.  
Disfluencies were occasionally deemed ‘complex’ if one type, say a repetition, was nested within 
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another type, say a substitution (eg. directly bas- directly we- west of your cattle stockade where 
we- west is the repetition nested inside the substitution directly bas- directly west). 
Table 7. Examples of Disfluency types in the MONITOR Project 
Original 
Utterance 
ReparanduM Repair Continuation  
Repetition: strings repeated verbatim with no substitution or deletion 
Just to My my left 
Substitution: replacement of a word, fragment or string by a word or string, including 
repetitions of the original words with shared syntactic features 
Like to the r- to the left of the burnt 
forest 
Insertion: repetition of a string with one or more words inserted before or within a repetition 
Go Two ehm about two centimetres 
above 
Deletion: Interruption and restarting without repetition or substitution 
Oh no not above the gr-  The line stops 
at the pirate 
ship 
 
The disfluency coder also labelled silent pauses and filled pauses (uh, um, eh).  For the most part, 
this thesis will focus on disfluencies, specifically speech repairs and filled pauses, rather than 
silent pauses. Silent pauses were not included in analyses because pauses have been shown to 
serve two possible functions: a) denotation of a syntactic boundary and b) gain time during 
hesitation (Goldman-Eisler, 1972; Duez, 1982).  
 
3.7.3 Data Coding – Gaze 
 
Experienced coders5 coded the videoed gaze data in the Psychology Department at the 
University of Glasgow. The coders used Observer Pro software, which makes it possible to code 
the location of the Giver’s gaze and the location of the visual feedback frame by frame. The coder 
typically coded 2 channels of information: on the first channel, the location of the red feedback 
square was coded with respect to the scheduled landmarks: a square might be ‘correct’ or 
8/5/078/5/07                                                          
5 Gaze coding was done under the auspices of the EPSRC MONITOR Project at The University of 
Glasgow and overseen by David Kenicer and Lucy Smallwood. 
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‘wrong’. By being wrong, the feedback square would ‘skip’ a landmark for a period of time and 
then return to it once guided back. On the second channel of gaze, the location of the Giver’s gaze 
was coded with respect to the landmarks on the route. Tags on the Follower’s gaze channel 
consisted of the landmark name with an indication of correct or wrong, or a ‘Travel’ tag for 
frames where the square moved between landmarks.  Tags included the focussed landmark name, 
an ‘Away’ tag for instances when the Giver’s gaze was on the screen and an ‘Offscreen’ tag for 
instances when the Giver blinked or looked offscreen. Gaze coding on yet a third level indicated 
whether the Giver was looking at the Follower or elsewhere on the route.  
 
3.7.4 Coder Reliability 
 
Any research involving coding should have some way of accounting for potentially subjective 
judgments of the coders. As Carletta (2005) points out, linguistic studies have used a variety of 
techniques to account for the reliability of their coders. For example, Silverman, Beckman, 
Pitrelli, Ostendorf, Wightman, Price et al. (1992) asked coders to employ the ToBI system while 
labelling English prosody. Agreement between coders was the ratio of agreements between 
coders to possible agreements, taking into account all possible pairings of coders (Silverman et 
al., 1992). As Carletta (2005) continues, a number of researchers simply relied on the reader’s 
own judgements of linguistic plausibility when presenting the results of their study.  
This is no longer an acceptable method, particularly when working with many coders on a 
large corpus of data (Carletta, 2005; Carletta et al., 1997; Krippendorff, 1980, 1987, 2004; Siegel 
& Castellan Jr., 1988). Fortunately, statistical methods for computing intercoder reliability exist. 
One method, suggested by Carletta (2005) for content analysis, is known as the Kappa Statistic or 
Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960).  The Kappa statistic calculates the proportion of agreements 
among an arbitrary number of coders applying a categorical system to data, accounting for the 
probability that coders will agree a certain proportion of the time just by chance (Krippendorff, 
1980, 2004; Siegel & Castellan Jr., 1988; Weber, 1985). 
Another statistic for determining coder agreement is Krippendorff’s α. Krippendorff (2004) 
suggests that Krippendorff’s α is a general-purpose means of determining the reliability of a 
coding system applied by any number of coders. Krippendorff’s α can be used to compute the 
reliability of a coding system with any number of categories or any number of coders. 
Krippendorff’s α calculates the average difference of agreement predictable by chance between 
all categories, regardless of which coder assigned them and to which units they were assigned 
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(Krippendorff, 2004). 
Krippendorff (2004) argues that the Kappa statistic overestimates reliability by increasing the 
amount of predictability of the categories that one coder uses compared to the categories used by 
the other coder. Mathematically speaking, the denominator of the Kappa statistic is similar to chi-
square, or a measure of correlation. What this means is that the Kappa statistic is more concerned 
about the coder agreement and less so about the coding of the agreement. 
Since this thesis will rest upon analyses taken from disfluency coding initially performed by 
the author, I will report the results of two reliability studies in subsequent chapters. The first 
reliability study was done to ensure that coders agreed on the disfluency coding system as 
outlined by Lickley (1998).  Coders were two PhD. CandidatesTP6 PT who were also conducting 
research on disfluency for their dissertations. At the beginning of the training period, coders were 
introduced to Lickley’s (1998) coding manual and guided through a pre-coded trial. The coders 
were then given 3 trials to code. The author met on occasion with the coders to resolve 
disagreements but no judgments were changed as a result of discussion. There were 70 
disfluencies about which all three coders agreed, 53 disfluencies about which only two coders 
agreed and 2 disfluencies about which all three coders disagreed.  I will cite Cohen’s Kappa 
because it is the most widely used, as well as Krippendorff’s alpha for the reasons explained 
above. The Kappa results of the disfluency coding reliability test showed that the author and the 
first coder had a Kappa of .578 at p < .001. Agreement between the author and the second coder 
was K = .63 at p < .001. Agreement between the two coders was the lowest with K = .44 at p < 
.001. When agreement was calculated for all three codersTP7 PT, Krippendorff’s α  = 0.74 (i.e. between 
the 0.67 < α  < 0.82 range at a p < .05 confidence level). 
 
3.7.5 Data Analysis 
 
All transcription-related data files were output in XML format for analysis using scripts 
designed for this purposeTP8 PT by the MONITOR Research Assistants TP9 PT. All experiments had XML 
files for the dialogue structure, the Giver’s gaze, the Follower’s gaze, and the Giver’s disfluency 
8/5/078/5/07                                                          
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PT Thanks to Michael Schnadt and Lucy MacGregor for assistance in this regard. 
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7
PT Thanks to Prof. Klaus Krippendorff for assistance in this manner. 
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8
PT Thanks to Henry S. Thompson for his assistance with scripts. 
TP
9
PT Thanks to Maria-Luisa Flecha García, Yiya Chen and Catriona Havard for assistance in this regard. 
record.  A dialogue XML file contains time-stamped Transactions and Moves in addition to 
words and referring expressions. A Giver’s gaze file contains time-stamped fixations with respect 
to the objects that the Giver gazed at.  The Follower’s gaze XML file includes time-stamped 
indications of the Follower’s movement along the route, with respect to whether these movements 
were correct or wrong. 
Disfluency coding began once a transcript for the trial in question was complete. This 
transcript was converted into a .words text-file for use in Xlabel using a script to remove 
extraneous XML tags10. Frequently, the disfluency coding process would reveal errors (i.e. 
missing words, mistranscribed words etc.) in the transcript, which were subsequently amended.  
Once a trial had been coded for disfluencies in Xlabel, the Xlabel disfluency file was converted 
into XML using a script especially designed for this purpose11.  Next, frequency counts were 
taken for all disfluency types and FPs using the grep function in UNIX.  Word counts for entire 
trials were also taken in the same manner. These counts were then entered into Excel and 
statistical tests were applied using SPSS v. 11.5 or v.12.0. The results of these tests are described 
in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
The next step in the data collection process involved analyzing all XML files for information 
on the relationship between the dialogue structure, the Giver’s uptake of information, Follower 
feedback and the Giver’s fluency. This task was accomplished in one of four ways: 1) by pulling 
data out using the NITE XML Toolkit12, 2) by using specific-purpose Perl scripts13, 3) by manual 
inquiry by the author if listening was required, or 4) by pulling information out with the MySQL 
database query language. The subsequent chapters will describe in detail the investigations 
undertaken and the ensuing results. 
In the following sections and chapters, I shall only report the results of by-subject analyses. 
By-items analyses (i.e. by map or landmark) were not done because a by-item analysis would not 
generalize over linguistic material. If the difference between the items were due solely to the 
different experimental conditions, one would benefit from doing a by-item analysis. In the current 
experiment, since linguistic material differs for each item, be it an entire map or a single 
landmark, one would not benefit from a by-items analysis precisely because it would not 
8/5/078/5/07                                                          
10 Thanks to Cedric MacMartin for his assistance with the trans2xlab script. 
11 Thanks to Ruli Manurung for his assistance with scripts. 
12 Thanks to Jean Carletta for her assistance with NITE. More Information on NITE can be found at 
http://www.ltg.ed.ac.uk/NITE/ 
13 Thanks to Joseph Eddy for his assistance with scripts. 
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generalize over linguistic material. 
 
3.8 Words and Speech Overall 
 
Table 8 below shows the overall distribution of transactions, words, disfluencies, filled 
pauses and average time a trial took.   
 
Table 8. Overall distribution of Total Transactions, Total Words, Average Time in 
Seconds a trial took, Total Disfluencies and Total Filled Pauses in Experiment 1B 
MEASURE FT FU NT NU 
Transactions 278 328 247 308 
Normal  226 240 229 280 
Retrieval  36 63 0 0 
Others 16 25 18 28 
Words 5763 7685 5166 7760 
Normal 5032 6443 4867 7392 
Retrieval 545 897 0 0 
Others 186 345 299 368 
Time in Seconds 101.23 149.36 82.89 137.75 
Disfluencies 204 305 150 249 
Repetitions 80 119 51 101 
Substitutions 36 42 19 51 
Insertions 51 78 56 75 
Deletions 37 65 21 22 
Filled Pauses 176 225 140 236 
 
 
Transaction and word counts are broken down into Normal, Retrieval and Other (e.g. 
Irrelevant, Review and Overview) Transactions to show where the most speech occurs.  In Table 
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8, I refer to the Feedback Timed condition as ‘FT’, the Feedback Untimed condition as ‘FU’, the 
No-Feedback Timed condition as ‘NT’ and the No-Feedback Untimed condition as ‘NU’.  The 
distributions of disfluencies, filled pauses, words and transactions by subject and trial are shown 




What type of transactions do speakers make most? To answer this question, the rate of 
transactions per trial was submitted to a within-subjects ANOVA for Time-pressure (2: Timed vs. 
untimed) x Feedback (2: Feedback vs. No Feedback).  Time-pressure caused the overall 
transaction rate per monologue to decrease. Speakers produced more transactions in time-
unlimited conditions (13.83 transactions per trial) (F1(1,23) = 9.95, p < .01) compared to the 
time-limited conditions (11.27 per trial).  The feedback condition did not contribute significantly 
(F1(1,23) = 3.98, n.s.) to the transaction total, nor was there an interaction between timing and 
feedback conditions (F(1,23) = 0.305, n.s.).  As shown in Figure 8, Normal transactions patterned 
according to the overall transaction rate: Normal transactions were more numerous in the 
Untimed condition (11.40 per trial) compared to the Timed condition (F1(1,23) = 5.77, p < .025).   















Figure 8. Observed mean transactions with respect to type for each experimental condition. 
 
As is evident from Figure 8, Retrieval transactions occurred only in the two feedback 
conditions (13% of all Transactions in Feedback-Timed; 18% in Feedback-Untimed) but very 
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rarely otherwise (0.8%14 of all No Feedback Timed transactions and 0.3% of No Feedback 
Untimed transactions: by-subjects ANOVA main effect for Feedback, (F1(1,23) = 25.84, p < 
.001)). There was a non-significant trend for more Retrieval transactions in untimed conditions 
(F1(1,23) = 4.12, p = .054) but only because of the increase in Retrievals in the Feedback 
conditions (interaction: (F1(1,23) = 5.40, p = .029).  Other transaction types were unaffected by 
the experimental factors suggesting that only Retrievals and Normal transactions were significant 
to the effects of the experimental design. 
Time-pressure caused the overall transaction rate per trial to decrease.  Speakers produced 
more transactions in time-unlimited conditions (13.83 transactions per trial) compared to the 
time-limited conditions (11.27 per trial) (Time-Pressure: F1(1,23) = 9.95, p < .01).  The feedback 
condition did not contribute significantly (F1(1,23) = 3.98, n.s.) to the transaction total, nor was 
there an interaction between timing and feedback conditions (F(1,23) = 0.305, n.s.).  As shown in 
Figure 8, Normal transactions patterned according to the overall transaction rate: Normal 
transactions were more numerous in the Untimed condition (11.40 per trial) compared to the 




Before determining how Givers respond in a disfluent manner, it might be helpful to have an 
inkling of their fluent behaviour during map description. Previous studies have found that longer 
dialogues, or dialogues with more words, tended to be more disfluent than shorter dialogues 
(Bard et al., 2001; Oviatt, 1995). According to these studies and to Haywood (2004) one might 
predict that lengthier trials are symptomatic of difficulty. For these reasons, it is useful to know 
something about the words delivered per trial (Figure 9). 
As previously reported by Bard et al. (2003) and Bard et al. (2004), time-pressure affected 
only the length of trials.  An ANOVA on the total number of words (including words in 
reparanda) showed that speakers were more loquacious in the conditions without time-pressure 
(319 words per trial on average) compared to when the IG had a deadline (224 words) (F1(1,23) = 
33.68, p < .001). 
8/5/078/5/07                                                          
14 The rates of Transactions in No Feedback trials are just visible in Figure 8 due to the large scale of the 
graph. 
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Figure 9. Observed mean fluent and disfluent words per monologue with respect to experimental 
condition 
 
Feedback had no significant effect for either word count and there was no significant interaction.  
Thus, the only factor influencing the length of the trials seemed to be time-pressure. This result is 
in concordance with previous research by Bard & Aylett (2001) and Oviatt (1995) which shows 
that given more time, speakers will say more.  
 
3.8.3 Temporal Dialogue Length in seconds 
 
As shown in Figure 10, Dialogues tended to be temporally longer in the presence of listener  
feedback (125.29 seconds on average) than in the absence of listener feedback (110.32 seconds) 
(by-subject ANOVA, main effect of Feedback: F1(1,23) = 11.91, p < .01).       
Speakers engaged in temporally longer dialogues when they had the time to do so: the 
untimed dialogues (143.56 seconds) tended to be longer than timed dialogues (92.06 seconds) 
with an average difference of 51.9 seconds (Time-pressure: F1(1,23) = 58.93, p < .001). A 
significant interaction of Feedback x Time-pressure was not found. Thus, both a feedback effect 
and a time-pressure effect are found for dialogue length in terms of seconds, but one was not 
found for dialogue length in terms of raw words. 
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Duration of Trial in Seconds
 
Figure 10. Observed duration of trials in seconds with respect to experimental condition 
  
3.8.4 Speech Rate 
 
Speech rate across experimental conditions was also subjected to a Repeated Measures 
ANOVA. An analysis of speech rate is important so that we can be certain that IGs were speaking 
at roughly the same rate in all of the conditions. Once we know that IGs speak at roughly the 
same rate, we can rule out the possibility that any changes in disfluency were artefacts of an 
external factor like speech rate.  To calculate the speech rate, we divided the total Giver words per 
map by the total amount of time the Giver spent speaking for that map (i.e. the sum of all 
conversational moves less the summed durations of silent and filled pause time).  There were no 
significant differences between either Feedback (F1(1,23) = 2.24, p = .148), Time-pressure  
(F1(1,23) = .247, p = .606) or the interaction (F1(1,23) = .000, p = .997) with respect to speech 
rate.  
 
3.9 Disfluency Rate  
3.9.1 Disfluency Rate Overall 
 
Are speakers more disfluent in interactive circumstances as predicted by both the Strategic-
Modelling View and the Cognitive Burden Hypothesis? To answer this question, I analysed 
disfluency rate per word. Since significant effects were found for both word and transactions in 
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the time-unlimited conditions, the results pertaining to disfluency may be only an effect of the 
length of the trial and opportunities to be disfluent.  Total numbers of disfluencies, that is the total 
number of speech repairs, are given in Table 8 while disfluency rate per fluent word is depicted in 
Figure 11. An ANOVA for disfluency rate (disfluency per fluent word) that crossed Time-
pressure (timed vs. untimed) and Feedback (feedback vs. no feedback) showed that the rates of 
disfluency events increased in conditions with feedback (F(1,22) = 4.45, p < .05).  An ANOVA 
for disfluency plus filled pause rate per fluent word that crossed Time-pressure (timed vs. 
untimed) and Feedback (feedback vs. no feedback) failed to reveal any significant results (all p > 
.05). 
 


















Figure 11. Observed Mean disfluency rate, (i.e. disfluency per fluent words) by experimental 
condition 
 
Previous research by Oviatt (1995) and Bard et al. (2001) showed that disfluency rate increases as 
a function of utterance length.  In order to control for this effect, an ANCOVA of disfluency rate 
with the numbers of transactions as a covariate further confirmed the significance of the presence 
of feedback (F1(1,22) = 11.23, p < .01) without the confounds of word and transaction.   
Overall, the results on disfluency rate show that Givers were more disfluent in interactive 
circumstances. Time-pressure did not affect disfluency rate. 
 
3.9.2 Disfluency Types 
 
Clark and Wasow (1998) predict that repetitions in particular fulfil a signalling function and 
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so in order to test this hypothesis, a test of disfluency rate by disfluency type is needed. One 
would predict that if repetitions are signals, then repetition rate should be higher in interactive 
circumstances. As found previously by Branigan et al. (1999), Lickley et al. (1999), (Maclay & 
Osgood, 1959) and Shriberg (1994), repetitions were the most frequent of the four repair types 
with a raw total of 351 across all conditions and all speakers.  Whilst the majority of work 
investigating the potentially strategic nature of repairs (cf. Clark & Wasow, 1998) has focused 
solely on repetitions, no significant effects were found here for either feedback or time-pressure.  
A nearly significant trend showed that speakers tended to repeat more in the feedback condition 
(.015) compared to the no-feedback condition (.011) (F1(1,23) = 3.89, p = .061). Figure 12 below 
depicts the disfluency rate breakdown into type of disfluency with respect to the four 
experimental conditions. 






















Figure 12. Disfluency rate (disfluencies per total words) by disfluency type in each of the four 
experimental conditions.  Disfluency rate is presented on the x-axis. 
   
Of the disfluency types described in Section 2.1.2, insertions and substitutions tend to correspond 
to Levelt’s (1983) Appropriateness repair type (Lickley, 1994).  This means that during an 
insertion or a substitution, the speaker is attempting to modify the original utterance by either 
adding or replacing information.  Individual ANOVAs for the rate of each disfluency type per 
fluent word were run.  Each ANOVA crossed Time-pressure (timed vs. untimed) with Feedback 
(feedback vs. no feedback).  Two ANOVAs failed to demonstrate significant effects for insertions 
(N = 148; Means: Feedback Timed = .007, Feedback Untimed = .006, No Feedback Timed = 
.004, No Feedback Untimed = .007) and substitutions (N = 260; Means: Feedback Timed = .009, 
Feedback Untimed = .01, No Feedback Timed = .012, No Feedback Untimed = .01).   
Deletions (N = 145) occur when the speaker abruptly stops mid-utterance and makes a fresh 
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start. Deletion rate per fluent word was submitted to an ANOVA that crossed Time-pressure 
(timed vs. untimed) with Feedback (feedback vs. no feedback). The rate of this repair type was 
the highest in the Feedback Untimed condition compared to any other. Speakers delete most in 
the presence of listener feedback (.008) compared to the no feedback conditions (.004) (F1(1,23) 
= 11.92, p < .01).  
Filled pauses are quite common in speech and have a role in the Strategic-Modelling View 
according to Fox Tree and Clark (1997). For this reason, filled pause rate (N =777) per fluent 
word was submitted to an ANOVA for Time-pressure (timed vs. untimed) and Feedback 
(feedback vs. no feedback).  Filled pause rate alone failed to show any significant results with 
respect to either feedback (F1(1,23) = .416, p = .526)  or time-pressure (F1(1,23) = .249, p =.622).  
For this reason, further discussion of filled pauses will be omitted from this chapter with the 
exception of Section 3.10 
For non-deletion disfluencies (summed raw totals of repetitions, substitutions and insertions), 
only the difference between timed and untimed conditions was significant (F1(1,23) = 14.22, p < 
.001).  No effects of any kind were found for non-deletion disfluency rate per fluent words. These 
results in comparison with those for deletions suggest how feedback influenced the speaker.  
Deletion frequency rose considerably when the speaker had access to feedback. For other 
disfluencies raw effects of time-pressure were found.  This finding suggests that raw disfluency 
totals reflect only a measure of the trial length.   
Contrary to the predictions made by Clark and Wasow (1998) for dialogue, speakers did not 
seem to use repetitions to make commitments to their utterances in interactive circumstances. 
Instead, Givers deleted more often when listener feedback was available. It could be the case that 
the occurrence of a deletion may depend on the behaviour of the eye-gaze feedback square.  
When it trails off course, the speaker is likely to abandon the current set of instructions in order to 
reorient the listener back on course.  To draw any conclusions about this matter we will need in 
depth analysis of eye-gaze with respect to repair onset time.    
In this section, we have shown that disfluency rate conforms to the expectations found in the 
literature, namely that it increases as a function of utterance length. Overall, disfluency rate was 
greater in the presence of feedback from the listener as anticipated by both the Cognitive Burden 
hypothesis and the Strategic-Modelling hypothesis. Individual tests of disfluency were conducted 
to investigate the functions that disfluency might fulfil in dialogue. If repetitions are a signal, they 
should occur more frequently in the presence of feedback from their recipient. Our results did not 
show support for this prediction. Instead, results suggested that deletions pattern according to the 
experimental design: there were more deletion disfluencies in the presence of listener feedback 
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than in the no feedback conditions.  What role do these deletions, and disfluencies in general, 
fulfil in the dialogue? We are now at a point where we can begin to investigate speaker 
behaviour, in order to understand the functions of disfluency, both generally and individually. 
First, we will investigate disfluency rate by Conversational Move type in order to understand 
which dialogue goals the speaker was attempting to fulfil when s/he became disfluent. Then, we 
shall turn to an investigation of disfluency and gaze in order to understand what the speaker was 
attending to during a disfluent episode. 
 
3.10 Disfluency Rate by Conversational Move Types 
 
Lickley (2001) reports disfluency rates for different move types in the HCRC Map Task 
Corpus (Anderson et al., 1991). Lickley investigated the differences between self-repair type 
disfluencies and filled pauses for every 100 words in moves of different types (See Section 3.7.1 
for full classification). His results showed that Reply-W Moves were the most disfluent, if both 
self-repair type disfluencies and filled pauses were considered.  If filled pauses were omitted and 
only self-repair rates were considered, then Instruct Moves, the bulk of most IG moves, were the 
most disfluent (Lickley, 2001).  
In order to determine whether certain Conversational Move types were associated with 
disfluency, a by-subjects ANOVA which crossed Time-pressure (2: Timed vs. Untimed), 
Feedback (2: Feedback vs. No Feedback), Disfluency Type (5: Filled Pauses vs. Repetition vs. 
Deletion vs. Insertion vs. Substitution) and Move Type (3: Instruct vs. Explain vs. Interactive) 
was executed. The dependent variable was calculated by counting the number of disfluencies and 
filled pauses of a certain type, for example repetitions, and then dividing by the number of fluent 
words in that Move. The rates were then averaged over all the values for that subject in the 
experimental condition, e.g. Feedback Timed. Since an entire Conversational Move can be 
abandoned if a deletion occurs resulting in 0 fluent words, 1 was added to all fluent word totals. 
Instruct Moves (.078) were again the most disfluency-prone (Move Type:  Explain: .055; 
Interactive: .018, FB1B(2,46) = 17.98, p < .001). Further support for the claim that deletions are more 
common when feedback is present was obtained. When they had access to feedback, speakers 
made more filled pauses (.90) than repetitions (.043) or insertions (.026) (Feedback x Disfluency 
Type: FB1B(4,92) = 6.86, p < .05, α  < .001; Bonferroni, t = 3.59, p < .003 α  < .003; Bonferroni, t = 
4.31,  p < .003, α < .003).  All other Bonferroni t-tests were non-significant. Repetitions, 
substitutions and insertion type disfluencies tended to occur more frequently in Instruct Moves 
than in Explain or Interactive Moves (Disfluency Type x Move Type: F B1B(8,184) = 2.62, p = .01; 
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Bonferroni t-tests, p < .001, α  < .001). Deletions were more common in Instruct Moves (.099) 
than they were in Interactive Moves (.024) (Bonferroni, t = 4.35, p < .05, α < .001) but no 
significant difference was found between Deletions in Instruct Moves (.099) and Deletions in 
Explain Moves (.109) (Bonferroni, t = -.289, p = .775).  Filled Pauses were most common in 
Instruct Moves (.096) compared to Interactive moves (.032) (Bonferroni, t = 6.71, p < .001, α 
<.001) matching Lickley’s results for Instruct Moves.  




























Figure 14. Disfluency rate by disfluency type per fluent words within Explain Moves 
 












Figure 15. Disfluency rate by disfluency type per fluent words within Interactive Moves 
 
Bard et al. (2003) report that Instruct Moves are the most common type of move in the 
MONITOR corpus. The disfluency rate results within Conversational Moves seem to reflect this 
aspect of the experimental design.  As Figures 13, 14 and 15 illustrate, repetitions, substitutions, 
insertions and filled pauses occur more frequently within Instruct moves than they occur within 
Explain or Interactive moves. Deletions occur at about the same rate within Explain and Instruct 
moves. Surprisingly, although deletions are more frequent in the presence of feedback, they were 
not as common in Interactive moves as they were in Instruct or Explain moves.  This result could 
indicate that when speakers make interactive moves to help the Follower in specific 
circumstances, they are not generally very disfluent. Rather, they are more disfluent when 
presented with the task of describing the route to the Follower.  Typically, an Instruct move will 
be more syntactically complex than any other type of move because the speaker is engaged in 
trying to describe the route. Thus, we can conclude that speakers are more disfluent when 
describing the route than they are when they interact directly with the feedback square. We can 
now turn to the next section in order to understand the gaze behaviour of the speaker during 
disfluency. 
 
3.11 Disfluency and Gaze within a Feedback Episode 
 
In this section, we analyze a further indicator of speaker behaviour, eye-gaze, in order to 
complement the knowledge we have already about speaker behaviour during different 
Conversational Moves.  Eye-gaze information is a valuable resource because it indicates what the 
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IG was attending to at the time s/he was disfluent.  If the IG was truly interested in the well-being 
of the listener and in attending to the listener’s feedback, then the Strategic-Modelling View of 
repairs would predict that disfluencies are concurrent with at the very least the most problematic 
spans of the discourse, i.e. when the speaker is dealing with an errant follower. Therefore, if we 
know what the speaker was attending to when s/he became disfluent, we can know a little more 
about the causes of disfluency. 
The effects of feedback condition on disfluency rate in Section 3.9 suggest that deletions in 
particular might be related to visual information.  In order to test this hypothesis, an analysis was 
undertaken of all feedback episodes in the feedback trials (N = 694) to see whether  
 
a. the Giver attended to the Follower’s location 
b. the Follower was where she was meant to be or whether she had deviated off-
course 
c. the Giver was disfluent during the episode 
 
A feedback episode begins when the feedback square moves to the next landmark on the route 
after the first mention of a landmark name by the IG.  If the feedback square was scheduled to 
move to a correct landmark, then it will move to the landmark just mentioned by the IG (Figure 
16).  If, on the other hand, the feedback square was scheduled to go to a wrong landmark, it will 
deviate off course to a landmark that was not just mentioned by the IG (Figure 17).  
The distribution of Feedback episodes is shown in Table 9. This Table breaks the Feedback 
episodes down into either ‘Correct’ (instances where the IF moved to the mentioned landmark) or 
‘Wrong’ (instances where the IF diverged off-route) sequences. An example of Correct feedback 
is depicted in Figure 16 and an instance of Wrong feedback is depicted in Figure 17.  Table 9 
further shows whether the Giver attended to the feedback square or whether he or she was busy 
looking somewhere else on the route. An opportunity was considered ‘Looked at’ if the Giver’s 
gaze hovered over the feedback square for even a short period during the episode, or ‘Not Looked 
otherwise.  Finally, the episode was labelled ‘disfluent’ if a disfluency of any type or filled pause 




Figure 16. An instance of ‘correct’ feedback where the Follower’s square hovers over the intended 
landmark. The black dot = IG gaze. The square = ‘IF’ gaze 
 
           
Figure 17. An instance of ‘wrong’ feedback where the Follower’s gaze is diverted to another location other 
than the one intended. The dot = IG gaze. The square = ‘IF’ gaze 
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Table 9. Distribution of Correct and Wrong Feedback opportunities in the Feedback conditions. 
Opportunities are divided with respect to Giver Attention (Looked vs. Not Looked) and Fluency (disfluent 
vs. fluent). Overall Means for each cell over all 24 participants is given in parentheses. 
 
Correct 
N = 507 
Wrong  




N = 389 
NOT LOOKED 
N = 118 
LOOKED 
N = 113 
NOT LOOKED 
N = 73 





































TOTAL 179 210 41 77 67 46 41 32 
 
To check for the effects of feedback type on disfluency, I ran an ANOVA with the proportion 
of disfluent feedback opportunities out of the total number of feedback opportunities as the 
dependent variable.  The independent variables were Square (2: Correct vs. Wrong) and Time-
pressure (2: Timed vs. Untimed). As Table 9 shows, there were more correct feedback episodes 
than wrong feedback episodes and for this reason the dependent variable must be the proportion 
of disfluent events. Givers were more disfluent when the feedback square was at a wrong 
landmark (.382) than they were when it visited a correct landmark (.292) (Square: F1(1,23) = 
5.75, p < .05).  Givers were also more disfluent in untimed feedback episodes (.376) than in timed 
episodes (.297) (Time-pressure: F1(1,23) = 5.28  , p < .05).  These results suggest an association 
between difficult feedback (i.e. wrong feedback) and disfluency but do not tell us whether the 
Giver gazed at the wrong feedback while being disfluent. 
To check for the effects of attention and feedback type on disfluency, I ran an ANOVA for 
disfluent “looked at” episode rate per feedback episode as the dependent variable with Feedback 
Square (2: Correct vs. Wrong) and Time-pressure (2: Timed vs. Untimed) as independent 
repeated measures.  The ANOVA revealed only an effect of time-pressure: Givers were more 
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disfluent when they had unlimited time (.399) than when they had a time-limit (.340) (FB1 B(1,23) = 
4.27, p < .05).  An ANOVA for the “not looked at” disfluent episodes showed that Givers 
responding to a lost Follower but not looking at the Wrong square (.224) were more disfluent than 
Givers responding to a correct Follower but not looking at the feedback square (.083) (FB1B(1,23) = 
21.12, p < .05, α < .001).  This result matches a general gaze and feedback interaction described 
by Bard et al. (2003) and Bard et al. (2004).  According to Bard et al., Givers spent more time 
gazing at feedback that was easy to process (i.e. the correct feedback which they would look at 
because it is next on the route) compared to feedback that was hard to process, or wrong feedback 
in which they would have to find the lost Follower. 
 
3.12 Function of Structural Disfluency Type 
 
The results of the previous section on disfluency and gaze investigated disfluency in general 
and found no indication that complicated feedback, such as gazing at the Follower’s feedback on 
a wrong, off-route landmark, induced disfluency. Though responding to a lost Follower did seem 
to make the Giver more disfluent.  In this section, we expand upon this research by investigating 
deletion disfluencies. Deletion disfluencies were the only type of disfluency to show any 
sensitivity to feedback and so by conducting a deletion-specific analysis we can understand more 
about which circumstances seem to induce them (Section 3.9.2).  There are two obvious functions 
for a deletion: one, the speaker could abandon an utterance because of something s/he saw on the 
screen which indicates that the speaker needs to re-plan the current utterance. I will call these 
‘planning deletions’.  In the second type, the speaker abandons an utterance when no salient 
external event has occurred but when instead s/he decides either to restart the utterance anew or 
rephrase the utterance in a different manner. I will call this type of deletion a ‘hesitation deletion’. 
In order to conduct an analysis of planning versus hesitation deletions, I listened to 155 
deletions and watched video MPEG recordings of the screen during the deletion. If the feedback 
square moved to a different landmark and the speaker’s gaze track moved as a result, a deletion 
within this episode was considered a planning deletion (If you go to the well, if you look…that’s it 
yeah, that’s that’s the start). All remaining deletions which could not be pinned down as 
occurring for planning reasons were considered hesitation deletions (If you can turn west you sh-
…uh there’s a swan pond). Raw numbers of planning and hesitation deletions are given in Table 
10. More planning and hesitation examples from Experiment 1 are given in Appendix D. 
A second reliability study was performed in order to ensure that a cognitive classification 
system devised by the author in order to test predictions made in this thesis is also replicable by 
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future research. The system required a coder to judge whether a disfluency is due to planning or 
hesitation functions. The coder for this reliability test was an MSc. StudentTP15 PT in psycholinguistics. 
At the beginning of the training period, the coding system was presented by the author to the 
coder through the medium of MPEG video clips and detailed transcripts of the dialogue featured 
in the video. Following the training period, the coder was asked to code 66 disfluencies according 
to their function, i.e. either planning or hesitation. The coder and the author then met following 
each block of coding to discuss the judgments. In some cases (23 out of 112), the discussion led 
to a recoding of the disfluency in question; in other cases (89 out of 112), judgments were left as 
they originally were by both parties. Agreement for this reliability test was good for both Kappa 
(K = .73) and Krippendorff’s alpha (α =.74; .58 < α < .90). 
The results on disfluency and speaker attention suggest that Givers were more disfluent when 
the feedback square was on a wrong landmark.  These results did not take into account whether 
the Giver had actually attended to the landmark while he was disfluent. A second ANOVA for the 
proportion of disfluent, “looked at” feedback episodes showed that only time pressure affected 
the results.  It seems then that the Giver encounters difficulty when he or she has to reorient a lost 
Follower. It is immediately evident from Table 10 that no planning deletions occur in the No 
Feedback condition. Nor can they as they depend on feedback.  I will omit these cells when doing 
statistical analyses. 
 
Table 10. Distribution of planning and hesitation deletions in Experimental conditions Rates are given in 
parentheses. 











Planning 17 (.003) 32 (.004) 0 0 
Hesitation 21 (.004) 38 (.005) 24  (.005) 23  (.004) 
TOTAL 38 70 24 23 
 
Independent ANOVAs for hesitation deletion rate per word with Feedback (2: Feedback vs. 
8/5/078/5/07                                                          
TP
15
PT Thanks to Ryan Gramacy for assistance in this regard. 
No Feedback) x Time-pressure (2: Timed vs. Untimed) revealed no significant effects (Feedback: 
F1(1,23) = 0.286, p = .598; Feedback: .005  No Feedback: .004 ; Time-pressure: F1(1,23) = 0.043, 
p = .637; Timed: .004; Untimed: .004).  Likewise, an independent ANOVA for planning deletion 
rate per word for Time-pressure (2: Timed vs. Untimed) revealed no significant effects (Time-
pressure: F1(1,23) = 0.607, p = .444). Thus, there does not seem to be any clear association for the 




As outlined in Chapter 2, there are two hypotheses which make predictions regarding the 
effects of time-pressure and feedback on disfluency. The first hypothesis, the Strategic-Modelling 
view, may predict high disfluency rates throughout a dialogue when listener feedback is involved 
but no effect of time-pressure. Next, the Cognitive Burden view may also predict high disfluency 
rates when a listener is involved but highest rates when both feedback and time-pressure are 
present.  The purpose of the eye-gaze and disfluency analysis presented in this chapter is twofold: 
first we must ground the experimental paradigm to be certain that speakers respond to the novel 
visual stimulus. Once that is done, we can determine the chronology of interaction and whether a 
lost IF induces difficulty and therefore disfluency for the IG. 
The results from this experiment show that time-pressure does make for shorter trials and less 
speech.  A higher rate of Retrieval Transactions in the presence of listener feedback indicates that 
speakers do attend to the Follower’s visual Feedback.  Secondly, the fact that disfluency rate is 
highest in conditions in which visual feedback was present suggests a connection between the 
presence of feedback, Retrieval Transactions and disfluency. Perhaps, the Strategic- 
Modelling view does make the correct prediction and speakers use disfluency as a method for 
indicating their commitment to a listener.  
A breakdown by disfluency type, however, reveals that only deletions are responsible for the 
higher disfluency rates with feedback.  This finding suggests a possible link between deletions 
and the speaker’s remedy for an errant IF.  Clark & Wasow’s (1998) commitment hypothesis 
relied upon repetitions as evidence for their theory that disfluencies can be used as signals.  In 
contrast, the analysis presented in this chapter found a feedback effect with deletions, which are 
essentially a marker of the abandonment of a current utterance and therefore the exact opposite of 
a repair which involves repetition.  A further detailed analysis of deletions in which deletions 
were grouped according to the likely function of their occurrence revealed that deletions can 
occur for planning (Eh down the bottom bi-…You look like you’re looking in the wrong spot) or 
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hesitative reasons (Then right along to the right-hand corner of the page, there are….I think it 
said white mountain). Although hesitative deletions were more common on the whole, there were 
no significant results for individual ANOVAs for either feedback or time-pressure. Overall, the 
analysis as whole shows that deletions (and for that matter any type of disfluency) that are 
classified according to a purely word surface structure coding system (e.g. Lickley, 1998) can in 
fact differ in origin and function. The planning deletions show that speakers were sensitive to the 
visual stimulus as they abandoned their utterances upon observation of it; for some, this might not 
be considered disfluent at all but just natural speaker behaviour given the experimental task. 
Hesitative deletions, on the other hand, can be conceived of as a genuine disfluency. Further 
investigation of the function of deletions in a more natural setting is required and will be 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
At the outset of this chapter, I predicted according to the claims of Clark & Wasow’s 
continuity hypothesis that one could determine why a speaker retraces an utterance rather than 
simply beginning where they left off.  If speakers are repeating solely to facilitate a signalling 
function in production when they make a repetition, as predicted by Fox Tree and Clark (1997), it 
might be the case that the feedback manipulation would not affect the filled pause and repetition 
rates because they fulfil such specific functions. On the other hand, if speakers retrace utterances 
for the benefit of the listener or to maintain an acceptable social appearance, one would expect 
higher rates of repetition in interactive circumstances. Results in this chapter failed to find a 
significant difference between the no feedback and the interactive trials, although a near 
significant trend was observed. This result could suggest that perhaps the feedback manipulation 
used in this experiment did not permit speakers to fulfil the specific functions required to signal 
with repetitions and filled pauses because there was no difference in disfluency rate between 
feedback and no feedback trials. This does not however mean that repetitions and filled pauses 
are intentional signals in the manner suggested by Clark and Fox Tree (2002) and Fox Tree and 
Clark (1997). Closer examination of the patterns of individual subjects revealed that for 16 out of 
24 speakers the mean repetition rate in the feedback condition was greater than the mean 
repetition rate in the no feedback condition.  Thus, it would seem for the moment that individuals 
retrace for different reasons with some speakers ostensibly retracing for the benefit of the speaker.  
In the present experiment, speakers only had visual feedback from their listener. Perhaps 
repetition rates did not differ between conditions because speakers were not permitted any verbal 
feedback from participants. Further investigation which looks at the particular function of 
structural disfluency types is necessary.  
An analysis of disfluency and feedback episodes revealed that disfluency was linked to 
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situations during which the IF’s feedback was in a wrong location. When speaker attention and 
disfluency were analysed together, however, there was only a significant effect of time-pressure.  
Thus, all we conclude is that Givers were more disfluent when faced with the task of having to re-
align with a lost listener.  In taxing situations, as predicted by Pickering and Garrod (2004) an IG 
encounters fluency problems when attempting to re-align with the IF.  We must therefore 
conclude that we do not have any gaze-related evidence to support the Cognitive Burden view.  
Likewise, we cannot claim full support for the Strategic-Modelling view either because the 
current experiment did not find overwhelming support that Givers tracked their Followers 
assiduously, especially during periods when the Follower needed the most help. Furthermore, 
repetitions were not found to occur significantly more frequently in the feedback condition, as 
one would predict if they are truly being used as signals to the listener.  For the moment, there is 
no strong pattern between disfluency and gaze. 
Since this experiment used a surrogate for eye gaze rather than face-to-face interaction, there 
are a number of issues to consider regarding experimental control. For example, the experimenter 
was placed in charge of moving the red square in a timely and believable fashion.  As previously 
mentioned, if the experimenter missed a single wrong landmark cue or more than 30% of the 
correct landmark cues, the trial was discarded. Six subjects were replaced because their data did 
not meet the 70% capture rate criterion. Furthermore, all subjects were questioned during 
debriefing whether they found anything ‘odd’ about the movements of the red square. The results 
of any subjects who disbelieved the visual feedback were also discarded. No subjects were 
removed in Experiment 1 for this reason. 
Another issue that arises when considering the degree of experimental control is the fact that 
the red square provides both more (e.g. the precise location of the Follower) and less information 
(e.g. no facial cues or gestures) than is available during a face-to-face dialogue. This fact suggests 
that the results obtained in this experiment may pertain only to the specific paradigm. This does 
not mean that any results found in this experiment are invalid. I believe that the current paradigm 
is no less natural than phone conversations where interlocutors have only verbal feedback and yet 
still engage in collaborative dialogue or gaze experiments which require the participant to wear a 
head-mounted eye-tracker, a potentially unnatural situation for unpracticed participants. As in any 
experiment, however, the results reported in this chapter should be taken at face-value: when 
Givers are presented with a visual-only stimulus in a wrong location, they tend to incur more 
disfluencies when attempting to realign. As mentioned above, further experimentation on this 
issure is required to distinguish between the Strategic-Modelling and the Cognitive Burden views. 
Since this experiment tested only the Giver’s attention to visual feedback (i.e. a surrogate for 
 131
real gaze), it shows only part of what happens in a real dialogue. In fact to face dialogues, 
interlocutors have access to both visual and verbal feedback. In such a scenario, the Strategic-
Modelling view predicts that speakers will be capable of attending to both the visual and verbal 
feedback of the Follower without difficulty. The Cognitive Burden theory, on the other hand, 
predicts that disfluency will increase with task difficulty. In order to address these predictions, it 
would be worthwhile analyzing the relationships between disfluency, task difficulty and attention 
to the Follower’s feedback. This analysis will be the subject of Chapter 4.  
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Since the goal of this thesis is to address why disfluency occurs, an investigation that includes 
both visual and verbal feedback is necessary to approach what happens between people in real 
dialogue. In order to understand why disfluency occurs, one needs to know what sort of 
behaviours is associated with disfluency. Experiment 1 showed that Givers were more disfluent in 
the Feedback conditions when they could access visual feedback from the Follower. Such a 
finding is in line with the predictions of the Strategic-Modelling view, which predicts that 
speakers will signal commitment through disfluency only when a listener is present. When 
disfluencies were analyzed by type, however, only deletions were significantly more frequent in 
the presence of feedback. Fox Tree and Clark (1997) and Clark and Wasow (1998) predict that 
repetitions are signals of commitment made for the benefit of the listener. Experiment 1 showed 
that deletions, or abandoned moves, are actually more responsive which suggests that Clark and 
Wasow’s predictions need to be revisited. In terms of Giver attention to gaze, the previous 
chapter found that Givers were more disfluent when the Follower feedback square hovered over a 
wrong landmark. This is evidence in support of the Cognitive Burden theory, which predicts that 
Givers’ disfluency rate will increase with task difficulty.  The current chapter will revisit these 
tests of disfluency rate by type to see whether disfluency rate is affected differently by visual or 
verbal feedback. 
Another way to analyse the association between speaker behaviour and disfluency is to 
investigate what the speaker’s dialogue goals were when he or she became disfluent. Givers who 
participated in Experiment 1 were found to be most disfluent during Instruct Moves when 
compared to Interactive Moves. What types of Transactions cause the speaker to be more 
disfluent? The current chapter will present an analysis of this sort.  
Finally, as reported in Chapter 3, no reliable function of disfluency could be found from 
Experiment 1. The current chapter will revisit this issue by investigating the functions, i.e. 
planning or hesitation for repetitions and deletions. Recall that the Strategic Modelling View 
predicts that repetitions will be associated with a planning function, because they are made as 
signals of commitment for the listener. 
Although Experiment 1 provided an indication of the distribution of disfluency relative to 
feedback from a listener, it said nothing about the distribution when Givers have both visual and 
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verbal feedback. Thus, Experiment 2 uses the same screen-based task as Experiment 1, but gave 
Givers access to verbal feedback, to visual feedback, and in some cases both simultaneously. 
Disfluencies were classified both structurally and according to the ‘dialogue goal’ and for the 
function of the repair. Analyses of disfluency, dialogue goal and gaze was then conducted, the 
results of which are explained in this chapter. 
 
4.2 Rationale and Predictions 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Strategic-Modelling view predicts that speakers will signal 
their commitments to utterance and interlocutor through disfluency. In terms of attention, the 
Strategic-Modelling view predicts that speakers will attend to the listener’s feedback throughout a 
dialogue, especially in circumstances when the follower deviates from the planned route. 
According to one possible prediction of the Strategic-Modelling view, disfluency rate should be 
high once more in conditions where feedback is present and low in monologue conditions. 
Alternatively, as observed in Chapter 3, if the signalling function of repetitions and filled pauses 
is highly specialised, it might be the case that the feedback manipulation used in Experiment 1 did 
not allow speakers to make these specific signals. In order to further rule out this possibility in 
Experiment 2, we must make the feedback manipulation as close to dialogue as possible by 
adding verbal feedback. Furthermore, according to the predictions of the Strategic-Modelling 
view, the speaker should gaze most when the Follower is lost, that is at a wrong landmark or 
when the Follower indicates verbally with negative feedback that she needs help. According to 
the predictions of Clark and Wasow (1998), repetitions should occur for planning reasons because 
speakers use repetitions as signals of commitment to the utterance for the benefit of the listener. 
In contrast, the Cognitive Burden view predicts that speakers will avoid attending to 
information when the cognitive cost of doing so is high. In terms of responsiveness, Givers will 
only respond to the Follower’s needs when the cognitive cost of doing so is low.  This suggests 
that Givers do not monitor the listener.  According to the Cognitive Burden view, disfluency rate 
is predicted to be high when task difficulty is also high. In response to this difficulty, Givers are 
predicted to avoid attending to the Follower’s feedback occasionally, even if she indicates that 
she is lost. If the Giver does attend to difficult feedback, for example a lost Follower, the 
Cognitive Burden view predicts that disfluency rates will increase in these situations because the 
speaker has to pay a cost for this difficulty. Similarly, a Giver who is in the process of Retrieving 
a lost Follower would be predicted to be more disfluent because retrieving a lost Follower is more 
difficult than simply describing the route from landmark to landmark. 
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Table 11.  Table summarising the predictions for the Cogntive Burden and Strategic-Modelling Views with 
regards to the Independent variables Feedback, Time-pressure, and Group 
















































































































































































Chapter 3, Section 3.2 summarised the predictions of the Cognitive Burden and Strategic-
Modelling views with regards to the dependent and independent variables tested in Experiment 1. 
To these predictions Experiment 2 adds a between-subjects Group variable that tests whether a 
group that received Verbal feedback behaves differently in a Dual-feedback situation (i.e. both 
visual and verbal feedback are present simultaneously) from a group that received Visual 
feedback. As shown in Table 11, the Cognitive Burden view predicts that gazing should be easiest 
for those group participants who have had more exposure to the visual feedback, namely the 
Visual Group. The Strategic-Modelling view predicts that all speakers should attend to the 
listener’s feedback with the same frequency, regardless of whether they’ve had visual or verbal 
feedback in earlier trials. For the analysis of the Function of disfluency, the Cognitive Burden 
view predicts that it should be difficult for Verbal group Givers to adjust to the addition of visual 
feedback and therefore they would be more disfluent than Visual group Givers. The Strategic-
Modelling view predicts no difference in disfluency rates between groups in this case because 
both groups should signal equally.  
With regards to the independent variables of Feedback and Time-pressure, the Cognitive 
Burden and Strategic-Modelling views make the same predictions as presented in Table 3 (page 
98) in Chapter 3. If anything these predictions are enhanced by the addition of verbal feedback 
which makes the task more interactive on the one hand and therefore possibly harder for the 
speaker to manage on the other. If one modality of feedback conflicts with the other (e.g. the 
Follower says one thing but does another), then the speaker has the responsibility of clarifying the 
issue. In this respect, Experiment 2 is really a test of Cognitive Burden. 
 
4.3 Experiment 2 Method 
 
Experiment 1 showed evidence of poor uptake of visual wrong feedback, evidence which 
supports the Cognitive Burden view that speakers do not monitor their listeners during dialogue. 
Experiment 216 contrasted visual feedback with verbal feedback to assess whether the speaker 
responded differently to verbal feedback. In Experiment 2, the design crossed Time-pressure (2) 
with Feedback Modality (3). As for Experiment 1, Time-pressure in Experiment 2 could either be 
present or absent.  In the timed condition of Experiment 2, Givers were limited to two minutes, a 
8/5/078/5/07                                                          
16 This experiment was run by Catriona Havard in the Department of Psychology at the University of Glasgow. 
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minute longer than in Experiment 1. The Feedback condition in Experiment 2 consisted of a no-
feedback trial, a Single-Modality feedback trial and finally a Dual-Modality trial in which the 
speaker had access to both verbal and visual feedback. Experiment 2 actually consisted of two 
separate smaller experiments, Experiment 2A and Experiment 2B, which differed only in the 
Single-Modality. In Experiment 2A, the Single-Modality feedback consisted of only verbal 
feedback from a confederate participant. Experiment 2A Givers can be referred to as the ‘Verbal 
Group’. In Experiment 2B, the Single-Modality feedback consisted of only visual feedback. 
Experiment 2B Givers will be referred to as the ‘Visual Group’.  Like the visual feedback, the 
verbal feedback was not derived from a naïve participant but instead a confederate who read from 
a prepared script. The confederate’s comments were designed to reflect a lost follower with 
statements such as I don’t see it as well as affirmations Yeah, that’s fine.  Confederates were 
requested to stay as close as possible to the provided script but could add backchannels like yeah 
or Ok when necessary.  
In the Dual-Modality trials of both Experiment 2A and 2B, each trial was pre-programmed to 
contain both consonant and dissonant verbal visual feedback pairs so that a Follower’s red square 
might be physically located on the correct landmark but the verbal feedback from the confederate 
reflects confusion (I don’t see it). Alternatively, the Follower’s square could deviate off the route 
while the confederate responds as if she understands where she should be (Yep, got that). Finally, 
consonant feedback pairs (ie. visual-positive and verbal-positive; visual-negative and verbal-
negative) also occurred.  In this way, it was possible to test whether the speaker responded 
differently to the separate types of feedback.  The visual feedback provides the speaker with an 
exact description of where the follower actually is at the moment where the verbal feedback 
conveys only a sense of where the speaker believes s/he should be. The theory of disfluency as a 
sign of cognitive burden predicts that speakers should be most disfluent in times of difficulty, 
hence when the follower has deviated off-course. 
  
4.4 Experimental Procedure 
 
The majority of the Experimental Procedure for Experiment 2 reduplicated the procedure used 
in Experiment 1. The same rooms, eye-tracking equipment, eye-tracking software, video 
recording software, and audio equipment were re-used. The role of confederate Information 
Follower was played by a different graduate student from the Psychology Department at the 
University of Glasgow.  
As discussed in Section 3.5, there is a possibility that IGs could have used their gaze deicticly 
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to point out the correct location because they believed that the IF could see their gaze. The 
experimenter once again explained that the IG would be able to see the IF’s gaze but the IF 
wouldn not be able to see the IG’s gaze. To be sure that no IGs used their gaze in a deictic 
fashion, the transcripts and videos from Experiment 2A and 2B were examined and no indication 
(i.e. explicitly deictic language indicating that gaze was being used to point as observed by Clark 
and Krych, 2004) was found. Two subjects were replaced because they were suspicious of the 
confederate participant. 
Thirty-six participants from the community of The University of Glasgow partook in 
Experiment 2 in exchange for £5 per hour. The same subject criterion for normal uncorrected 
vision was upheld. A subject’s data was discarded if the data did not meet the criteria for 
feedback or capture quality. The data from thirteen subjects were discarded because less their data 
fell below the 70% capture rate criterion. These subjects were replaced with an additional thirteen 
subjects so that a total of fifty-one participants were needed (i.e. and additional thirteen to uphold 
the 70% capture criterion and an additional two to uphold the “naïve” nature of the confederate) 
in order to obtain thirty-six usable trials.  A copy of the instruction sheet and the consent form 
that the subjects were asked to sign is given in Appendix AA. 
 
4.5 Experimental Design 
 
Experiment 2 was run on 36 subjects according to 3 x 2 Repeated Measures design for 
Feedback Modality (3) x Time-pressure (2).  Feedback-was within-subjects variable with 3 levels: 
no feedback, during which the speaker received no feedback whatsoever from the Follower, a 
Single-Modality feedback, during which the speaker received either visual or verbal feedback, 
and Dual-Modality feedback, during which the speaker received both visual and verbal feedback.  
Feedback type in the Single-Modality condition was a between-subjects variable. The 18 Subjects 
who participated in Experiment 2A received a verbal-only feedback condition and the 18 subjects 
in Experiment 2B received a visual-only feedback condition. Each subject participated in 6 trials 
using a new map each time. Time-pressure was a within-subjects variable. Time-limited trials had 




Since there were six conditions, the same four maps from Experiment 1 were used again and 
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an additional two maps from the HCRC Map Task corpus were re-used17.  The addition of verbal 
feedback meant that more landmarks had to be added to all the maps so that each map contained 8 
visual=correct verbal=positive landmarks, 3 visual= correct verbal= negative landmarks, 3 
visual=wrong verbal=positive landmarks and 3 visual=wrong verbal=negative landmarks. 
As explained in Chapter 3, Materials Section 3.4, the visual feedback used in the MONITOR 
project was designed to correspond to the mismatched landmarks that subjects encountered in the 
HCRC Map Task Corpus. Similarly, the verbal feedback was designed to correspond to the 
original mismatch. For example, if the IG had 2 Allotments landmarks, the first one on the route 
at the top of the page and the second one at the bottom of the page, the IF would indicate a 
mismatch by going to the second Allotments landmark and whilst providing negative verbal 
feedback I don’t see it.  The schedule of verbal and visual feedback for the Crane Bay map is 
shown below. All other schedules appear in Appendix F. 
 
LM    Verbal Response   Visual FB 
Start / Sandy Shore:  Ok got that.    Correct 
Well:    Ok, yes.    Correct 
Hills:    Yep, fine    Correct 
Local Residents:               Can’t see it   Correct 
Iron Bridge:   I don’t see it   Wrong 
Wood:    Okay, fine   Correct 
Forked Stream:   Got it.    Wrong 
Farmed Land 1:  Don’t know where you mean.  Wrong 
Dead Tree:   Okay, got it.   Correct 
Pine Grove:   Ok, got that   Wrong 
Farmedland 2:   Can’t see it.   Correct 
Lagoon:    Yep, got it.   Wrong 
Crab Island:   Ok, I’m with you   Correct 
Rock Fall:   No, not with you.   Correct 
CCSub18:   Stop, where’s that?  Wrong 
Pirate ship / Finish:  Yes, ok.    Correct 
 
 
Figure 18. The schedule of verbal and visual feedback for the Crane Bay map 
8/5/078/5/07                                                          
17 See Appendix E for the full set of Experiment 2 maps. 
18 CCSub = Computer Controlled Submarine 
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Maps were paired and then run through a Latin Square design where order of presentation, 
experimental condition and subject were counter-balanced. This order can be seen in Appendix G. 
For example, the ‘Crane Bay’ map and the ‘Safari’ map were subjected to all of the experimental 
conditions. In order to ensure that there was no effect of map difficulty, the rate of words per 
number of landmarks was submitted to an ANOVA with a 6-valued independent variable for 
Maps. This ANOVA failed to retrieve a significant effect for Map (F1(5,170) = 1.44, p = .214). 
This suggests that although one of the maps had 18 landmarks (Pyramid), four maps had 17 
landmarks (Diamond Mine, Mountain, Safari, Telephone Kiosk) and one map had 16 landmarks 
(Crane Bay), these maps took the same amount of work to complete. 
 
4.7 Data Coding 
 
The dialogues were transcribed and coded for disfluencies, Conversational Moves and 
Transactions in the manner explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.7.1. The eye-gaze data from the 
videos was coded frame by frame in Observer Pro software at The University of Glasgow19, as 
explained in Chapter 3.  
The procedure of Experiment 2 introduced a new form of data: verbal feedback from the 
Follower. Verbal feedback was first transcribed verbatim in a separate file from the transcript of 
the Giver. Later, this was coded at the University of Edinburgh20 in a similar fashion to visual 
feedback as either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. Positive verbal feedback Yeah got it indicates that the 
confederate Follower understood which landmark she was meant to find. Negative No, not with 
you feedback suggests that the confederate was confused and unaware. The verbal feedback was 
transcribed, time-stamped and then output into a separate XML file for analysis. 
4.7.1 Coder Reliability 
 
The Coder Reliability tests used for Experiment 2 were the same as those used for 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 3, Section 3.7.4).  
 
 
8/5/078/5/07                                                          
19 Thanks to Catriona Havard for assistance in this manner 
20 Thanks to Yiya Chen for overseeing the coding and transcription of all Experiment 2 dialogues. 
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4.7.2 Data Analysis 
 
The data were analyzed in a similar fashion to the analysis method described in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.7.5.  For analyses which involved the fine details of timing of disfluency with regard to 
gaze (see Section 4.9), I accessed the data by referring to the time-stamped XML files and by 
watching the MPEG video files. The results of such an analysis are described in Section 4.12. 
 
4.8 Words and Speech Overall 
 
Tables 12 and 13 show the overall distribution of transactions, words, disfluencies, filled pauses 
and average time a trial took for the Verbal and Visual groups, respectively.  Transaction and 
word counts are broken down into Normal, Retrieval and Other (e.g. Irrelevant, Review and 
Overview) Transactions to show where the most speech occurs. Appendix H shows the Total 
distribution for both Experiment 2A and 2B combined as well as by subject. 
 
4.8.1 Word Count 
 
Word counts for whole and part-words show less speech with time-pressure (418 words/trial 
on average) than without (580): (FB1B (1,34) = 25.34, p < .001).  Visual Group Single-Modality 
trials (461 words) were shorter than the corresponding Dual-Modality trials (585 words) 
(Feedback Modality x Group: (FB1 B(2,68) = 8.87, p < .001; Bonferroni: t = -6.6, p <  .003, α < 
.003). For the Verbal Group, No Feedback trials (355 words) were shorter than both Single-
Modality trials (545) and Dual-Modality trials (611) (Bonferroni: t = -5.87, p < .003, α < .003; 
Bonferroni: t = -5.22, p < .003, α < .003), which did not differ. The interaction between 







Table 12 Total speech, total disfluencies, and average time spent for the Verbal Group (Experiment 2A) 
 Timed Untimed 
MEASURE None One Dual None One Dual 
Transactions 256 384 398 282 422 454 
Normal   252 263 279 276 304 324 
Retrieval   0 106 116 0 106 122 
Others 4 15 3 6 12 8 
Words 5235 8180 9134 7502 11417 12810 
Normal 5179 5261 5790 7386 7338 8769 
Retrieval 0 2798 3305 0 3880 3967 
Others 56 121 39 116 199 74 
Time in Seconds 121.81 189.33 214.94 186.66 277.73 311.66 
Disfluencies 152 249 265 203 446 530 
Repetitions 59 84 87 95 205 251 
Substitutions 54 91 87 58 120 122 
Insertions 27 38 34 27 62 63 
Deletions 12 36 57 23 59 94 







Table 13 Total speech, total disfluencies, and average time spent for the Visual Group (Experiment 2B) 
 Timed Untimed 
MEASURE None One Dual None One Dual 
Transactions 239 259 342 303 334 427 
Normal   232 240 243 298 296 295
Retrieval   2 18 93 0 34 123
Others 5 1 6 5 4 9
Words 6596 7443 8553 9133 9121 12443 
Normal 6403 7022 5819 9038 8257 8600
Retrieval 175 411 2711 0 819 3804
Others 18 10 23 95 45 39
Time in Seconds 149.00 158.93 188.13 208.63 219.30 285.98 
Disfluencies 150 180 240 183 219 366 
Repetitions 60 64 91 61 57 135
Substitutions 57 75 68 73 89 118
Insertions 22 18 23 29 33 42
Deletions 11 23 58 20 40 71
Filled Pauses 157 181 221 280 259 369 
 
4.8.2 Word Count 
 
Word counts for whole and part-words show less speech with time-pressure (418 words/trial 
on average) than without (580): (F1 (1,34) = 25.34, p < .001).  Visual Group Single-Modality 
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trials (461 words) were shorter than the corresponding Dual-Modality trials (585 words) 
(Feedback Modality x Group: (FB1 B(2,68) = 8.87, p < .001; Bonferroni: t = -6.6, p <  .003, α < 
.003). For the Verbal Group, No Feedback trials (355 words) were shorter than both Single-
Modality trials (545) and Dual-Modality trials (611) (Bonferroni: t = -5.87, p < .003, α < .003; 
Bonferroni: t = -5.22, p < .003, α < .003), which did not differ. The interaction between 
Feedback-Modality and Group is depicted in Figure 19. 
 



















Figure 19. Raw word counts for both the Verbal and Visual Groups in Experiment 2 
  
Since Dual-Modality conditions do not differ between groups (Verbal: 610, Visual: 584), we can 
use this condition to examine the relationships between disfluency and gaze or dialogue events.   
 
4.8.3 Speech Rate 
 
I also examined speech rate in order to be certain that experimental conditions are comparable 
for the disfluency analyses.  To calculate speech rate, I divided the number of Giver words per 
map by the total Giver speaking time for the map (the summed durations of all conversational 
moves less the summed durations of both filled and simple pauses). Time-pressure had no 
significant effect on speech rate. The interaction between Feedback Modality and Group 
(F B1B(2,68) = 4.87, p < .02) presented in Figure 20, is due only to a difference between the No-
Feedback (.34) and Dual-Modality (.30) conditions for the Verbal Group (Bonferroni, p =  .006, 
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α  < .003). Again Dual-Modality conditions are alike. 
 








Figure 20.  Mean Speech rate (word / Total speaking time ) in seconds from Feedback Modality for the 
Visual and Verbal Groups 
 
4.8.4 Transaction Rate 
 
To understand how Givers break the route description down into sub-goals, I analyzed the 
number of Normal, Retrieval and Other transactions per trial.  A Normal transaction occurs when 
the speaker provides instructions to get from one landmark to the next. The raw number of 
Normal transactions was submitted to an ANOVA for Feedback-Modality (3) x Time-pressure (2) 
x Group (2).  The untimed conditions (16.6 per trial) contained more Normal transactions than the 
timed condition (13.97) (Time-pressure: F B1 B(1,34) = 26.66, p < .001).  There were no other 
significant results or interactions for Normal transactions. The result for time-pressure reflects the 
fact that when speakers have more time, they will say more. 
Recall that each map had 9 scheduled landmarks with either wrong visual feedback or 
negative verbal feedback (i.e. 3 visual=wrong verbal=positive landmarks, 3 visual=wrong 
verbal=negative landmarks and 3 visual=correct verbal=negative landmarks). The Giver could be 
expected to retrieve a lost Follower in any of these situations. 
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Figure 21. Transaction rate per trial by transaction type and condition in Experiment 2A: The Verbal 
Group 






















Figure 22.Transaction rate per trial by transaction type and condition in Experiment 2B: The Visual Group 
 
 
Instead, a different pattern emerged when the rate of Retrieval transactions per trial was 
submitted to a Mixed Between and Within by-subjects ANOVA for Feedback Modality (3) x 
Time-pressure (2) x Group (2). In terms of Feedback Modality, Verbal Group Givers made more 
retrievals in their Single-Feedback modality (5.89) than Visual Group Givers made in their 
Single-Feedback modality (1.44)  (Feedback Modality x Group: F B1B(2,68) = 55.44, p < .001; 
Bonferroni t = 10.04, p < .001, α < .003). This result suggests that Givers respond more often to 
verbal feedback than to visual feedback.  The same interaction also revealed that Verbal Group 
Givers made more Retrieval transactions in the Single-Feedback (5.89) and the Dual-Feedback 
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(6.61) modality than in the No Feedback modality (.000) (Bonferroni t-tests, p < .001, α < .003).  
Visual Group Givers made more Retrievals in the Dual-Feedback modality (6.00) than in either 
the Single-Feedback (1.44) or No Feedback (.056) modality (Bonferroni t-tests, p < .001, α < 
.003). 
In terms of Time-pressure, Givers in the Verbal Group retrieved more often in both the timed 
(4.11) and untimed (4.22) conditions than Visual Group Givers did in their timed (2.09) or 
untimed (2.91) conditions (Time-pressure x Group: FB1B(1,34) = 6.36, p < .02; Bonferroni t-tests, p 
< .001, α < .008).  An interaction between Time-pressure and Feedback showed that Givers 
retrieved more often in the Timed Dual-Feedback modality (5.81) than in either the Timed 
Single-Feedback (3.44) or Timed No Feedback (.056) modality (Time-pressure x Feedback 
Modality: F B1B(2,68) = 4.94, p = .01; Bonferroni t-tests, p < .001, α < .003). The difference between 
Single-Feedback (3.44) and No Feedback (.056) modalities was significant (Bonferroni t = -
12.16, p < .001, α < .003). In the Untimed condition, the same pattern emerged: Givers retrieved 
more in the Dual-Feedback modality (6.81) than in the Single-Feedback (3.89) or No Feedback 
modality (.000) (Bonferroni t-tests, p < .001, α < .003).  Once again, the difference between 
Single and No Feedback modalities was significant (Bonferroni t = -12.47, p < .001, α < .003). 
The rate of Other (Review, Overview and Irrelevant) transactions per trial was also submitted 
to an ANOVA for Feedback Modality (2) x Time-pressure (2) x Group (2). There was a 
significant interaction between Feedback Modality x Group (FB1B(2,68) = 4.83, p < .02) which 
showed that Verbal Group Givers had the highest rate of Other transactions in the Single-
Feedback modality (.75) compared to any of the other cells (Verbal Group: No Feedback: .306; 
Dual: .306; Visual Group No Feedback: .278; Single: .139; Dual: .417).  Post-hoc comparisons 




Recall from Chapter 2 that Anderson et al. (submitted) report raw gaze patterns (i.e. average 
time spent fixating on feedback) which show that speakers in the MONITOR Project avoided 
gazing at the Follower feedback when it hovered over a wrong landmark.  For Experiment 2, 
Anderson et al. report that when speakers were presented with verbal feedback, their tendency to 
gaze at the Follower increased.  These results show that verbal feedback affects Giver gaze in 
terms of total fixation. Is the same result true for an analysis of Giver gaze per feedback episode? 
This measure is important because a similar measure, disfluency per gazed at episodes, will be 
used later in order to test the relationship between disfluency and Giver attention. Furthermore, it 
is necessary to determine whether all conditions (e.g. verbal = negative visual = correct versus 
verbal = wrong visual = wrong) in which a Giver might gaze at a feedback square actually 
succeeded in directing the Giver’s attention to the square.  
To check for overlap of gaze between Giver and purported Follower feedback, the video 
record of feedback and Giver Gaze were analyzed frame by frame for the landmark at which each 
was directed. When Follower Gaze and Giver Gaze were on the same landmark, the Giver was 
considered to be looking at the feedback square. The No Feedback condition has shown us what 
the baseline gaze time if for landmarks when there is no feedback from the Follower.  A feedback 
episode, or task sub-portion containing feedback, starts with the departure of the feedback square 
for a landmark and continues until the feedback square departs for the next landmark. A by-
subjects ANOVA with the number of feedback episodes as the dependent variable was run with 
Group (2: Experiment 2A vs. Experiment 2B), Verbal Feedback (2: positive vs. negative) and 
Visual Feedback (2: correct vs. wrong) as independent factors. 
Givers did not make use of all their opportunities by any means (Figure 23). Nor did they use 
their opportunities equally in all conditions (Visual Feedback x Verbal Feedback: F1(1,34) = 7.70, 
p < .01). Strangely enough, Givers used fewest opportunities in an important concordant 
condition, where the Follower was clearly lost: the Follower square was hovering over a wrong 
landmark while the Follower simultaneously provided negative verbal feedback (verbal=positive 
visual=correct: .366). 
 

















Figure 23. Proportion of feedback episodes attracting speaker gaze to feedback square in Experiment 2A 
and 2B: Effects of combinations of visual and verbal feedback in dual channel conditions 
 
These attracted fewer looks than another concordant condition – when the Follower needed no 
help because she was in the right place and said so (verbal=positive, visual=correct: .511). 
 148
 149
Similarly, Givers looked less when the Follower was lost but claimed not to be (verbal=positive 
visual=negative: .448) than when she was correct but claimed to be lost (verbal=negative 
visual=correct: .591) (Bonferroni t-tests, p = .005, α < .008).  Put simply speakers are most likely 
to track listeners, when the listener’s location falls under their own gaze, which is occupied by the 
things they are describing. Apparently, speakers prefer not to go off-route to learn the 




Experiment 1 found that speakers were more disfluent in interactive circumstances. How does 
the addition of verbal feedback in Experiment 2 affect this tendency? In order to answer this 
question, I plotted disfluency rate under each experimental condition. Once again, because 
disfluencies are more common in longer utterances (Bard et al, 2001; Oviatt, 1995; Plauché & 
Shriberg, 1999) the disfluency rate per total words was plotted.  Rates were calculated for entire 
trials speaker by speaker. Overall, there were 3183 speech repair disfluencies (Verbal Group: 
1845; Visual Group: 1338) and 2931 filled pauses (Verbal Group: 1464; Visual Group: 1467).  
Disfluency rates from both experiments were submitted to a Mixed by-subjects ANOVA for 
Group (2: Verbal vs. Visual) x Time-Pressure (2: timed vs. untimed) x Feedback Modality (3: 
none, Single or Dual-Modality).  Interactive conditions were more prone to disfluency: the Dual-
Modality condition (.030) and the Single-Modality (.028) condition were both more disfluent than 
the No Feedback (.024) condition (Feedback Modality: FB1B(2,68) = 8.04, p = .001). There was no 
significant difference between the Dual-Modality and Single-Modality conditions for disfluency 
rates alone.  The results for the Verbal Group are shown in Figure 24 and the results for the 
Visual Group are depicted in Figure 25. Since Single and Dual-Modality conditions do not differ, 
we can proceed to examine only the Dual-Modality conditions in the expectation that conflicting 
feedback (only found in the Dual Modality) per se is not an overall cause of disfluency.  
A by subjects ANOVA of disfluency rate per words which included filled pauses revealed a 
similar finding to the one just reported about disfluency rates alone.  Givers were more disfluent 
in the Dual-Modality condition (.058) than in the No Feedback condition (.05) (Feedback 
Modality: FB1B(2,68) = 4.98, p = .01).  There was no significant difference between the Single-
Modality and Dual-Modality condition. As in the ANOVA of disfluency rates alone, the ANOVA 
including filled pauses revealed no significant interactions at all. 
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Figure 24. Rates of Disfluencies per fluent words for Experiment 2A, Verbal group. 
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Figure 25. Rates of Disfluencies per fluent words for Experiment 2B, Visual group 
  
4.10.1 Disfluency Types 
 
Experiment 1 found a result contrary to the predictions of the Strategic-Modelling view that 
repetitions might occur more frequently in interactive circumstances if they are true strategic 
signals.  Could it be the case that the paradigm in Experiment 1 wasn’t interactive enough 
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because it didn’t have verbal feedback? To test this hypothesis and to determine the frequency of 
different disfluency types according the experimental conditions, I conducted independent 
analyses for each type of disfluency. The total counts of disfluencies in Experiment 2A and 2B 
are shown in Table 14. An initial investigation of disfluency types overall suggests differences 
between deletions and repetitions.  Figure 26 displays the distributions of all disfluency types 
across experimental conditions for the Verbal Group. Figure 27 displays the distributions of 
disfluency types across experimental conditions for the Visual Group.  Disfluency rate in this 
instance was calculated by dividing the total number of disfluency of a given type by the number 
of words for that trial.  
 
Table 14. Distribution of disfluencies according to type in the Verbal and Visual Groups 
 Repetitions Substitutions Insertions Deletions Filled Pauses 
Verbal Group 781 532 251 281 1464 
Visual Group 468 480 167 223 1467 
 
As was the case for Experiment 1, deletion rate showed a significant effect of feedback: 
Deletion rate rose significantly with each additional Feedback Modality (No Feedback .002, 
Single .004, Dual .007; F1(2,68) = 21.02, p < .001). There were no effects of time-pressure on 
deletion rate and no significant interactions.  A by-subject ANOVA of only Verbal Group 
subjects revealed that speakers made more deletions in the Dual-Modality condition (.007) than in 
the No Feedback modality (.003) (Experiment 2A: Feedback Modality: F1(2,34) = 7.65, p < .01).  
Similarly, an by-subject ANOVA for only the Visual Group revealed that speakers deleted more 
often in the Dual-Modality condition (.006) than they did in either the Single-Modality condition 
(.004) or the No Feedback condition (.002) (Experiment 2B: Feedback Modality: F1(2,34) = 
15.28, p < .001). 
Repetition rate was submitted to an ANOVA for Feedback-Modality (3) x Time-pressure (2) x 
Group (2).  Although there was a significant interaction between Time-pressure x Group, internal 
comparisons were not significant (F1(1,34) = 6.16, p < .02; Experiment 2A Timed: .009; 
Untimed: .012; Experiment 2B Timed: .009; Untimed: .008).  Though Verbal Group speakers 
considered alone showed no effect of conditions the Visual Group subjects had a higher repetition 
rate in the Dual-Modality condition (.011) than in either the Single-Modality (.007) or the No 
Feedback Modality condition (.007) (Feedback Modality: F1(2,34) = 6.66, p < .01). 
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Figure 28. Rates of Disfluencies and Filled Pauses for Experiment 2A Verbal group 
 





















Figure 29. Rates of Disfluencies and Filled Pauses for Experiment 2B, Visual group 
 
 
ANOVA for Feedback Modality (3) x Time-pressure (2) x Group (2) showed no effects on 
substitutions rate. Similarly, Insertion rate was also submitted to an ANOVA of Feedback 
Modality (3) x Time-pressure (2) x Group (2).  Speakers from the Verbal Group (.005) made 
more insertions than speakers from the Visual Group (.003) (Group: F1(1,34) = 6.02, p < .02).  
A disfluency type analysis revealed an expected result.  Deletions were once again associated 
with highly-interactive environments.  As shown in Chapter 3, it could be the case that speakers 
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make deletions for planning purposes. It makes sense that deletions should occur most in the 
Dual-Modality conditions because in these conditions the speaker has access to both visual and 
verbal feedback and can therefore see when the Follower’s square diverts off-course or hear signs 
of hesitation or uncertainty.  In these cases, the speaker abandons an utterance they were currently 
producing in favour of assisting the Follower or to provide confirmation that the Follower has 
reached the targeted landmark.  As shown in Chapter 3, it could be the case that speakers make 
deletions for planning reasons. Repetitions also showed an effect of Feedback Modality for the 
Visual Group so the Strategic-Modelling prediction that the feedback manipulation used in this 
experiment would not affect repetition rate is disconfirmed, at least for the Verbal Group. This 
suggests that repetitions might also occur for planning reasons. An investigation of these two 
types of disfluencies can show not only the differences between them but can also be used to 
distinguish between the Cognitive Burden and Strategic-Modelling views. I will investigate this 
issue in Section 4.13. 
 
4.10.2 Filled Pause Rate 
 
Figures 28 and 29 (page 153) show the rates of filled pauses per words for Experiment 2A and 
Experiment 2B, respectively.  Independent by-subjects ANOVAs of filled pause rate per fluent 
word failed to reveal any significant effects for Feedback (F1(2,68) = .303, p = .740).  There was 
a near significant trend for Time-pressure: Givers made more filled pauses in Untimed conditions 
(.028) compared to Timed (.025) (F1(1,34) = 3.31, p = .078).  As shown in Section 4.8.1, untimed 
trials were lengthier in terms of words.  Bard et al. (2001) and Oviatt (1995) have shown that 
disfluency rate increases in longer trials.  It could be the case that filled pause rate increases as a 
function of the number of words in a trial.  This fact is not investigated further here since the 
effect did not reach significance. 
 
4.11 Disfluency rate in Transactions 
 
Section 4.8.4 showed that Normal transactions were as expected the most common type of 
Transaction and that Retrieval Transactions were more common in the presence of feedback than in 
the No Feedback condition. Chapter 3 investigated the rate of disfluencies within particular 
Conversational Move types to find evidence of the speaker’s goals with regard to speech when they 
became disfluent.  In the current section, I extend this analysis to Transaction types to determine 
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whether disfluency was associated with any transaction-level speech goals. Results are reported as 
disfluency rate by transaction type: the number of disfluencies of a given type for any particular 
speaker within that speaker’s transactions of the given type divided by the speaker’s total words 
uttered within transactions of that given type. The dependent variable was then submitted to a by-
subject ANOVA where Transaction Type (2: Normal vs. Retrieval), Time-pressure (2), Feedback 
Modality (2) and Group (2) were independent factors. The No Feedback conditions were omitted in 
this ANOVA because as Section 4.8.4 explained and Figures 21 and 22 (page 146) illustrate, there 
are few retrieval transactions in these conditions. 
4.11.1 Overall Disfluency Rate 
 
Overall, disfluency rates were higher in Retrieval transactions (.037) than in Normal 
transactions (.030) (Transaction: F B1B(1,34) = 14.50, p = .001).  A significant interaction between 
Transaction x Group, however, revealed that the disfluency rate of Retrieval transactions for the 
Verbal Group (.046) was higher than the rate of disfluency in Normal transactions in the same 
group (.031) (Transaction x Group: FB1B(1,34) = 14.94, p < .001; Bonferroni t = -5.17, p < .001, α < 
.003).   
Visual Group Givers were more disfluent in the Dual-Feedback modality (.033) than they 
were in the Single-Feedback modality (.023) (Feedback Modality x Group: F B1B(1,34) = 6.24, p = 
.02; Bonferroni t = -3.25, p = .005, α  <.008). In terms of Time-pressure, Givers were more 
disfluent overall in Untimed Retrieval transactions (.042) than they were in Untimed Normal 
Transactions (.031) (Transaction x Time-pressure: F B1B(1,34) = 4.51, p < .05; Bonferroni t = -3.69, 
p = .002, α  <.008). 
The Transaction x Group interaction which showed a significant difference for the Verbal 
Group might be due to a particular subject in the Verbal Group who made many more 
disfluencies than most subjects.  An ANOVA for disfluency rate per words in transaction was 
rerun without the outlying subject.  There were no differences between these results and the 
previous ANOVA for disfluency overall. 
4.11.2 Repetitions 
 
An ANOVA for repetition rate within transactions for Transaction Type (2) x Feedback 
Modality (2) x Time-pressure (2) x Group (2) including the outlier revealed that Visual Group 
Givers made more repetitions in the Dual-Feedback modality (.012) than they did in the Single-
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Feedback visual modality (.006) (Feedback Modality x Group: F B1B(1,34) = 15.41, p <.05; 
Bonferroni t = -5.62, p < .001, α < .008). There was also a significant interaction between 
Transaction x Group (F B1B(1,34) = 8.48, p <.05; Normal Transaction: Verbal: .011; Visual: .01; 
Retrieval Transactions Verbal: .015; Visual: .008) but post-hoc tests were not significant.  
Once again, the ANOVA for repetition rate for Transaction Type (2) x Feedback Modality (2) 
x Time-pressure (2) x Group (2) was rerun without the outlying subject from the Verbal Group.  
Without the outlying subject, Givers made more repetitions in Retrieval Transactions in the Dual-
Feedback condition (.014) than in Retrieval Transactions in the Single-Feedback condition (.007) 
(Transaction Type x Feedback Modality: F B1 B(1,33) = 5.50, p <.05; Bonferroni, t = -3.764, p = .002, 
α < .008).  Givers also made more repetitions in the Dual-Feedback in Retrieval Transactions 
(.014) than in Normal Transactions (.008) in the Single-Feedback modality (.008) (Bonferroni, t = 
-3.364, p = .004, α < .008).   
The outlying subject, subject 15, appears to have made enough repetitions in both Normal and 
Retrieval Transactions to cancel out these effects for the whole Group when his rates were 
included.  In fact, most of the disfluencies made by this subject were repetitions at the beginning 
of a clause, for example where the repetition reparandum is highlighted in bold text and then we 
are going to…we are going to travel along eh just the top of that missionary camp or this 
example from the same dialogue em and then you are going to bear…you are going to bear east 
until you come to the…until you come to the extreme right of the stones.  The means of subject 
15 are compared to the other 17 subjects’ means in Table 15.  The repetitions for the other 17 
Verbal Group Givers tended to have shorter reparanda than reparanda in Subject 15’s repetitions, 
for example where the reparandum is indicated in bold: If you just go ehm…go up the page about 





An ANOVA for substitution rate per words in transactions for Transaction Type (2) x 
Feedback Modality (2) x Time-pressure (2) x Group (2) including the outlying subject revealed a 
significant main effect of Time-pressure (F B1B(1,34) = 10.40, p <.01; Timed: .006; Untimed: .009) 
as well as two significant three-way interactions. An interaction between Transaction Type x 
Time-pressure x Group showed that Visual Group Givers made more substitutions in Untimed 
Retrieval Transactions (.014) than Givers from the same group made substitutions in Timed 
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Retrievals (.005) (Time-pressure x Transaction Type x Group: F B1B(1,34) = 10.68, p =.002; 
Bonferroni, t = -4.229, p = .001, α < .002). 
 
Table 15. Mean raw disfluencies by type across all conditions for the Verbal Group 
    Repetitions Substitutions Insertions Deletions 




3.96 4.62 2.06 2.24 
Verbal Group 
with subject 15 
7.23 4.92 2.32 2.60 
 
Verbal Group Givers made were more prone to substitutions in Untimed Retrieval transactions 
(.015) than they were in Untimed Normal transactions (.01) (Bonferroni t = -3.89, p = .001, α < 
.002). A Between Group effect showed that Verbal Group Givers made more substitutions in 
Timed Retrieval Transactions (.016) than Visual Group Givers made substitutions in Timed 
Retrieval Transactions (.005) (Bonferroni, t = 4.84, p < .001, α < .002).  Although there was a 
significant interaction between Transaction Type x Time-Pressure x Feedback, internal 
comparisons were not significant (F B1B(1,34) = 6.03, p < .02). 
An ANOVA for substitution rate for Transaction Type (2) x Feedback Modality (2) x Time-
pressure (2) x Group (2) without the outlying disfluent subject revealed the same results for the 
Transaction Type x Time-pressure x Group interaction that were observed when the outlying 
subject was included.  One three-way interaction showed significant results without the outlying 
subject: the Verbal Group were more prone to Retrieval Transactions in the Single-Modality 
(.017) than speakers from the same group were prone to Normal Transactions in Single-Feedback 
modality (.011) (Transaction Type x Feedback Modality x Group: FB1 B(1,33) = 4.27, p <.05; 
Bonferroni, t = -4.62, p < .001, α < .002).  Thus, it seems that the only difference the outlying 
subject was responsible for in substitutions was the difference between Normal and Retrievals in 
the Single-Feedback Modality.  The outlying subject made enough substitutions in both 
transaction types to cancel out the overall Group effect. 





















Figure 30. Disfluency rate per words in Normal Transactions for Verbal and Visual Groups of Experiment 
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An ANOVA for insertion rate for Transaction Type (2) x Feedback Modality (2) x Time-
pressure (2) x Group (2) per words revealed only that Retrieval Transactions (.006) were more 
 158
 159
prone to disfluency than Normal Transactions (.004) (F B1B(1,34) = 5.33, p <.05). There was no 




Finally, an ANOVA for deletion rate revealed that deletion rate was higher in the Dual-
Feedback modality (.008) than in the Single-Feedback modality (.005) (Feedback Modality: 
F B1B(1,34) = 7.57, p < .01). Givers from the Verbal Group made more deletions per word in 
Retrieval Transactions (.009) than in Normal Transactions (.005) (Transaction Type x Group: 
F B1B(1,34) = 7.26, p <.02; Bonferroni, t = -3.70, p = .002, α = .008). There were no changes to the 




This section has investigated speaker disfluency behaviour by looking at which Transaction 
types were more prone to disfluency. Overall, Retrievals seem to be more prone to higher rates of 
disfluency, although there were reasons to expect that an outlying subject influenced some of the 
results. For the analysis of all disfluency types combined, an ANOVA including the outlying 
subject revealed that Retrievals were more prone to disfluency than Normal Transactions, but 
only for the Visual Group and not for the outlying subject’s group, the Verbal Group.  When the 
outlying subject was removed from the Verbal Group, the effect remained non-significant for the 
Verbal Group and significant for the Visual Group.  From this, we must conclude that the Visual 
Group was simply more disfluent overall in Retrieval transactions than speakers in the Verbal 
Group, even without the outlier. 
ANOVAs of types of disfluency showed that Repetitions were more common in the Dual-
Feedback Modality than in the Single-Feedback Modality; once again this was only true for the 
Visual Group. An ANOVA without the outlying subject, however, showed that Dual-Feedback 
Modality was more disfluent than the Single-Feedback Modality, suggesting that the outlying 
subject did play a role when it came to repetition rate.  
To summarise for each of the Experimental conditions, Time-pressure affected only the 
Visual Group’s substitution rate in Retrieval transactions.  Visual Group Givers made more 
substitutions in Untimed Retrievals than in Timed Retrievals. The only important effect of 
Feedback Modality is an interaction between Feedback Modality and Group that involves the 
Single Feedback Modality because this is the only condition where the groups differed.  There 
were no differences of this sort for any individual disfluency type or all disfluencies considered 
together.  The only differences of Feedback Modality found for Deletion rate within Transactions 
and Repetition rate within Transactions further confirmed the results found in Experiment 1 and 
Section 4.10 that interactive circumstances like the Dual-Feedback Modality are more prone to 
disfluency than the No Feedback Modality.  Finally, Retrievals seem to be more prone to 
disfluency than Normal Transactions. Could this be indicative of a cognitive burden that subjects 
experience? Possibly, but one could also argue that subjects were attempting to send their 
listeners signals by being disfluent at critical moments. We shall turn to an analysis of Disfluency 
and Eye Gaze in the next section to understand speaker gaze behaviour during disfluent periods. 
 
4.12 Disfluency Gaze within a Feedback Episode 
 
Within the Dual-Modality condition, the experimental design contrasted positive and negative 
feedback in the two modalities. However, the modalities can be concordant or discordant only if 
the Giver actually takes up both visual and verbal feedback.  The tendency for more speech in 
conditions with verbal feedback suggests that subjects were attending to what the confederate 
Follower said. Eye-tracking enabled us to tell when the Giver had actually looked at the 
Follower’s visual feedback.  Time-pressure has tended to reveal significant effects in the untimed 
conditions where Givers have more time to say more.  As depicted in Figure 23 (page 148) and as 
explained in Section 4.9, Givers do not take up the same proportion of concordant and discordant 
feedback.  They gazed most at one kind of discordant feedback (negative verbal + correct visual) 
and least at a concordant condition (negative + wrong feedback) when the Follower is in trouble 
and acknowledges that fact. 
To look for disfluency in truly versus potentially concordant and discordant feedback 
situations, we examined disfluency per feedback opportunities in concordant and discordant 
situations contrasting those in which Givers did or did not look at Follower feedback. The 
dependent variable, disfluency per ‘looked at’ feedback episode, was submitted to a Mixed 
Within and Between by-subjects ANOVA with Group (2) x Concordance (2: concordant 
feedback vs. discordant) x Time-pressure (2) as independent variables.   
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Figure 32. Proportion of disfluent concordant or discordant feedback opportunities 
with respect to whether the Giver was either looking or not looking at the Follower. 
The agreement difference is significant when the Giver looked at the Follower. 
 
In fact, Givers who attended to discordant feedback from the Follower subsequently became 
disfluent. The number of disfluencies per feedback opportunity was greatest following a 
discordant feedback episode in which the Giver had actually gazed at the Follower feedback 
square (.325), a significantly higher rate than following a concordant feedback episode which had 
drawn the Giver’s attention (.206) (Concordance: by subject: F1(1,34) = 9.60, p  = .004).  One 
type of discordant landmark (verbal = positive, visual = wrong) (.624) attracted more disfluency 
when gazed at by the Giver than a concordant (verbal = positive, visual = correct landmark (.264) 
suggesting that Givers pay a cost for processing difficulty feedback (Visual Feedback x Verbal 
Feedback: by materials: F2(1,4) = 14.58, p < .02) . Givers were more disfluent in Untimed 
episodes (.328) than in Timed episodes (.203) (Time-pressure: by subject: F1(1,34) = 7.28, p  = 
.011). This difference could be due to the fact that Givers say more in Untimed episodes, as 
shown in Section 4.8.1. 
Recall from Section 4.9 that subjects avoided gazing at lost Followers who indicated both 
verbally and visually that they were having difficulties. The fact that Givers did not look at lost 
Followers supports the Cognitive Burden theory by suggesting that subjects found full uptake of 
Follower knowledge to be a difficult task. Overall, this section has shown that Givers tended to be 
more disfluent when presented with discordant feedback, which in conjunction with the General 
Gaze results from Section 4.9 point towards the Cognitive Burden hypothesis.  The Strategic-
Modelling View predicts that Givers will gaze at their Followers, especially in times of need.  
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The results presented here suggest that Givers do not always find it easy to gaze at their Followers 
and they make more disfluencies in the discordant condition as evidence of that fact. 
  
4.13 The Function of Structural Disfluency Types 
 
As shown in Chapter 3, deletions may occur for more than one reason. In some cases, it 
became clear that what the speaker said was classified as a deletion simply when the speaker 
changed their speech plan because of some external change in the Follower feedback, e.g. the 
Follower interrupted the speaker with verbal feedback or the speaker was interrupted by the 
moving feedback square. These instances show that the speaker needed to alter his or her plan of 
the discourse when, for example, she sees that the current utterance is redundant because the 
visual feedback shows that the goal has been achieved or that realignment is urgently required. 
Since these planning deletions are more interactive by nature, it is quite likely that the Feedback 
effect whereby deletion rate increases in more interactive circumstances is due to these planning 
deletions and not to the hesitation fresh starts. For this reason, I conducted separate ANOVAs of 
‘planning’ and ‘hesitation’ deletions. 
Section 4.10 and 4.11.2 showed that repetitions can be sensitive to the manipulations of 
Feedback Modality as well. Repetitions were found to occur more frequently in the Dual-
Modality condition of the Visual Group of Experiment 2B than in the Single-Feedback Modality. 
This suggests that repetitions could stem from at least two different functions, planning and 
hesitation. For this reason, repetitions will be included in an analysis of the function of 
disfluency. Table 16 shows examples of planning and hesitation repetitions and deletions while 
Tables 17 and 18 show the distribution in raw numbers of planning and hesitation deletions and 
repetitions, respectively for the Verbal and Visual Groups. 
This section presents the results of an analysis of the functions of two types of disfluency to 
determine whether any one type of disfluency is more associated with a particular function.  Data 
were collected by watching MPEG videos for 1204 repetitions and 482 deletions in all conditions 
of Experiments 2A and 2B. Video examples and transcripts are included in Appendix J. A 
disfluency was considered to be from a ‘planning’ function if the movement of the visual 
feedback square or the verbal response from the confederate interrupted the speaker whilst 
speaking. All other cases were marked as occurring for a hesitation reason. Textual examples are 
provided in Table 16. Since there is no external function of feedback in the No Feedback 
Modality, this condition was omitted from the analysis explained below. The dependent variable 
for the analysis was calculated by dividing the number of planning disfluencies or the number of 
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hesitation disfluencies by the number of words in the trial.  
 
Table 16. Examples of disfluencies by goal and type. For repetitions, both reparandum and repair 
appear in bold text. For deletions, just the reparandum appears in bold text since the repair is 
effectively non-existent. 
 Dialogue Goal 
Disfluency Type Planning Hesitation 
Repetition ‘No ga- No gazelles?’ ‘Eh you travel directly ehm 
sort of north … north and 
east’ 
Deletion ‘So loop around the 
waterfall over…Yeah, 
there’ 
‘Um can you si- … it’s to 
the left of the pine grove’ 
 
 
Table 17. Distribution of planning and hesitation deletions across experimental conditions and within the Verbal and 
Visual Groups. Totals are given in bold text. 
 Timed Untimed 
FEEDBACK None One Dual None One Dual 
Verbal Group 11 35 56 19 56 93 
Planning   0 6 28 0 8 41 
Hesitation   11 29 28 19 48 52 
Visual Group 11 23 57 18 34 69 
Planning   0 13 48 0 15 44 
Hesitation   11 10 9 18 19 25 




Table 18. Distribution of planning and hesitation Repetitions across experimental conditions and within the 
Verbal and Visual Groups. Totals are given in bold text. 
 Timed Untimed 
FEEDBACK None One Dual None One Dual 
Verbal Group 60 81 84 101 194 234 
Planning   0 9 17 0 9 22 
Hesitation   60 72 67 101 185 212 
Visual Group 60 64 86 61 57 123 
Planning   0 6 20 0 9 22 
Hesitation   60 58 66 61 48 101 
TOTAL 120 145 170 162 251 356 
 
The dependent variable, rate of planning disfluencies per words in the trial, was submitted to 
an ANOVA for Feedback Modality (2) x Time-pressure (2) x Group (2). Givers made more 
planning deletions in the Dual-Feedback Modality (.004) than they made planning repetitions in 
the Dual-Feedback Modality (.002) or planning deletions in the Single-Feedback Modality (.001) 
(Feedback Modality x Disfluency Type: F B1B(1,34) = 8.90, p < .01). There were no significant 
between-subjects effects or any other significant interactions. 
The rate of hesitation disfluencies per word was also submitted to an ANOVA for Disfluency 
Type (2) x Feedback Modality (2) x Time-pressure (2) x Group (2). A three-way interaction 
revealed that Visual Group Givers made more hesitation repetitions in the Single-Feedback 
modality (.006) and the Dual Feedback modality (.008) than speakers from the same group made 
hesitation deletions in either the Single-Feedback (.002) or the Dual-Feedback modality (.002) 
(Disfluency Type x Feedback Modality x Group: FB1B(1,34) = 4.28, p < .05; Bonferroni, t-tests, p < 
.002, α. < .002). A further interaction showed that Visual Group Givers made more hesitation 
repetitions in both Timed (.008) and Untimed (.007) conditions than they made hesitation 
deletions in either Timed (.001) or Untimed (.002) conditions (Disfluency Type x Time-pressure 
x Group: FB1B(1,34) = 6.70, p < .02; Bonferroni, t-tests, p < .002, α. < .002).  
 
 










































Figure 33. Planning Disfluency Rate per words by Feedback Modality and Group (Verbal vs. Visual) 
 















































Recall from Section 4.11 that the Verbal Group contained the outlying subject. The results just 
reported show significant effects for the Visual Group, the group without any outliers, but no 
significant results for the Verbal Group. The outlying subject could be the cause of this difference 
and so an ANOVA with his data removed is warranted. The rate of planning disfluencies was 
submitted to an ANOVA for Disfluency Type (2) x Feedback Modality (2) x Time-pressure (2) x 
Group (2).  With the outlying subject excluded, a previously non-significant three-way interaction 
became significant: Visual Group Givers made more planning deletions in the Dual Feedback 
Modality (.002) than Verbal Group Givers made planning repetitions in either the Single-
Feedback Modality (.001) or the Dual-Feedback modality (.001) (Disfluency Type x Feedback 
Modality x Group: FB1 B(1,34) = 8.45, p < .01; Bonferroni, t-tests, p < .002, α. < .002).  Visual 
Group Givers made more planning deletions in the Dual-Feedback Modality (.002) than speakers 
from the same group made planning repetitions in either the Single-Feedback (.001) or the Dual-
Feedback modality (.002) (Bonferroni, t-tests, p ≤ .002, α. < .002). Even when the outlying 
subject was excluded from the analysis, there were no significant results for the Verbal Group. 
One possible explanation is that Visual Group Givers, who had more exposure to visual feedback, 
might be more sensitive to this modality of feedback and for that reason make more planning 
deletions following its movement. Alternatively, in order for the verbal feedback to interrupt the 
speaker, the confederate must provide her verbal response exactly when the Giver was about to 
speak or in some cases must interrupt the speaker. The visual feedback, which was controlled by 
an experimenter running a computer simulation, may not be as polite as the confederate human 
and for this reason might be more prone to interrupt speakers than a confederate. 
An ANOVA of hesitation disfluency rate for Disfluency Type (2) x Feedback Modality (2) x 
Time-pressure (2) x Group (2) without the outlying subject revealed significant differences for the 
Verbal Group: Verbal Group Givers made more hesitation repetitions in both Timed (.005) and 
Untimed (.009) trials than Givers from the same group made hesitation deletions in Timed (.003) 
or Untimed (.004) trials or than Visual Group Givers made hesitation deletions in Timed (.001) or 
Untimed (.002) trials (Disfluency Type x Time-pressure x Group: Group F B1B(1,33) = 5.41, p < .05; 
Bonferroni, t-tests, p ≤ .002, α. < .002). Likewise, as previously observed with the outlying 
subject, Visual Group Givers made more hesitation repetitions in both Timed (.008) and Untimed 
(.007) conditions than they made hesitation deletion in Timed (.001) or Untimed (.002) conditions 
(Bonferroni, t-tests, p ≤ .002, α. < .002). The fact that these results were significant when the 
outlying subject was removed suggests that his higher than average repetition rates in all 
conditions were responsible for the non-significance of the results when his data was included.  
Thus, it seems that overall there is a tendency for repetitions to occur for reasons of hesitation.  
Overall, repetitions tended to be associated with hesitation functions.  
For deletions, the rates of planning disfluencies were higher in the Dual-Modality than in the 
Single-Feedback Modality. This was also true, however, for hesitation deletions in the Dual-
Feedback Modality so it is hard to determine whether deletions were more associated with one 
function over another. As shown in Figures 33 and 34 (page 165), the difference in planning and 
hesitation functions to deletion seemed to depend upon the group. The Verbal Group seemed to 
have a higher hesitation deletion rate while the Visual Group had a higher planning deletion rate. 
Recall that planning functions are the movement of the visual feedback square or the verbal reply 
of the confederate Follower while the Giver was speaking. It could be the case that the saccadic 
movements of the visual feedback square interrupt the speaker much more often than speech from 
the scripted confederate Follower ever could. Since the Visual Group encountered many more 
trials with visual feedback, one could suggest that possibly the Givers in these trials were more 
prone to interruption, thus explaining the higher occurrence of planning deletions. 
In terms of the predictions of the Strategic-Modelling hypothesis and the Cognitive Burden 
hypothesis, this analysis has confirmed once again that two types of disfluencies, repetitions and 
deletions, stem from two possible functions.  Participants in the experiment abandoned utterances 
in both the Single-Feedback and the Dual-Feedback modalities after attending to the movement of 
the visual feedback or after being interrupted by the verbal feedback of the Follower. Participants 
repeated more often for a hesitation reason, and not as the Strategic-Modelling hypothesis might 
predict, for the benefit of the hearer. Whether the hesitation repetitions are genuine intended 
signals of commitment as the Clark view would predict is known only to the speaker and is not 




At the outset of this thesis, the predictions of the Strategic-Modelling view and Cognitive 
Burden hypothesis were contrasted.  One version of the Strategic-Modelling view predicts that 
the Giver will attend to the Follower’s feedback throughout the dialogue and that disfluency rate 
could increase when the Giver has access to Follower feedback. In contrast, one version of the 
Cognitive Burden view predicts that the Giver will avoid responding to the Follower if the cost of 
doing so is high. Therefore, disfluency rate is predicted to rise in times of difficulty, for example 
when the Giver’s language production system is over-burdened.  
Givers were more disfluent in the Dual-Feedback condition than they were in the No 
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Feedback condition, thus meeting the predictions of both the Strategic-Modelling and Cognitive 
Burden view that disfluency occurs most when interlocutors are co-present. Recall that the 
Cognitive Burden view predicts that feedback itself increases difficulty, thereby increasing 
disfluency rate. Another explanation for why disfluency rate may increase in the feedback 
condition is that perhaps the speaker tries harder to be understood when they have both visual and 
verbal feedback. In a sense, by trying harder to be understood when feedback is present, the 
speaker is changing his or her own level of difficulty but is doing so only when feedback is 
present.  
As far as disfluency types are concerned, the distribution of disfluency types by Feedback 
Modality revealed that deletions increased significantly in the Dual-Feedback condition compared 
to the No Feedback condition. This finding partially supports the results found in Chapter 3: 
deletions occur more frequently when a speaker has access to Follower feedback. There was also 
a Feedback effect for repetition rate in the Visual Group where repetition rate was higher in both 
the Dual-Feedback and Single-Feedback Modality than in the No Feedback Modality.  The results 
also suggest that repetition rate is also sensitive to the manipulations of the Feedback Modality. 
Since an effect of feedback was found, we have some evidence to rule out the possibility that the 
signalling function of repetitions is so highly specialised that the feedback manipulations used in 
Experiment 2 might not have created the necessary situations for an effect to occur. Note, 
however, that such a result did not occur until verbal feedback was added to the Visual Group; 
perhaps the verbal feedback enhanced the reality of the visual feedback.  
Clark and colleagues suggest that repetitions are signals of commitment (Clark & Wasow, 
1998; Fox Tree & Clark, 1997). However, results presented in both the current and previous 
chapters suggest that deletions were also used as indications of planning.  Therefore, I conducted 
an analysis of the potential functions of disfluency for a speaker in dialogue. Two functions were 
identified: during a planning disfluency the speaker is interrupted by the movement of the visual 
feedback or by the verbal feedback of the confederate. During a hesitation disfluency¸ the Giver 
elaborates on something already uttered by adding, correcting or deleting spoken material. Initial 
results showed that repetitions were associated with hesitation functions, whilst deletions tended 
to be labelled as occurring for a planning reason. This suggests that deletions are used as signals 
in critical points of the interaction and not repetitions as predicted by the Strategic Modelling 
view. The speaker seems to have behaved according to the Joint Responsibility and abandoned an 
unnecessary utterance as soon as he or she learned that it was unnecessary so that s/he could help 
re-route the Follower instead. In order to confirm this suspicion, an analysis of Giver attention 
was necessary. 
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The Strategic-Modelling view predicts Givers will gaze most when the Follower clearly 
indicates that she is lost, that is, in the concordant wrong condition where both verbal and visual 
feedback indicate that the Follower is lost.  An analysis of Giver attention to the Follower’s 
feedback showed that Givers used most opportunities to look at the Follower’s square when the 
Giver was presented with one kind of discordant feedback (visual=correct verbal=negative). 
Since the Giver would look at such on-route landmarks just to continue describing the route, the 
Giver has not gone out of her way to track the Follower in this instance. In contrast, when the 
Follower was lost in the concordant wrong condition Givers took less than fifty percent of the 
available opportunities to locate them. Therefore, Givers appear to prefer gazing at what is easiest 
for them rather than tracking a lost listener. This result supports the Cognitive Burden view. 
A further prediction made by the Cognitive Burden theory is that Giver disfluency will 
increase in periods of difficulty. In order to answer this question, an analysis of disfluency and 
gaze was conducted. Givers were more disfluent when they had gazed at discordant feedback than 
at concordant feedback.  Proponents of the Cognitive Burden view such as Barr and Keysar 
(2002) and Horton and Keysar (1996) suggest that merely having an interlocutor will increase 
difficulty and therefore disfluency should increase. Pickering and Garrod (2004) suggest that 
disfluency will arise out of misalignment in dialogue. Since discordant feedback is essentially 
misaligned feedback, both with the interlocutor and with itself, this prediction seems to be met. 
Furthermore, because the discordant feedback is difficult to process due to is conflicting nature, 
the predictions of the Cognitive Burden theory that disfluency increases with task difficulty are 
also met. 
This chapter has investigated the relationship between disfluency, functions of disfluency and 
gaze in order to learn more about why disfluency occurs. In Chapter 2, I suggested that one way 
of answering this question is to determine whether structurally-classified disfluencies can be 
linked to a cognitive motivation or ‘dialogue goal’. As this chapter has shown, structurally-
classified disfluencies were indeed associated with certain goals: deletions tended to occur for 
planning reasons, although there were differences between the Visual and Verbal Groups. On the 
other hand repetitions were strongly associated with hesitation functions. Moreover, by 
classifying disfluencies according to their functions, we have observed that ideal versions of two 
prominent psycholinguistic theories are certainly just that, ideal. In real dialogue situations, 
speakers seem to be capable of attending to the listener’s feedback at certain points while still 
avoiding attending to the listener’s feedback at other points. When the speaker makes a planning 
deletion, the only thing the speaker is ‘signalling’ is a necessary change in direction for the 
Follower’s feedback. At other times, the same speakers looked elsewhere on the map and made a 
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repetition which stemmed from a hesitation function.  
Finally, while the present chapter has revealed a great deal about the nature of disfluency in 
dialogue, it has still left a few questions remaining. One question is whether the speakers were 
perhaps just not motivated enough to perform the task because it was held in an experimental 
setting. In order to address this question, a further experiment, reported in Chapter 5, was 
designed and carried out. This experiment re-uses the basic design of Experiment 2, but adds a 









Chapter 4 investigated the role of two types of feedback, verbal and visual, on disfluency.  In 
conjunction with the predictions of the Cognitive Burden theory, Givers made more disfluencies 
during periods of difficulty and avoided looking at the Follower when it was difficult to do so.  
Proponents of the Strategic-Modelling View might suggest that the participants who performed as 
Information Givers were simply not committed enough to the task. A highly committed 
individual would be more likely to make collateral signals to their listener, according to Clark 
(2002).  Fox Tree and Clark (1997) suggest that repetitions are one example of such a signal.  
Proponents of the Cognitive Burden view would argue that the speakers’ altruism competes 
with the demands of language production and is limited by the available cognitive resources 
(Bard et al., 2004; Horton & Keysar, 2004). Participants offered additional incentive would, 
according to the Cognitive Burden view, be expected to attend to the listener’s feedback only 
when it was easy for them to do so. Disfluency rate is predicted to increase in difficult 
circumstances (Bard et al., 2001). In this Chapter, I report the results of an experiment which 
tested the effect that additional incentive had on the Giver during the dialogue to further tease 
apart these two hypotheses and furthermore how the function of disfluency maps onto the 
structure. 
 
5.2 Rationale and Predictions 
 
The current chapter sets out to test whether speakers who are offered extra compensation for 
optimal performance behave differently from a control group who were not offered additional 
compensation. The predictions of Experiments 1 and 2 were summarised in Table 3 (page 98) and 
Table 11 (page 135), respectively. The predictions with regards to Feedback, Time-pressure and 






Table 19. Table summarising the predictions for the Cogntive Burden and Strategic-Modelling Views with 
regards to the Independent variables Feedback, Time-pressure and Motivation  
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According to the arguments of Fox Tree and Clark (1997) mentioned above, speakers repeat 
themselves more often prior to complex utterances; these repetition disfluencies are a signal of 
commitment to the listener. Speakers who are more motivated should then produce more 
disfluencies, particularly repetitions, than speakers in the control group. Motivated speakers 
should also look more often at their task partners. If repetitions are signals of commitment to both 
the listener and the utterance, then one would expect repetitions to be associated with dialogue 
behaviour in which the goal of the utterance is to be attentive to the listener’s feedback. 
Speakers who are participating according to the Cognitive Burden view, would be expected to 
perform in an economical and cooperative manner with respect to the joint effort required from 
both speakers to accomplish the task. Rather than making repetition disfluencies to indicate 
commitment to the listener, a conscientious interlocutor who is behaving in a cooperative manner 
might be expected to abandon utterances in order to provide pertinent information. Motivated 
speakers are therefore predicted to exhibit a higher deletion rate in interactive circumstances than 
elsewhere. In terms of cost-sharing, the Cognitive Burden view would predict that speakers incur 
a cost for careful attention to their listeners’ feedback. Therefore, one would predict that although 
motivated speakers may be more attentive, there is a cognitive cost for this effort that may be paid 
in terms of fluency. 
 
5.3 Experiment 3 Method 
 
With two exceptions, the same experimental method used in Experiment 2 was re-used in 
Experiment 3. Firstly, the Time-Pressure condition was eliminated since it only affected the 
amount of speech in Experiment 2. Secondly, a Motivation condition was added to test the effects 
of Motivation on the outcome of the task. Speakers were allocated to one of two groups, either the 
Control group or the Motivated Group. The Control Group consisted of nine participants from 
Experiment 2B who were told that they would receive £5 for their time.  Only the untimed trials 
of the Control Group were used. Participants in the Motivated group were told that they would be 
offered £5 for their time regardless of how they performed, but if their description of the route on 
the map matched a certain criterion, they would be offered double their money, or £10 for the 
hour. The naïve participant and the confederate were then asked to decide amongst themselves 
who would be the Information Giver and who would be the Follower. The confederate always 
urged the naïve participant to perform the role of Giver and the naïve participant always agreed. 
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5.4 Experimental Procedure 
 
The majority of the Experimental Procedure for Experiment 3 replicated the procedure used in 
Experiments 1 and 2. The same rooms, eye-tracking equipment, eye-tracking software, video 
recording software, and audio equipment were re-used. The role of confederate Information 
Follower was played by a different graduate student from the Psychology Department at the 
University of Glasgow.  
Eighteen participants from the community of the University of Glasgow took part in 
Experiment 3. Nine participants, who had been paid £5 per hour, were taken from Experiment 
2B; they constituted the Control Group. Nine Motivated participants were offered £10 per hour if 
they performed well or for £5 for their time. After each trial, each Motivated subject was paid £10 
per hour.  The same subject criterion for normal uncorrected vision was upheld. A subject’s data 
was discarded if the data did not meet the 70% capture rate criterion for feedback or capture 
quality.  In total, ten subjects were discarded because two were suspicious of the confederate’s 
role in the experiment and eight did not meet the 70% capture criterion. All subjects were native 
English speakers. A copy of the instruction sheet and the consent form that the subjects were 
asked to sign is given in Appendix AA. 
Motivated participants were paired with Control group subjects from Experiment 2B.  Each 
Motivated subject saw the same maps in the same order and the same experimental condition as a 
Control group subject (Appendix E).  6 subjects (3 Motivated and 3 Control) had the ‘Crane Bay’ 
map, followed by the ‘Diamond Mine’ map, followed by the ‘Pyramid’ map. Another 6 subjects 
saw the ‘Pyramid’ map first, the ‘Safari’ map second and the ‘Telephone Kiosk’ map last. 
Finally, the last 6 subjects saw the ‘Mountain’ map first, the ‘Telephone Kiosk’ map second and 
the ‘Crane Bay’ map last.  This ordering and pairing of subjects and maps means that the Crane 
Bay, Pyramid and Telephone Kiosk maps were each seen 6 times. The Pyramid and Crane Bay 
maps were each seen 3 times in the No Feedback condition and 3 times in the Dual-Feedback 
modality condition. The Telephone Kiosk map appeared 3 times in the Single-Feedback modality 
and 3 times in the Dual-Feedback modality. The other maps, Safari, Mountain and Diamond 
Mine, were only used a total of 3 times each in Experiment 3. The Safari and Diamond Mine 
maps appeared only in the Single-Feedback condition while the Mountain map appeared only in 





5.5 Experimental Design 
 
The experiment crossed Feedback Modality (3) and Motivation (2: Control vs. Motivated). In 
the Dual-Feedback Modality condition, subjects received both visual and verbal feedback. 
Subjects in the Motivated group were offered double their money for excellent performance 




The six maps from Experiment 2 were reused in Experiment 3. Once again, maps were 
paired to make a balanced design. Maps can be found in Appendix E. 
 
5.7 Data Coding 
 
Following the completion of Experiment 3, the dialogues were transcribed and coded for 
disfluencies, Conversational Moves and Transactions in the same manner explained in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.7. 
5.7.1 Coder Reliability 
 
The Coder Reliability tests used for Experiment 3 were the same as those used for Experiment 1 
(Chapter 3, Section 3.7.4) and Experiment 2 (Chapter 4, Section 4.13). 
5.7.2 Data Analysis 
 
The data were analysed using the method used for Experiment 1 (Chapter 3, Section 3.7.5) and 
Experiment 2 (Chapter 4, Section 4.7.2). 
 
5.8 Words and Speech Overall 
 
Table 20 shows the distribution of Transactions, Words, Disfluencies, and Filled Pauses for 
the Motivated and Control Givers in Experiment 3.  
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Table 20. Distribution of Transactions, Words, Disfluencies, and Filled Pauses for 9 Motivated and 9 
Control Group Givers 
 GROUP GIVERS 
 MOTIVATED CONTROLS 
FEEDBACK 
MODALITIES None Single Dual None Single Dual 
Transactions 159 240 259 152 174 221 
Normal   144 168 172 151 150 156
Retrieval   0 52 75 0 21 61
Others 15 20 12 1 3 4
Words 3070 6037 6446 4748 4737 6400 
Normal 3039 4246 4449 4702 4329 4608
Retrieval 0 1619 1921 0 365 1785
Others 31 172 76 46 43 7
Disfluencies 52 119 171 183 221 383 
Repetitions 16 41 49 66 59 139
Substitutions 16 24 40 70 84 126
Insertions 8 15 16 28 35 44
Deletions 12 39 66 19 43 74
Filled Pauses 67 77 74 144 142 177 
 
As Table 20 depicts, Control Group Givers have higher raw totals of disfluency than the 
Motivated Givers.  On the whole, however, Control Group Givers were also more loquacious than 
Motivated Givers. Section 5.8.1 investigates raw word count to see whether this difference is 
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significant. Appendix K shows these results by subject and trial for the 9 Motivated subjects and 
the 9 Control subjects. 
5.8.1 Words 
 
Previous studies (Bard et al., 2001; Oviatt, 1995) have shown that longer utterances give rise 
to higher disfluency rates. For this reason, it is important to be aware of the effects of the 
experimental design on raw word counts. As depicted in Figure 35 below, No Feedback 
conditions were the shortest. A by-subjects ANOVA revealed that Control Group Givers said 
more in terms of raw word count in the Dual-Feedback Modality condition (761.8 words) than 
they did in the No-Feedback condition (541.4) (Feedback Modality x Group: FB1 B(2,32) = 4.94, p < 
.02; Bonferroni t -test, p < .003, α < .003).  The same result was found for Motivated Givers:  
Givers in the Motivated group also said more in the Dual-Feedback Modality (731.6) than they 
did in the No Feedback condition (351.6) (Feedback Modality x Group: (FB1 B (2,32) = 4.54, p < .02; 
Bonferroni, t = -4.33, p < .003, α < .003).  Between groups, Control Group Givers said more in 
the Dual-Feedback Modality (731.6) than Motivated Givers said in the No Feedback condition 
(351.6) (Bonferroni t -test, p < .003, α < .003).   











Figure 35. Mean raw word count for Motivated and Control Group Givers 
  
The Single-Feedback Modality (Motivated: 685.4; Control: 547.9) did not differ significantly in 
terms of raw word count from either the No Feedback (Motivated: 352.4; Control: 530.2) or the 
Dual-Feedback Modality (Motivated: 735.1; Control: 763.6) for either group (Bonferroni t -test, p 
< .003, α > .003).  There was also no significant overall effect of Motivation on word count 
(Between-Groups: FB1 B (1,16) = 0.97, p = .760) .  Thus, it appears that Givers from both groups said 
more in the Dual-Feedback modality when they could interact with the Follower than they did in 
the No Feedback modality without the possibility of interaction. 
 
5.8.2 Speech Rate 
 
Since Chapter 4 revealed a significant result for speech rate, I will proceed to test speech rate 
for Experiment 3. Speech rate across experimental conditions was also subjected to repeated 
measures ANOVA. Again speech rate, equals the total Giver words per map by the total amount 
of time the Giver spent speaking for that map (ie. the sum of all conversational moves less the 
summed durations of silent and filled pause time). There were no significant differences between 
either Groups (Motivated vs. Control) (Group: F1 (1,16) = .63, p < .86) or among Modalities (No 
Feedback, Visual-Only, Dual-Feedback Modality) (Feedback Modality: F1 (2,32) = .234, p < .95) 
with respect to speech rate. 
 
5.8.3 Transaction Rate 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 showed that Normal Transactions are not affected by Feedback 
Modality.  Instead, Normal Transactions were more common in Untimed conditions since Givers 
tended to say more when they had the time to do so. Retrieval Transactions were more common 
in the Dual-Feedback Modality than in the No Feedback modality (see Section 4.8.3).  In this 
section, I will investigate whether Motivated Givers made more effort to retrieve lost Followers 
than Givers in the Control Group. An analysis of this sort is valuable because it can tell us 
whether the paradigm of offering some Givers more incentive to perform well actually worked. 
 
Table 21. Rate of Normal Transactions for the Control and Motivated Groups. The 
difference between Groups is not significant. 
Feedback Modality None Single Dual 
Control Group 16.78 16.67 17.33
Motivated Group 16.00 16.67 19.11
 
The rate of Normal Transactions per trial was submitted to an ANOVA for Group (2) x 
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Feedback Modality (3).  There were no significant results for the rate of Normal Transactions 
(Table 21).   
For Retrieval Transactions, on the other hand a Between-subjects Group effect was observed: 
Motivated Givers (4.74) were more likely to retrieve a lost Follower than Control Group Givers 
(3.04) (Between-Subjects, Group: F B1B (1,16) = 6.96, p < .02).  As usual, Retrievals were more 
common in both the Dual-Feedback Modality (7.56) and the Single-Feedback Modality (4.06) 
than in the No Feedback Modality (.056) (Feedback Modality: FB1B (2,32) = 61.52, p < .001).   








Figure 36. Rate of Retrieval Transactions for the Control and Motivated Group with respect to Feedback 
Modality. 
 
Figure 36 shows the distribution of Retrieval transactions by Groups. From this graph, there is an 
observable difference between how often Motivated Givers retrieved compared to Control Group 
Givers in the Single-Feedback modality.  In fact, there was a nearly significant interaction for 
Feedback Modality x Group: both Motivated and Control Givers made more Retrievals in the 
Dual-Feedback modality (Motivated: 8.33; Control: 6.78) than they did in the No Feedback 
modality (Motivated: .11; Control: .00) (F B1B(2,32) = 3.05, p = .06; Bonferroni, t-tests, p < .003; α < 
.003).  Post-hoc tests did not show a significant difference between the rate at which Motivated 
Givers made Retrievals in the Single-Feedback modality (5.78) and the rate at which Control 
Givers made Retrievals in the same modality (2.33) (Bonferroni, t = 2.05, p = .075, α < .003). 
Overall, the results for Transaction rate in Experiment 3 support the general trend for 
Experiments 1 and 2. Normal Transactions are not affected by manipulations of Feedback-
Modality whereas Retrieval Transactions are more common in the Dual-Feedback Modality. The 
result of that extra £5 was that Motivated Givers retrieved their presumably lost Followers more 
often than Control Group Givers did. This result would suggest that Motivated Givers are able to 
retrieve lost Followers because they spend more time gazing at the Follower. Since Motivated 
Givers did retrieve their Followers more often than Control Group Givers, we have reason to 
believe that the motivation manipulation worked and can therefore go on to examine the effects of 
motivation on disfluency. We turn to Section 5.9 to determine whether additional motivation 




One goal set out at the beginning of this chapter is to determine whether additional 
motivation actually enhanced or altered participant performance. For this experiment, we ask 
whether Motivated Givers generally gaze more often at the Follower’s feedback than the Control 
Group Givers did. I attempted to answer this question using 276 ‘feedback episodes’ from Dual-
Feedback Modality trials from all 18 subjects (155 episodes for Motivated Givers, 121 episodes 
for Control Givers). Episodes were defined as beginning when the Giver mentions a new 
landmark and ending just before he introduces the next landmark on the route. If the Giver gazes 
at the Follower’s feedback square during the episode, the entire episode is labelled ‘looked at’.  If 
the Giver’s gaze fails to overlap the Follower’s feedback square, the episode is labelled ‘Not 
looked at’. The dependent variable, general gaze rate, is calculated by dividing the number of 
looked at episodes by the total number of feedback episodes. 
A Mixed Between and Within by-subjects ANOVA (Motivation (2) x Verbal Feedback (2) x 
Visual Feedback (2)) where the dependent variable consisted of only the ‘looked at’ episodes 
revealed that Givers in the Motivated Group (.914) gazed more at their Followers than Givers in 
the Control Group (.554) (Between-Subjects Group: F1 (1,16) = 42.44, p < .001).  Once again, 
By-Material ANOVAs were not performed because it is impossible to generalize over the 
linguistic material surrounding different landmarks and maps under all conditions.  These results 
show that Motivated Group Givers attend more closely to their Followers’ feedback overall. An 
analysis of Visual Feedback x Verbal Feedback can inform us whether Motivated Givers met the 
predictions of the Strategic-Modelling View by looking at Followers more often on a wrong 
landmark. 
As in Experiment 2, Givers tended to gaze more at Correct Visual Feedback (.798) than at 
Wrong Visual Feedback (.670) (Visual Feedback: F1 (1,16) = 6.35, p < .05).  There was a 
significant interaction between Visual and Verbal Feedback effects (F1 (1,16) = 8.16, p < .02), but 
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internal comparisons were not significant (Visual Feedback: Correct: .758; Wrong: .838; Verbal 
Feedback Positive: .724; Negative: .616) and there was no interaction with groups.  
















Figure 37. Proportion of feedback episodes attracting speaker gaze to feedback square: Effects of 
combinations of visual and verbal feedback in Dual-Feedback conditions. Post-hoc tests for this interaction 
were not significant. 
  
Overall, it seems that when Givers are offered additional incentive to perform, they gaze 
more often at the Follower’s location. Givers in both groups tended to gaze at the Follower when 
it was easy for them to do so, namely when the visual feedback was Correct.  The predictions of 
the Cognitive Burden theory suggest that Givers may not be able to afford the effort to gaze at the 
Follower during difficulty, i.e. when the Follower is lost. The results observed here for General 
Gaze support results observed in Chapter 4, Section 4.9 and the predictions of the Cognitive 
Burden view. 
 
5.10 Disfluency Rate 
 
In total, there were 342 disfluencies for the Motivated Group and 787 disfluencies for the 
Control Group across all speakers and all conditions. The dependent variable disfluency rate was 
submitted to a by-subjects Mixed ANOVA for Group (2: Control vs. Motivated) and Feedback 
Modality (3: No Feedback, Visual-only and Dual-Feedback Modality). Overall, Givers were more 
disfluent in the Dual-Feedback Modality condition (.027) than they were without any feedback at 
all (.018) or in the Single-Feedback Modality (.021) (Feedback Modality: F1 (2,32) = 8.66, p = 
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.001).  These results are depicted in Figure 38.  There were neither significant Groups effects nor 
any significant interactions. 





















Figure 38. Overall Disfluency Rate for Control and Motivated Groups across the No Feedback, Visual-
Only and Dual-Modalities 
  
 
The pattern for disfluency rates suggests the added Motivation is not critical to disfluency rate. 
Again, as for raw word counts, the Visual-only condition did not differ statistically from the 
Dual-Feedback Modality condition for either group. We can therefore examine only the Dual-
Feedback Modality conditions since the presence of an additional medium does not seem to affect 
disfluency rate in any way. 
 
5.10.1 Disfluency Types 
 
Previous disfluency research has found that individual types of disfluencies behave in 
systematic ways (Fox Tree, 1995; Levelt, 1983; Lickley, 2001). Clark & Wasow (1998) and Fox 
Tree (1997) predict that repetitions are linked to strategic signalling from speaker to listener. In 
terms of audience design, one would therefore predict higher repetition rates in more interactive 
circumstances. For this reason, disfluency rates of individual types were calculated and submitted 
to independent analyses. In total, there were 106 repetitions, 80 substitutions, 39 insertions and 
117 deletions for the Motivated Group. The Control Group made 139 repetitions, 280 
substitutions, 107 insertions and 74 deletions in total. 
As found in Experiment 2, there was a significant Feedback Modality main effect.  
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Repetitions were more common in the Dual-Feedback Modality (.009) than in the No Feedback 
Modality (.005) (Feedback Modality: F1 (2,32) = 3.68, p < .05). The Single-Feedback Modality 
(.007) did not differ significantly from either the Dual-Feedback modality or the No Feedback 
modality. There was no significant Group effect or any significant interactions. 
In concordance with Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, deletion rate exhibits a significant 
effect of feedback (No Feedback .003, Visual-only .006, Dual .007; F1 (2,32) = 5.22, p < .02 ). 
Givers made more deletions in the Dual-Feedback Modality (.007) than the No Feedback 
condition (.003). Motivation also seemed to affect deletion rate significantly: Motivated Givers 
made more deletions per word (.007) than Control Group Givers (.004) (Between Subjects: F1 
(1,16) = 8.76, p < .01). These results are shown in Figure 39. 
 












Figure 39. Disfluency Rate by Type for Motivated and Control Givers 
  
      
As depicted in Figure 39, the Control Group (.008) produced more substitution disfluencies 
than the Motivated participants did (.005) (Between Subjects: F1(1,16) = 6.98, p < .02).  There 
were no other significant main effects or interactions. An ANOVA of rates of insertions failed to 
reveal any significant results. 
Thus, deletions and substitutions both exhibit independent effects of motivation, albeit in 
different directions. The additional motivation increased deletion rate while it reduced 






5.10.2 Filled Pause Rate 
 
Filled pause rate per word was submitted to an ANOVA for Feedback (3) x Group (2).  There 
was a significant interaction between Feedback-Modality x Group, but post-hoc comparisons 
were not significant (F B1B(2,32) = 6.03, p < .01; Bonferroni, t-tests, p < .003, α > .003). Means 
(Motivated Group: No Feedback: .0233; Single-Feedback Modality: .015; Dual-Feedback 
Modality: .013; Control Group: No Feedback: .018; Single-Feedback Modality: .021; Dual-
Feedback Modality: .029) are shown in Figure 40. 





















Figure 40. Filled Pause Rate for Control and Motivated Groups 
 
Internal comparisons were not significant between the Motivated and Control Groups but notice 
from Figure 40 that the Motivated Givers made the most Filled Pauses in the No Feedback 
condition when they did not receive feedback from the Follower.  Clark and Fox Tree (2002) 
suggest that filled pauses are used as strategic signals where um signifies a longer delay than uh. 
The Strategic-Modelling view predicts that Givers should make signals more often in the 
presence of a listener. The results observed here for the Motivated Group go against these 
predictions because in fact, Motivated Givers showed a tendency to make more filled pauses in 
the No Feedback condition than in either the Single-Feedback or Dual-Feedback modalities when 
they could interact more frequently with the Follower. 
 
5.11 Disfluency Rate by Transaction Types 
 
Chapter 4 investigated disfluency rate per word by Transaction types in order to determine 
whether disfluency is associated with a particular dialogue goal. Since the Control Group for the 
current Experiment consists of subjects from Experiment 2B, we can compute the same results in 
order to determine whether Motivation is a factor. Disfluency rate per Transaction (i.e. the 
number of disfluencies in Normal Transactions per the number of words in Normal Transactions) 
was submitted to an ANOVA for Transaction type (2) x Feedback-Modality (2) x Group (2).  
Retrieval Transactions (.033) were more prone to disfluency than Normal Transactions (.023) 
(Transaction Type: F1(1,16) = 9.58, p < .01). Givers made more disfluent transactions in the 
Dual-Feedback Modality (.032) than in the Single-Feedback Modality (.024) (Feedback 
Modality: F1(1,16) = 4.87, p < .05). There were no significant Group effects or significant 
interactions. 
Disfluencies of different types were also submitted to independent ANOVAs. Repetition rate 
was higher in Retrieval Transactions (.012) than Normal Transactions (.007) (Transaction Type: 
F1(1,16) = 6.15, p < .05. Control Group Givers (.012) made more substitutions than Motivated 
Givers (.004) (Group: F1(1,16) = 10.76, p < .01). There was also a significant interaction between 
Transaction x Group, but internal comparisons were not significant (Transaction x Group: 
F1(1,16) = 6.97, p < .02). ANOVAs for Insertion and Deletion rate failed to produce any 
significant results. 
 



























Figure 41. General Disfluency Rate in with respect to Transaction Type, Feedback Modality and 
Group 
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Figure 42. Rates of Disfluency Types by Transaction Type and Feedback Modality for the Control 
Group 































Figure 43. Rates of Disfluency Types by Transaction Type and Feedback Modality for the 
Motivated Group 
 
Retrieval Transactions were more prone to disfluency than Normal Transactions in 
Experiment 3, as in Experiment 2.  Motivation did not affect disfluent transaction rate. The only 
Group effect was found for substitutions rate: Control Group Givers made more substitutions than 
Motivated Givers. There was no effect of Motivation for deletion rate in transactions, although 
one was found in Section 5.10.1.  Contrary to the predictions of the Strategic-Modelling view, 
enhanced Motivation did not increase repetition rate, suggesting that speakers do not use 
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repetitions as signals.  In the next section we turn to investigate speaker’s gaze behaviour to see 
whether disfluency is associated with gazing for Motivated Givers. 
 
5.12 Disfluency and Gaze with a Feedback Episode 
 
Section 5.9 above showed that motivation increased the frequency with which Givers gazed 
at visual feedback. Does the additional effort of gazing at the Follower have an associated cost in 
terms of fluency? In order to answer this question, we looked at the number of disfluencies per 
feedback opportunity in 18 Dual-Feedback Modality trials (9 from Motivated Givers, 9 from 
Control Givers). Feedback episodes were defined as for the General Gaze analysis. An episode 
was ‘looked at’ when the Giver gazed at the Follower’s feedback square. The episode was 
deemed ‘disfluent’ if the Giver was disfluent while talking about the current landmark within the 
episode. Disfluency rate per feedback opportunity was then calculated by dividing the number of 
disfluent episodes by the total episodes of that type to give the dependent variable, disfluency per 
opportunity. To answer the question of whether there is a cost associated with additional attention 
to the Follower’s feedback, the dependent variable, proportion of ‘looked at’ episodes per total 
episodes, was then submitted to a Mixed Within and Between by-subjects ANOVA where Visual 
Feedback (2: Correct vs. Wrong), Verbal Feedback (2: Positive vs. Negative) and Group (2: 
Motivated vs. Control) were the independent factors. 










Figure 44. Proportion of disfluent feedback episodes for both the Motivated and the Control Groups 
per total episode opportunity with respect to whether the Giver was looking or not looking at the 
Follower 
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Motivated Givers were more disfluent when they looked (.487) at the Follower than Control 
Group Givers (.223) (Between Subjects Group: F1(1,16) = 9.54, p = .007).  There were no other 
significant interactions with Group. 
As shown in Figure 45, All Givers were more disfluent when they looked at wrong visual 
feedback (.444) than when they gazed at ‘correct visual feedback (.226) (Within Subjects Visual 
Feedback: F1(1,16) = 9.55, p = .007).  There was a near significant trend showing that Givers 
were also more disfluent following negative verbal feedback (.433) than following positive verbal 












Figure 45. Proportion of disfluent episodes with respect to the Visual Feedback 
(correct or wrong) and Giver Attention (Looked vs. Not Looked) 

















Results presented in Section 5.9 showed that Motivated Givers gazed more often at their 
Followers than Control Givers.  In addition to gazing more often, this section has shown that 
Motivated Givers are also more disfluent per episode than Control Givers when they gaze at the 
Follower. This suggests that Motivated Givers are either a) more disfluent because they are 
committed to the Follower and are using disfluency as a collateral signal or b) more disfluent 
because they are under stress when the Follower indicates that she is lost with wrong visual 
feedback. Were Motivated Givers attempting to use their disfluencies as signals to their 
Followers? We turn to the next section to answer this question. 
 
 
5.13 The Function of Structural Disfluency Types 
 
The results presented thus far have shown that Motivated Givers pay more attention to the 
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Follower’s feedback and make more deletions than Control Group Givers. These results answer 
the questions of whether Givers attend more if they are motivated to do so and of how this extra 
caution manifests itself with respect to Giver fluency. The remaining question pertains to what the 
function of disfluency was. What sort of a function did the Giver fulfil with the disfluency? Was 
the disfluency rooted in an external or internal source?  Chapter 4 investigated the function of 
repetitions and deletions produced in Experiment 2. Since Experiment 3 is modelled on 
Experiment 2 and since both repetitions and deletions increased in interactive circumstances, I 
will investigate the function of both repetitions and deletions in this Section.  The Strategic-
Modelling view would predict that Motivated Givers would be especially likely to signal to the 
listener through repetitions. The Cognitive Burden view predicts that Givers will assist their 
Followers, if they notice that they are lost but only if it is easy for the Giver to do so.  Therefore, I 
examined 95 deletions and 85 repetitions occurring in two Feedback modalities of the Motivated 
Givers and 100 repetitions and 54 deletions in the two Feedback Modalities of the Control Group 
Givers. This data is portrayed in Table 22. 
 
Table 22. Distribution of Repetitions and Deletions by Feedback Modality and Group 
 REPETITIONS DELETIONS 
Feedback Modality Single Dual Single Dual 
Control Group 31 69 21 33 
Motivated Group 42 43 32 63 
 
Once again, the rate of planning disfluencies was submitted to an ANOVA for Disfluency 
Type (2) x Feedback-Modality (2) x Group (2). As found previously for Experiment 2, speaker-
planning deletions (.004) were more common than planning repetitions (.002) (Disfluency Type: 
F1(1,16) = 6.14, p < .05).  A Group effect revealed that Motivated Givers (.004) made more 
disfluencies for planning reasons than Control Givers (.002) (Between-subjects, Group: F1(1,16) 
= 8.92, p < .01).  A near-significant interaction between Disfluency Type and Feedback Modality 
showed that Givers made more planning deletions occur in the Dual-Feedback Modality (.005) 
than they made planning deletions in the Single-Feedback Modality (.002), planning repetitions in 
the Dual-Feedback Modality (.002) or in the Single-Feedback Modality (.002) (F1(1,16) = 4.11, p 
= .06).  These results were not significant in post-hoc tests. 
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Figure 46. Distribution of repetitions and deletions by Group and Function in Experiment 3 
 
 
The rate of hesitation disfluencies per word was also submitted to an ANOVA for Disfluency 
Type (2) x Feedback Modality (2) x Group (2).  In line with the results from Experiment 2, 
hesitation repetitions were more common per word (.005) than hesitation deletions (.003) 
(F1(1,16) = 6.67, p = .02).  Additional motivation to complete the task did not affect the rate of 
hesitation disfluencies: there was no significant Group effect (Motivated: .004; Control: .004). 
As found previously for Experiment 2, the results for Experiment 3 showed that Deletions 
were associated with planning reasons, whereas repetitions were associated with hesitation 
functions. The only Group effect was found for planning disfluencies suggesting that Motivated 
speakers were more prone to abandoning their own utterance to accommodate the Follower. Thus, 
it seems that some structural types of disfluencies can occur for planning reasons without 
necessarily being strategic signals in line with the Strategic-Modelling View predictions. The 
analysis of hesitation disfluencies showed, however, that Motivated Givers made just as many 
hesitation disfluencies as Control Givers did suggesting that both types of Givers made 
disfluencies because of a difficulty they encountered. A hesitation disfluency by definition does 
not necessarily occur ‘for the listener’, suggesting that disfluencies could fulfill two cognitive 




In an attempt to discover when and where disfluency occurs, I have investigated different 
dialogue situations in the form of disfluency rate within Transactions and speaker gaze behaviour 
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during dialogue. In line with Chapter 4, Retrieval transactions were once again more prone to 
disfluency. Additional incentive did not affect disfluency rate or transaction type. The fact that 
Retrieval transactions are more prone to disfluency suggests that the difficulty of retrieving a 
Follower is a source of disfluency. Motivation did seem to affect general gaze patterns, however, 
because Motivated Givers looked more often at the Follower feedback than Control Givers did. 
Thus, Motivated Givers attend to the Follower’s feedback more closely, and were more disfluent 
per opportunity than Control Givers, suggesting that either disfluency is indicative of 
commitment, according to the Strategic-Modelling View, or difficulty, according to the Cognitive 
Burden View. 
An investigation of why disfluency occurs has necessitated a comparison of a structural 
classification system with a cognitive classification system. As found in Experiment 2, the results 
suggest that the same structurally classified disfluencies appear to fulfil different cognitive 
functions for the speaker in different dialogue situations. Accordingly, any classification system 
should consider both the function and structure of disfluency. In this thesis, I have developed a 
classification system for discovering the function of disfluency, which I believe could assist 
future research.  
In order to answer the questions of why disfluency occurs, the current chapter has 
investigated the effect that additional motivation has on a speaker during dialogue. Incentive 
works in some cases but not in all of them. A Motivated Giver looks at the Follower more often, 
retrieves lost Followers more often, abandons utterances (i.e. makes a deletion) more often, 
substitutes more often and is more disfluent per opportunity when looking for the Follower’s 
location than a Control Giver.  Motivated Givers were no more disfluent overall, however, than 
Control Group Givers when measured in terms of disfluency rate per words. Thus, overall we can 
conclude from these results that given additional incentive to perform well, a motivated 
participant will be more willing to perform difficult tasks that other subjects (e.g. controls) were 
not willing to perform.  
As Section 5.13 shows, disfluency types seem to fulfil different behavioural functions for the 
speaker, intentional or otherwise. Contrary to at least some of the predictions of the Strategic-
Modelling, repetitions were not associated with planning goals as frequently as deletions. As 
Brennan (2004) observed, attentive speakers abandoned moves when they observed from the 
movement of visual feedback that the current utterance was no longer relevant to the listener’s 
new location.  If any structural type of disfluency fulfils the function of a collateral signal in the 
sense suggested by Clark (2002), it would seem from the results presented in this thesis to be a 
planning deletion, or abandonment. This does not, however, mean that all disfluencies of the 
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same structural type fulfil this role, nor does it mean that all disfluencies of different structural 
type fulfil this role. Repetitions are less clearly collateral signals because they tend to be made for 
hesitation reasons rather than planning reasons.  It seems, therefore, that Givers were behaving 
according to the predictions of joint action. The acts of retrieving and abandonment would 
suggest that they took only partial responsibility for their Follower. Speakers would be expected 
to look more often at the listener and only offer additional assistance when they are cognitively 
capable of doing so and when they realise the success of the entire collaborative effort is at risk if 
they do not. 
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis set out to address the questions of why disfluency occurs in collaborative 
dialogue. In order to answer these questions, I reviewed two theories from the psycholinguistic 
literature which attach different functions to disfluency and therefore differ in their explanation 
for why disfluency occurs. The Cognitive Burden View suggests that disfluencies are simply 
errors of an overburdened language production system and that they are not intentionally 
controlled. The Strategic-Modelling View, on the other hand, suggests that disfluencies occur as 
strategic signals from speaker to listener to signal that the speaker is committed to the utterance 
but is currently experiencing difficulties. Since each of these theories attach specific functions to 
structural types of disfluencies, I tested the predictions of each theory by observing speaker 
behaviour in a multi-modal setting while the speaker was disfluent.  The results of this analysis 
showed that disfluencies described by strict structural classifications don’t always perform the 
same functions in dialogue. 
Experiment 1 investigated a baseline condition of visual feedback in order to establish a 
viable paradigm. Speakers retrieved the visual feedback square after noticing that it had gone 
astray. This is strong evidence to suggest that speakers believed the visual feedback was genuine 
and therefore, that the experimental paradigm worked. Further effects of trial length in words, 
speech rate and disfluency rate were in line with previous research which suggested that speakers 
say more when given more time and wordier trials are more prone to disfluency (Bard et al., 
2001; Oviatt, 1995). Next, I analysed whether the experimental manipulations on feedback and 
time-pressure affected speaker gaze behaviour and disfluency rate. Results suggested that 
speakers gazed more often at the Follower when she was hovering over a correct landmark, and 
less when she hovered over a wrong landmark.  This suggests that the speaker avoids the difficult 
information because of the cognitive load required on his part. In terms of disfluency rate and 
gaze, results showed that speakers have a high disfluency rate when they must re-orient a lost 
Follower, that is a Follower hovering over a wrong landmark. Speakers, according to the 
Strategic-Modelling view, should be most attentive when the listener is lost, if the speaker is 
behaving according to the principles of Optimal Design which suggest that speaker design their 
utterances ‘for the listener’. Likewise, the evidence only partially supports the Cognitive Burden 
view, which predicted that speakers would be more disfluent during difficult periods, i.e. when 
faced with a ‘lost’ Follower. Finally, deletions were classified as fulfilling hesitation or planning 
functions. Givers were found to make more planning deletions after noticing the movement of the 
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visual feedback square. This result supports the Middle Ground view of disfluencies which states 
that speakers and listeners have a joint responsibility in collaboration. When the speaker 
abandoned an utterance, the speaker was taking responsibility and attempting to re-align the 
listener. 
Experiment 2 paired visual feedback with verbal feedback in order to determine whether 
speaker behaviour changed as a result of feedback type.  For Givers who received Visual-only 
feedback in the Single-Feedback Modality, there was a sharp increase in trial length in the Dual-
Modality once verbal feedback had been added. This sharp increase did not occur for Givers who 
received Verbal-only feedback in the Single-Feedback Modality suggesting that Givers relied 
more on verbal feedback than on Visual Feedback. Similarly, Givers retrieved more often when 
they had verbal feedback than in the Visual-only feedback condition. In terms of speaker gaze 
behaviour, Givers once again avoided gazing at their Follower when she clearly indicated that she 
was lost with both visual and verbal cues. This supports the Cognitive Burden view that Givers 
will avoid gazing at their Followers when it is difficult to do so. Finally in terms of speaker 
disfluency behaviour, Givers were most disfluent in the Dual-Feedback Modality in both groups, 
supporting the claims of both the Strategic-Modelling view and the Cognitive Burden view that 
speakers will be more disfluent in interactive circumstances. Once again, deletion rate increased 
significantly in interactive circumstances. Repetition rate also showed a significant effect of 
Feedback in Experiment 2, thus partially supporting the claims of Clark and Wasow (1998) that 
speakers use repetitions as strategic signals. A further analysis of disfluency and gaze behaviour 
showed that Givers were more disfluent after they had gazed at discordant feedback, i.e. correct 
visual, negative verbal feedback or wrong visual, positive verbal feedback, compared to 
concordant feedback. Since the difficulty level increases in discordant feedback, this result 
supports the Cognitive Burden view. In order to pinpoint the behavioural differences between 
deletions and repetitions, an analysis of disfluency function was also conducted. Deletions tended 
to occur for planning reasons whereas repetitions occurred more often for hesitation reasons, 
although there were some differences between Visual and Verbal Groups. The finding that 
repetitions occur most often for hesitation reasons is important when evaluating the Strategic-
Modelling view since it predicts that repetitions are strategic signals to a listener. The findings in 
this thesis do not support this prediction or at least suggest that the intentionality of a repetition 
disfluency is not immediately apparent. 
Finally, Experiment 3 tested the effect of additional incentive or motivation of the speaker to 
perform well. Compared to controls, Motivation was found to affect speaker attention (i.e. gaze 
patterns), retrieval transaction rate, deletion rate and the speaker’s disfluency per opportunity. 
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Motivated Givers attended to the Follower’s feedback more closely and retrieved lost Followers 
more often than Control Group Givers. Motivated Givers were also found to abandon utterances 
more often than Control Givers. Thus, from these results, we can conclude that motivated 
participants are more willing to perform difficult tasks in dialogue. This observation should be 
considered in future studies.  
Taking all experiments into account, there seems to be mixed support for both the Cognitive 
Burden and Strategic-Modelling views. Speakers in all experiments were more disfluent in 
interactive circumstances, supporting the predictions of the Strategic-Modelling view. Speakers in 
Experiments 1 and 2, however, tended to avoid difficult tasks like gazing at a lost Follower and 
were more disfluent during complicated feedback (i.e. discordant feedback episodes), supporting 
the Cognitive Burden view. When structural disfluency types like repetitions and deletions were 
paired with functions, repetitions fulfilled a hesitation function and not a strategic, planning role 
as Clark has elsewhere claimed (e.g. Clark & Wasow (1998) or Fox Tree & Clark (1997).  
Deletions, on the other hand, tended to fulfil a planning function when the speaker observes that 
the feedback has found the correct landmark or has gone astray.  Since it would be redundant for 
the speaker to continue saying the current utterance, the speaker abandons this utterance and 
provides more pertinent information instead.  Brennan (2004), Clark (2002) and Clark and Krych 
(2004) have observed similar speaker behaviour. Clark and Krych (2004) have suggested that 
such behaviour suggests that speakers are opportunistic.  This could well be the case for a subset 
of deletions or even of all disfluencies. As I have shown in this thesis, not all structural 
disfluencies of the same or different type necessarily fulfil the same function in dialogue. 
Regarding this matter, we can then conclude in line with Schober and Brennan (2003) that 
speakers may adapt in some circumstances and avoid adaptation in other circumstances. 
This thesis has largely remained agnostic about the intentionality of disfluency. As described 
in Section 2.3.4, Chapter 2, in order for something to be considered intentional by a speaker, there 
must be mutual knowledge that the speaker intended to make the utterance and that the speaker 
intended for the listener to be aware of this intention. Determining whether a speaker had these 
intentions in mind when making a disfluency is an extremely difficult task since modern science 
is not yet capable of truly determining what a speaker had in mind even with invasive techniques. 
As Brennan and Schober (2003) suggest, an experimenter using an online test can better access 
speaker intention than an experimenter conducting a corpus analysis.  Eye-tracking technology 
allows a researcher to see what the speaker looked at and previous research has found that 
speakers tend to talk about what they looked at (Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, In Press; Griffin, 
2005; Griffin & Bock, 2000; Tanenhaus et al., 2000). While eye-tracking has provided some 
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useful insights in this thesis about the association between disfluency and gaze, one still has to be 
careful about deciding what the speaker’s intentions were when they were disfluent. Therefore, I 
believe that the results found in this thesis elucidate potential circumstances under which a 
speaker could utter something which sounds like a disfluency (i.e. structurally coded deletions 
which fulfil a planning function) but is by no means an intentional signal. Instead, the speaker has 
simply stopped speaking because an external stimulus provided new and relevant information to 
the task and the speaker.  In conjunction with Schober and Brennan (2003), this would seem to 
indicate that speakers use deletion-like utterances in some situations to adapt to a listener some of 
the time (i.e. in the case of planning deletions) but also make disfluencies out of genuine 
difficulty in other situations (i.e. in the case of hesitation deletions or hesitation repetitions).  
The feedback manipulation used in this thesis is perhaps the most contestable part of the 
experiments. It is possible that Strategic-Modelling would predict no change in repetition or filled 
pause rate if the signals that repetitions and filled pauses send are so highly specialised that they 
could not occur in a simulation of eye-gaze. Experiment 1 showed no significant difference 
between repetition rates in a feedback and no feedback trial.  Although theoretically still possible, 
this suggests that visual feedback alone was not enough to create the situations for such specific 
signals. Of course, it could also be the case that repetitions were not being used as signals 
regardless of the feedback manipulation. Experiment 2, which incorporated verbal feedback as 
well as visual, revealed that Visual Group subjects increased their rates of repetitions when 
provided with verbal feedback in the Dual-Feedback modality. Repetition rates in Experiment 3 
were significant in an interaction with Feedback and Group. Thus, we can conclude for the 
present that it is possible that verbal feedback alone does not create the situation in which it is 
possible to discern between the two possible predictions of the Strategic-Modelling view. Once 
verbal feedback is added, however, repetition rates show a feedback effect, ruling out the 
possibility that the signalling function is too highly specialised for the present paradigm. When 
the function of repetitions is tested, we see that some behave like obvious planning disfluencies 
but that on the whole this role was generally left to deletion-like disfluencies as previously 
discussed. 
Likewise, the feedback manipulation presented some ambiguities for the predictions of the 
Cognitive Burden view. Some proponents of the Cognitive Burden view suggest that dialogue is 
more difficult than monologue (Horton and Keysar, 1996; Barr and Keysar, 2002) and therefore 
disfluency rate should increase in the feedback condition compared to a no feedback condition 
(Bard et al., 2001). Another possibility is that the speaker simply tries harder to be understood 
when they have feedback, either visual or verbal or both, and is therefore more disfluent in 
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feedback situations. What does it mean to say that the speaker ‘tried harder’? In one sense, such a 
prediction is no different from saying that feedback itself increased the burden on the speaker. On 
the other hand, it may be possible that the methods used in the present thesis are not capable of 
discerning between a situation in which feedback alone induces difficulty and a situation in which 
the speaker tries harder and is therefore more disfluent. For the present, all we can conclude is 
that disfluency rate increased in the presence of listener feedback and admit possible 
explanations: feedback alone increases difficulty or perhaps the speaker simply tried harder when 
presented with feedback. 
The MONITOR Project used a simulation of eye-gaze in a multi-modal, interactive setting in 
order to investigate speaker attention to a listener’s feedback. The experimental results show that 
speaker’s believe that this feedback is genuine and so there is no reason to discount the results 
solely on the basis of the visual feedback or experimental paradigm. Previous research has shown 
that disfluency types differ according to the task assigned to the speaker (Oviatt, 1995). Still, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, the results presented in this thesis only pertain to the specific paradigm. 
As Schober and Brennan (2003) stated, the most beneficial research agenda within collaborative 
dialogue is to observe under what circumstances speakers do and do not adapt their language 
usage. This thesis has shown that when presented with a surrogate for gaze, speakers use 
deletions to adapt to a listener in some circumstances but also make disfluencies out of difficulty 
in other circumstances. In order to be certain that the results found in this thesis with simulated 
gaze hold for face-to-face gaze, future research could conduct an experiment using face-to-face 
dialogue with remote eye-trackers or a video-conferencing task whilst eye-tracking both 
participants. This technique would still allow the same time-stamped accuracy employed in the 
current paradigm and one would permit face-to-face gaze between interlocutors. Since 
participants could perform a different task while holding the video-conference one could further 
investigate whether disfluency types occur with the same frequency and from the same source as 
observed in the current thesis.  
 
 
  Right, Right, Right… that’s it finished finished finished finished… 
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APPENDIX A – PAPERS PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR DURING THE 
COURSE OF THE PHD. 
Where block A= No feedback/Verbal only/verbal+visual 
Where block B = no feedback/visual only/verbal+visual 
 
APPENDIX G – ORDER OF MAPS BY SUBJECT 
 
For A1 trials, the first three trials were timed; the last three were untimed 
For A2 trials, the first three trials were untimed; the last three were timed 
For B1 trials, the first three trials were untimed; the last three were timed 
For B2 trials, the first three trials were timed; the last three were untimed 
 
Subject# Condition trial 1 trial 2 trial 3 trial 4 trial 5 trial 6 
1 A1 T C D P S M 
2 A2 M T C D P S 
3 A1 S M T C D P 
4 A2 P S M T C D 
5 A1 D P S M T C 
6 A2 C D P S M T 
7 A1 T C D P S M 
8 A2 M T C D P S 
9 A1 S M T C D P 
10 A2 P S M T C D 
11 A1 D P S M T C 
12 A2 C D P S M T 
13 A1 T C D P S M 
14 A2 M T C D P S 
15 A1 S M T C D P 
16 A2 P S M T C D 
17 A1 D P S M T C 
18 A2 C D P S M T 
        
1 B1 T C D P S M 
2 B2 M T C D P S 
3 B1 S M T C D P 
4 B2 P S M T C D 
5 B1 D P S M T C 
6 B2 C D P S M T 
7 B1 T C D P S M 
8 B2 M T C D P S 
9 B1 S M T C D P 
10 B2 P S M T C D 
11 B1 D P S M T C 
12 B2 C D P S M T 
13 B1 T C D P S M 
14 B2 M T C D P S 
15 B1 S M T C D P 
16 B2 P S M T C D 
17 B1 D P S M T C 
18 B2 C D P S M T 
 
APPENDIX H – DISFLUENCIES, WORDS and TRANSACTION COUNTS BY 




Table 1. Overall totals of transactions, disfluencies, words and average time spent on a trial in seconds 
for the Verbal Group of Experiment 2 
 Timed Untimed 
MEASURE None One Dual None One Dual 
Transactions 256 384 398 282 422 454 
Normal           252 263 279 276 304 324 
Retrieval            0 106 116 0 106 122 
Others 4 15 3 6 12 8 
Words 5235 8180 9134 7502 11417 12810 
Normal 5179 5261 5790 7386 7338 8769 
Retrieval 0 2798 3305 0 3880 3967 
Others 56 121 39 116 199 74 
Time in Seconds 121.81 189.33 214.94 186.66 277.73 311.66 
Disfluencies 152 249 265 203 446 530 
Repetitions 59 84 87 95 205 251 
Substitutions 54 91 87 58 120 122 
Insertions 27 38 34 27 62 63 
Deletions 12 36 57 23 59 94 







Table 2. Overall totals of transactions, disfluencies, words and average time spent on a trial in seconds 
for the Visual Group of Experiment 2 
 Timed Untimed 
MEASURE None One Dual None One Dual 
Transactions 239 259 342 303 334 427 
Normal           232 240 243 298 296 295 
Retrieval            2 18 93 0 34 123 
Others 5 1 6 5 4 9 
Words 6596 7443 8553 9133 9121 12443 
Normal 6403 7022 5819 9038 8257 8600 
Retrieval 175 411 2711 0 819 3804 
Others 18 10 23 95 45 39 
Time in Seconds 149.00 158.93 188.13 208.63 219.30 285.98 
Disfluencies 150 180 240 183 219 366 
Repetitions 60 64 91 61 57 135 
Substitutions 57 75 68 73 89 118 
Insertions 22 18 23 29 33 42 
Deletions 11 23 58 20 40 71 






Table 3. Overall disfluency count for the Verbal Group by trial and subject 
 OVERALL DISFLUENCIES BY SUBJECT 










1 2 17 12 13 19 24 
2 4 10 11 6 41 41 
3 7 16 9 8 10 9 
4 13 22 11 7 8 15 
5 4 4 7 4 4 2 
6 7 8 7 5 9 14 
7 12 15 29 12 33 34 
8 5 13 15 11 14 10 
9 8 16 14 12 9 23 
10 5 13 6 2 14 15 
11 9 12 14 4 15 19 
12 17 13 7 13 18 17 
13 10 13 26 16 31 26 
14 6 13 14 13 18 30 
15 29 44 47 54 153 203 
16 3 4 14 5 26 13 
17 5 7 12 3 7 6 
18 6 9 10 15 17 29 








Table 4. Overall disfluency count for The Visual Group by trial and subject 
 OVERALL DISFLUENCIES BY SUBJECT 










1 8 8 14 9 10 24 
2 11 24 25 22 22 42 
3 17 8 10 7 10 28 
4 2 7 15 7 11 21 
5 6 8 10 7 12 16 
6 4 6 2 4 12 8 
7 13 11 16 4 9 20 
8 3 5 15 9 9 9 
9 23 25 20 11 14 27 
10 3 10 9 9 17 28 
11 11 7 18 12 11 23 
12 2 3 13 7 11 12 
13 10 17 8 26 23 31 
14 13 10 18 19 19 18 
15 9 12 13 9 10 14 
16 4 4 13 7 8 22 
17 6 9 10 9 7 12 
18 5 6 11 5 4 11 








Table 5. Total Repetitions by Subject for The Verbal Group 
 OVERALL REPETITIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 1 4 1 6 5 7 
2 1 1 4 2 20 19 
3 2 4 5 0 3 2 
4 3 4 1 0 0 3 
5 2 1 1 3 1 0 
6 2 4 0 1 1 3 
7 2 6 8 9 10 8 
8 2 4 2 3 4 1 
9 3 5 4 3 4 7 
10 2 3 3 1 9 8 
11 3 3 4 2 5 8 
12 6 1 2 8 3 5 
13 2 4 5 3 8 9 
14 3 5 7 7 5 8 
15 21 30 33 38 110 145 
16 1 1 2 1 9 8 
17 2 3 4 2 4 2 
18 1 1 1 6 4 8 








Table 6. Total Repetitions by Subject for The Visual Group 
 OVERALL REPETITIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 3 2 3 1 1 5 
2 5 18 16 13 8 22 
3 8 5 7 4 2 14 
4 1 0 5 2 0 1 
5 2 0 4 4 6 4 
6 1 1 1 0 4 2 
7 6 5 9 2 3 8 
8 1 2 6 2 2 3 
9 13 8 12 7 4 14 
10 1 4 3 1 5 8 
11 2 1 5 2 1 9 
12 0 1 1 3 2 3 
13 2 3 1 8 9 15 
14 6 6 7 6 3 6 
15 2 3 4 2 3 2 
16 2 2 4 1 1 10 
17 3 1 2 1 2 3 
18 2 2 1 2 1 6 








Table 7. Total Substitutions by Subject for The Verbal Group 
 OVERALL SUBSTITUTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 1 8 5 2 4 8 
2 1 4 3 0 7 14 
3 1 8 2 6 5 4 
4 4 12 5 3 2 6 
5 2 1 4 1 1 1 
6 2 3 4 4 6 7 
7 7 6 13 2 8 12 
8 3 3 8 7 7 6 
9 3 7 8 4 5 10 
10 2 4 1 0 2 2 
11 5 4 0 0 3 4 
12 7 6 2 3 7 4 
13 3 8 8 8 12 5 
14 2 5 3 5 7 11 
15 4 6 5 7 22 16 
16 1 1 6 1 13 4 
17 2 0 6 0 2 0 
18 4 5 4 5 7 8 







Table 8. Total Substitutions for The Visual Group 
 OVERALL SUBSTITUTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 3 3 4 5 2 13 
2 2 2 5 7 6 10 
3 7 3 2 2 6 9 
4 1 5 5 2 8 9 
5 4 7 1 0 4 5 
6 2 4 1 4 6 3 
7 4 4 5 1 5 6 
8 1 3 3 3 6 3 
9 2 8 4 3 3 5 
10 2 4 2 3 7 6 
11 8 2 7 7 1 9 
12 1 1 5 3 5 4 
13 7 11 5 8 10 11 
14 5 3 5 7 9 7 
15 4 8 3 6 5 7 
16 1 1 4 4 4 4 
17 2 2 3 6 0 4 
18 1 4 4 2 2 3 







Table 9. Total Insertions by Subject for The Verbal Group 
 OVERALL INSERTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 0 2 1 5 2 0 
2 0 2 1 2 9 6 
3 2 2 2 0 1 0 
4 5 3 3 2 3 1 
5 0 0 1 0 2 1 
6 2 0 1 0 2 1 
7 3 1 7 1 9 7 
8 0 3 3 0 2 3 
9 1 3 2 4 0 3 
10 1 3 0 1 1 1 
11 1 1 2 1 3 4 
12 4 5 2 1 3 3 
13 3 0 2 2 4 3 
14 1 1 2 1 6 7 
15 3 6 3 5 8 16 
16 1 2 2 1 2 1 
17 0 2 0 0 1 3 
18 0 2 0 1 4 3 







Table 10. Total Insertions by Subject for The Visual Group 
 OVERALL INSERTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 2 0 4 2 3 4 
2 3 2 1 1 4 0 
3 1 0 1 1 0 1 
4 0 0 0 1 2 5 
5 0 1 1 2 1 2 
6 1 0 0 0 0 2 
7 2 1 0 0 1 2 
8 0 0 3 3 1 2 
9 6 6 0 1 2 3 
10 0 0 1 4 4 5 
11 0 1 1 2 4 0 
12 1 0 0 0 2 3 
13 0 2 0 7 1 1 
14 1 1 1 2 4 3 
15 2 1 3 0 0 2 
16 1 0 2 1 2 2 
17 1 3 3 1 1 4 
18 1 0 2 1 1 1 







Table 11. Total Deletions by Subject for The Verbal Group 
 OVERALL DELETIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 0 3 5 0 8 9 
2 2 3 3 2 5 2 
3 2 2 0 2 1 3 
4 1 3 2 2 3 5 
5 0 2 1 0 0 0 
6 1 1 2 0 0 3 
7 0 2 1 0 6 7 
8 0 3 2 1 1 0 
9 1 1 0 1 0 3 
10 0 3 2 0 2 4 
11 0 4 8 1 4 3 
12 0 1 1 1 5 5 
13 2 1 11 3 7 9 
14 0 2 2 0 0 4 
15 1 2 6 4 13 26 
16 0 0 4 2 2 0 
17 1 2 2 1 0 1 
18 1 1 5 3 2 10 







Table 12. Total Deletions by Subject for The Visual Group 
 OVERALL DELETIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 0 3 3 1 4 2 
2 1 2 3 1 4 10 
3 1 0 0 0 2 4 
4 0 2 5 2 1 6 
5 0 0 4 1 1 5 
6 0 1 0 0 2 1 
7 1 1 2 1 0 4 
8 1 0 3 1 0 1 
9 2 3 4 0 5 5 
10 0 2 3 1 1 9 
11 1 3 5 1 5 5 
12 0 1 7 1 2 2 
13 1 1 2 3 3 4 
14 1 0 5 4 3 2 
15 1 0 3 1 2 3 
16 0 1 3 1 1 6 
17 0 3 2 1 4 1 
18 1 0 4 0 0 1 






Table 13. Total Filled Pauses by Subject for The Verbal Group 
 OVERALL FILLED PAUSES BY SUBJECT 










1 1 7 6 8 19 17 
2 22 20 18 35 46 53 
3 7 8 6 3 10 10 
4 0 7 11 7 9 17 
5 6 8 7 5 8 11 
6 3 13 7 10 12 19 
7 6 12 19 10 18 17 
8 4 8 7 5 6 7 
9 5 7 7 13 13 14 
10 2 13 16 5 19 15 
11 12 20 32 11 40 29 
12 2 4 4 3 7 11 
13 4 12 5 5 12 14 
14 5 5 6 10 4 12 
15 28 29 28 48 72 59 
16 10 8 9 16 14 15 
17 15 23 33 6 24 17 
18 2 1 13 5 7 9 






Table 14. Total Filled Pauses by Subject for The Visual Group 
 OVERALL FILLED PAUSES BY SUBJECT 










1 24 7 14 19 13 24 
2 23 24 18 35 26 26 
3 9 10 5 16 20 17 
4 3 5 16 9 2 22 
5 1 1 0 1 9 9 
6 6 7 14 7 13 17 
7 1 6 3 4 3 7 
8 0 3 21 10 13 39 
9 19 12 4 9 19 22 
10 2 2 5 8 12 17 
11 3 11 7 21 14 24 
12 1 10 14 5 8 9 
13 12 18 12 49 40 47 
14 6 3 7 7 1 9 
15 15 15 19 21 20 25 
16 5 5 15 7 9 17 
17 2 2 2 4 4 2 
18 25 40 45 48 33 36 






Table 15. Total Word Count per trial by Subject for The Verbal Group 
 TOTAL RAW WORD COUNT BY SUBJECT 










1 240 484 386 335 584 568 
2 265 428 507 513 831 873 
3 441 543 657 311 508 523 
4 194 503 483 278 360 434 
5 251 338 333 219 386 401 
6 256 406 441 334 506 783 
7 366 643 716 289 527 716 
8 210 529 553 722 699 647 
9 490 640 534 602 577 598 
10 286 482 431 293 607 629 
11 331 546 890 341 839 896 
12 232 340 316 379 402 392 
13 312 308 387 343 583 511 
14 228 330 402 459 572 938 
15 516 693 870 843 1911 2328 
16 236 340 379 346 570 584 
17 138 311 390 129 315 291 
18 243 316 459 766 640 698 






Table 16. Total Raw Word Count by Subject for The Visual Group 
 TOTAL RAW WORD COUNT BY SUBJECT 










1 696 546 557 582 468 1113 
2 379 515 557 647 659 917 
3 393 513 572 464 508 746 
4 243 366 472 475 450 855 
5 416 437 372 492 582 679 
6 193 206 248 279 346 399 
7 352 538 614 308 331 545 
8 258 293 446 537 481 631 
9 572 661 770 607 710 845 
10 268 246 328 424 440 749 
11 370 273 351 607 676 665 
12 357 450 494 596 509 661 
13 455 483 479 833 693 994 
14 302 265 367 428 471 444 
15 381 561 639 573 583 656 
16 244 268 339 376 300 451 
17 388 404 433 391 411 565 
18 336 418 515 514 503 528 






Table 17. Total Transactions by Subject for The Verbal Group 
 TOTAL TRANSACTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 13 27 21 15 17 22 
2 17 25 22 18 27 28 
3 17 25 24 16 29 22 
4 8 22 22 14 18 21 
5 13 16 21 15 20 24 
6 15 19 23 13 21 27 
7 16 18 21 9 19 22 
8 10 19 19 24 24 22 
9 15 21 11 15 19 19 
10 18 29 22 14 20 25 
11 15 27 28 11 35 40 
12 16 19 24 19 22 22 
13 14 14 20 14 21 20 
14 8 19 20 19 26 30 
15 16 28 31 20 44 37 
16 17 18 21 13 19 27 
17 13 19 20 15 19 19 
18 16 19 28 18 22 27 






Table 18. Total Transactions by Subject for The Visual Group 
 TOTAL TRANSACTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 20 15 15 18 19 30 
2 16 19 16 20 24 26 
3 12 12 17 13 14 19 
4 12 11 24 18 16 24 
5 12 10 21 17 23 27 
6 7 16 21 14 23 21 
7 18 22 30 14 13 24 
8 15 13 18 19 20 25 
9 18 22 26 16 25 24 
10 13 13 17 16 10 22 
11 12 9 15 18 22 20 
12 12 17 21 15 17 25 
13 16 13 15 22 20 23 
14 14 12 15 15 19 23 
15 10 13 17 19 18 29 
16 11 12 20 15 14 19 
17 12 13 16 15 20 25 
18 9 17 18 19 17 21 






Table 19. Total Normal Transactions by Subject for The Verbal Group 
 NORMAL TRANSACTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 13 22 15 15 13 16 
2 17 17 17 18 18 22 
3 16 19 18 16 22 15 
4 8 16 16 13 12 15 
5 13 11 15 15 15 18 
6 14 11 13 12 13 17 
7 16 12 12 9 13 14 
8 10 11 15 24 18 16 
9 14 16 7 15 12 12 
10 16 16 16 14 15 19 
11 15 18 19 10 25 31 
12 16 13 18 18 16 18 
13 14 10 13 14 15 14 
14 8 13 13 19 19 20 
15 16 22 24 19 36 29 
16 17 12 15 13 14 19 
17 13 12 14 15 12 12 
18 16 12 19 17 16 17 





Table 20. Total Normal Transactions by Subject for The Visual Group 
 NORMAL TRANSACTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 18 15 13 18 18 21 
2 16 13 11 20 19 18 
3 12 12 13 13 13 15 
4 12 10 15 16 16 17 
5 12 9 15 17 18 19 
6 7 15 15 13 17 13 
7 17 18 23 13 11 16 
8 14 13 12 18 19 17 
9 17 17 16 16 17 16 
10 12 13 13 16 10 15 
11 12 9 11 18 18 13 
12 11 17 15 15 17 17 
13 16 13 11 22 18 18 
14 14 12 10 15 17 16 
15 10 13 13 19 18 22 
16 11 12 13 15 14 11 
17 12 12 11 15 19 16 
18 9 17 13 19 17 15 






Table 21. Total Retrieval Transactions by Subject for The Verbal Group 
 RETRIEVAL TRANSACTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 0 5 6 0 4 6 
2 0 7 5 0 6 6 
3 0 6 6 0 6 6 
4 0 6 6 0 6 6 
5 0 5 6 0 5 6 
6 0 7 9 0 7 9 
7 0 6 9 0 6 8 
8 0 8 4 0 6 6 
9 0 5 4 0 7 7 
10 0 7 6 0 5 6 
11 0 4 8 0 6 6 
12 0 6 6 0 6 4 
13 0 4 7 0 5 6 
14 0 6 7 0 7 8 
15 0 6 6 0 6 8 
16 0 6 6 0 5 7 
17 0 6 6 0 7 7 
18 0 6 9 0 6 10 






Table 22. Total Retrieval Transactions by Subject for The Visual Group 
 RETRIEVAL TRANSACTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 2 0 2 0 1 9 
2 0 6 5 0 5 8 
3 0 0 4 0 1 4 
4 0 1 8 0 0 6 
5 0 1 5 0 5 7 
6 0 0 6 0 6 8 
7 0 4 7 0 2 6 
8 0 0 5 0 0 6 
9 0 5 9 0 6 7 
10 0 0 4 0 0 7 
11 0 0 4 0 4 7 
12 0 0 6 0 0 7 
13 0 0 4 0 1 5 
14 0 0 5 0 2 7 
15 0 0 4 0 0 7 
16 0 0 7 0 0 8 
17 0 1 4 0 1 9 
18 0 0 4 0 0 5 






Table 23. Total Other Transactions by Subject for The Verbal Group 
 OTHER TRANSACTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 0 3 0 
3 1 0 0 0 1 1 
4 0 0 0 1 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1 0 0 0 0 0 
10 2 6 0 0 0 0 
11 0 5 1 1 4 3 
12 0 0 0 1 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 1 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 2 
15 0 0 1 1 2 0 
16 0 0 0 0 0 1 
17 0 1 0 0 0 0 
18 0 1 0 1 0 0 






Table 24. Total Other Transactions by Subject for The Visual Group 
 OTHER TRANSACTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 1 2 0 1 
5 0 0 1 0 0 1 
6 0 1 0 1 0 0 
7 1 0 0 1 0 2 
8 1 0 1 1 1 2 
9 1 0 1 0 2 1 
10 1 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1 0 0 0 0 1 
13 0 0 0 0 1 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 1 0 0 0 
18 0 0 1 0 0 1 
TOTAL 5 1 6 5 4 9 
 
APPENDIX I – TRANSCRIPT FOR AUDIO EXAMPLE ON CD-ROM OF 













“Ehm…so if you…I’ll tell you w-….see if you see if you can try and ehm if you can 
look see if you move…see if you…see if you right…if you stop where you are right 
now okay” 
APPENDIX J – TRANSCRIPTS OF DUAL-FEEDBACK MODALITY AND 
EXAMPLES OF PLANNING AND HESITATION DISFLUENCIES 
 
NOTE: The reliability judgements reported in Section 3.12 were done on these and 
other similar materials. 
 
Clip 1, Subject 2, Visual Group, Experiment 2 
Example of Hesitation Repetition 








3.52 of MUTUAL GAZE at 
Overgrowngully 
IG starts gazing at 
Overgrowngully 
246.903 begin normal_transaction  begin instruct_move  
You loop round the 
overgrown gully , um ,  
250.08 end of MUTUAL GAZE 




IG starts gazing at 
Giraffesnorth 
  
251.744 begin disfluency (r)   <R to the  
252.405 end disfluency (r)   
to the R> left-hand side, 
to the right-hand side of 
it . 
254.594 end instruct_move  begin instruct_move  And then head north.  
255.793 end normal_transaction  end instruct_move   
255.793 begin normal transaction begin interactive move 
Um, do you have any 
giraffes at all 
256.68 





















Clip 2, Subject 4, Visual Group, Experiment 2 
Example of Planning Deletion 
PLAY s4-both-clip2-del.avi ALONG WITH THIS TRANSCRIPT 
 
66.88 
IF feedback arrives at 
Rocks 
0.2 of MUTUAL GAZE 
at Rocks 
67.08 end of MUTUAL GAZE IG stops gazing at Rocks 
67.097 end explain_move  begin explain_move  
so it's d just down from the rift 
valley  
68.32 












IG stops gazing at 
Outlawshideout 
  
69.582 end explain_move  begin interactive_move   
70.627 begin disfluency (d)   <D just,  
70.80 
0.32 of MUTUAL GAZE 
at Rocks 
IG starts gazing at Rocks  
70.96  end disfluency (d)   
D> I think you are looking at 
the right spot 
71.12 end of MUTUAL GAZE IG stops gazing at Rocks  
71.92 IG starts gazing at Noose   
71.96 IG stops gazing at Noose   
72.00 
2.48 of MUTUAL GAZE 
at Rocks 
IG starts gazing at Rocks  
72.582 end interactive_move  begin instruct_move  
we will loop underneath those 
rocks  
74.48 end of MUTUAL GAZE IG stops gazing at Rocks IG starts gazing at StonecreekN 
74.88 




0.4 of MUTUAL GAZE at 
Rocks 
IG starts gazing at Rocks  
75.271 end instruct_move  begin instruct_move  
and head up diagonally left 
towards the stone creek  
75.32 end of MUTUAL GAZE IG stops gazing at Rocks IG starts gazing at StonecreekN 
75.56 
0.24 of MUTUAL GAZE 
at Rocks 
IG stops gazing at 
StonecreekN 
IG starts gazing at Rocks 
75.80 end of MUTUAL GAZE IG stops gazing at Rocks IG starts gazing at StonecreekN 
76.28 
IG stops gazing at 
StonecreekN 




IG stops gazing at 
Whitewater 




IG stops gazing at 
StonecreekN 
IG starts gazing at 
Whitewater 
 
80.432 end normal_transaction  end instruct_move   
 
 
Clip 3, Subject 13, Motivated Subject from Experiment 3 
Example of Hesitation Deletion 
PLAY s13-both-clip3-del.avi ALONG WITH THIS TRANSCRIPT 
 
38.64 










































<D ehm we 
are  
43.48 




















43.935 end disfluency (d)   D> 
44.20 

















side of the 
page  
44.44 




































IG starts gazing at 
Flamingoes 
   
47.92 




























   
48.36 





    
48.52 
IG starts gazing at 
Waterfall 
     
49.40 
IG stops gazing at 
Waterfall 
     
49.68 






    
50.08 





    
50.36 
IG starts gazing at 
Fallen Pillars 
     
50.44 
IG stops gazing at 
Fallen Pillars 
     
50.88 
IG starts gazing at 
Waterfall 
     
50.96 









   





side of the 
page  
   
52.24 





    
52.40 
IG starts gazing at 
Waterfall 
     
52.88 









   
53.32 












53.76 IG starts gazing at      
Waterfall 
54.08 









   
55.08 








   







side of the  
   
55.44 
IG stops gazing at 
Flamingoes 
     
55.68 
IG starts gazing at 
Fallen Pillars 
     
55.80 
IG stops gazing at 
Fallen Pillars 
     
 
 
Clip 4, Subject 10, Motivated Group 
Example of Planning Repetition 
PLAY s10-clip4-rep.avi ALONG WITH THIS TRANSCRIPT 
 
140.28 IG starts gazing at Stones 
142.00 




“No, not with you” 
142.832 begin retrieval_transaction  begin interactive_move  well where  
143.308 begin disfluency (r)   <R you're  
143.798 end disfluency (r)   
you're R> looking now I've 
got some ancient ruins 
146.293 end interactive_move  begin explain_move  
You want to pass up the left-
hand side of that  
149.219 end retrieval_transaction  end explain_move   
156.76 





158.92 IG stops gazing at Stones   
 
APPENDIX J - DISFLUENCIES, WORDS and TRANSACTION COUNTS BY 




Table 1. Overall disfluencies for Experiment 3 by Subject and Feedback Modality 
 OVERALL DISFLUENCIES BY SUBJECT 










1 2 17 34 9 10 24 
2 7 11 19 7 10 28 
3 7 4 5 7 12 16 
4 8 8 14 4 9 20 
5 5 8 26 11 14 27 
6 8 11 20 12 11 23 
7 6 19 15 26 23 31 
8 5 18 9 9 10 14 
9 2 23 21 9 7 12 




Table 2. Overall repetitions for Experiment 3 by Subject and Feedback Modality 
 OVERALL REPETITIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 0 2 6 1 1 5 
2 3 1 7 4 2 14 
3 2 0 1 4 6 4 
4 3 0 1 2 3 8 
5 1 5 6 7 4 14 
6 2 3 3 2 1 9 
7 1 9 9 8 9 15 
8 2 8 3 2 3 2 
9 0 14 9 1 2 3 






Table 3. Overall substitutions for Experiment 3 by Subject and Feedback Modality 
 OVERALL SUBSTITUTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 2 3 8 5 2 13 
2 1 0 4 2 6 9 
3 1 1 0 0 4 5 
4 3 4 3 1 5 6 
5 4 2 10 3 3 5 
6 2 2 6 7 1 9 
7 1 8 2 8 10 11 
8 0 1 1 6 5 7 
9 2 5 4 6 0 4 




Table 4. Overall insertions for Experiment 3 by Subject and Feedback Modality 
 OVERALL INSERTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 0 2 4 2 3 4 
2 2 5 2 1 0 1 
3 1 0 2 2 1 2 
4 1 1 5 0 1 2 
5 0 0 1 1 2 3 
6 1 2 2 2 4 0 
7 1 1 0 7 1 1 
8 2 1 0 0 0 2 
9 0 3 0 1 1 4 







Table 5. Overall deletions for Experiment 3 by Subject and Feedback Modality 
 OVERALL DELETIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 0 10 16 1 4 2 
2 1 5 6 0 2 4 
3 3 3 2 1 1 5 
4 1 3 5 1 0 4 
5 0 1 9 0 5 5 
6 3 4 9 1 5 5 
7 3 1 4 3 3 4 
8 1 8 5 1 2 3 
9 0 1 8 1 4 1 





Table 6. Overall filled pauses for Experiment 3 by Subject and Feedback Modality 
 OVERALL FILLED PAUSES BY SUBJECT 










1 11 14 3 19 13 24 
2 12 9 10 16 20 17 
3 1 1 5 1 9 9 
4 2 2 3 4 3 7 
5 0 4 1 9 19 22 
6 0 2 15 21 14 24 
7 5 5 4 49 40 47 
8 26 29 19 21 20 25 
9 7 11 14 4 4 2 







Table 7. Total raw word count for Experiment 3 by Subject and Feedback Modality 
 TOTAL RAW WORD COUNT BY SUBJECT 










1 214 607 922 582 468 1113 
2 452 552 581 464 508 746 
3 283 421 444 492 582 679 
4 379 696 745 308 331 545 
5 314 379 920 607 710 845 
6 530 966 761 607 676 665 
7 203 546 403 833 693 994 
8 294 489 453 573 583 656 
9 401 1381 1217 391 411 565 





Table 8. Overall transactions for Experiment 3 by Subject and Feedback Modality 
 OVERALL TRANSACTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 16 23 35 18 19 30 
2 19 24 26 13 14 19 
3 14 18 21 17 23 27 
4 20 29 33 14 13 24 
5 18 20 34 16 25 24 
6 22 35 30 18 22 20 
7 14 30 24 22 20 23 
8 21 25 19 19 18 29 
9 16 36 37 15 20 25 






Table 9. Total Normal Transactions for Experiment 3 by Subject and Feedback Modality 
 NORMAL TRANSACTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 15 15 21 18 18 21 
2 18 15 19 13 13 15 
3 13 16 14 17 18 19 
4 18 17 20 13 11 16 
5 17 16 22 16 17 16 
6 19 26 21 18 18 13 
7 12 21 16 22 18 18 
8 18 17 14 19 18 22 
9 14 25 25 15 19 16 






Table 10. Total Retrieval Transactions for Experiment 3 by Subject and Feedback Modality 
 RETRIEVAL TRANSACTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 0 6 12 0 1 9 
2 0 6 5 0 1 4 
3 0 0 5 0 5 7 
4 0 8 11 0 2 6 
5 0 1 11 0 6 7 
6 1 7 7 0 4 7 
7 0 8 7 0 1 5 
8 0 6 5 0 0 7 
9 0 10 12 0 1 9 




Table 11. Total Other Transactions for Experiment 3 by Subject and Feedback Modality 
 OTHER TRANSACTIONS BY SUBJECT 










1 1 2 2 0 0 0 
2 1 3 2 0 0 0 
3 1 2 2 0 0 1 
4 2 4 2 1 0 2 
5 1 3 1 0 2 1 
6 2 2 2 0 0 0 
7 2 1 1 0 1 0 
8 3 2 0 0 0 0 
9 2 1 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 15 20 12 1 3 4 
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This paper addresses the causes of disfluency. Disfluency has 
been described as a strategic device for intentionally signalling 
to an interlocutor that the speaker is committed to an utterance 
under construction [14, 21]. It is also described as an automatic 
effect of cognitive burdens, particularly of managing speech 
production during other tasks [6]. To assess these claims, we 
used a version of the map task [1, 11] and tested 24 normal 
adult subjects in a baseline untimed monologue condition 
against conditions adding either feedback in the form of an 
indication of a supposed listener’s gaze, or time-pressure, or 
both. Both feedback and time-pressure affected the nature of 
the speaker’s performance overall. Disfluency rate increased 
when feedback was available, as the strategic view predicts, 
but only deletion disfluencies showed a significant effect of 
this manipulation. Both the nature of the deletion disfluencies 
in the current task and of the information which the speaker 
would need to acquire in order to use them appropriately 
suggest ways of refining the strategic view of disfluency. 
1. Introduction 
Disfluency is known to be more common in dialogue than in 
monologue [19]. Explanations for this fact fall into two 
categories. One ties disfluency to active strategies for 
cultivating common ground, the accumulating knowledge that 
interlocutors are mutually conscious of sharing [9, 13, 21], 
while the other sees disfluency as an accidental result of 
cognitive burdens [6], which necessarily increase when a 
speaker must process a listener’s utterances while composing 
his or her own. 
In the strategic view, disfluency is one of a number of 
intentional strategies which speakers employ to maintain 
mutuality. Clark and Wasow [14] argue that repetition 
disfluencies are strategically deployed to signal ongoing 
difficulty in producing an utterance to which the speaker is 
nonetheless committed. Evidence of prosodic cues that signal 
strategic intention has been obtained for repetitive repair [21].  
In the alternate view, conversation is a cognitively taxing 
process and competition is high for production resources [3, 4, 
9, 15, 16]. A speaker must design the sub-goals of any task 
which a dialogue helps the interlocutors to pursue, plan the 
sections of the dialogue which correspond to these goals, and 
attend to the contributions of the interlocutor, while micro-
planning his/her own utterances [4, 5]. Disfluencies may occur 
when this burden becomes so great that errors in planning or 
production are not detected and edited covertly before 
articulation begins. Increases in disfluency accompanying 
increased complexity of any of the cognitive functions 
underlying dialogue are taken to support this view. Long 
utterances, which tend to be more complex than short, 
certainly tend to be disfluent more often [14]. Bard and her 
colleagues have shown that even with utterance length taken 
into account, production burdens correlate with disfluency: 
formulating multi-reference utterances and initiating new 
sections of the dialogue both tend to encourage disfluency. In 
contrast, no characteristics of the prior interlocutor utterance 
have any independent effect on disfluency rate. This account 
of disfluency joins other models of dialogue phenomena in 
ascribing to the speaker’s own current needs many of the 
behaviours which are often thought to be adaptations to a 
developing model of the listener’s knowledge [See 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 
20]. 
This paper presents the first group of results from a series of 
experiments designed to discover whether speakers are more 
concerned with attending to their listeners’ knowledge or 
completing their own production tasks. The experiments use a 
variant of the map task [1, 11]. In the original task, players 
have before them versions of a cartoon map representing a 
novel imaginary location. The Instruction Giver communicates 
to the Instruction Follower a route pre-printed on the Giver’s 
map. The current series uses only Instruction Givers and 
manipulates both time-pressure and feedback from a 
presumptive Follower.  
The time-pressure variable contrasts instructions composed 
in the Giver’s own time with a time-limited condition. If 
disfluencies are a basic signaling device and important to the 
conduct of a dialogue, then this manipulation will not affect 
them. If disfluencies are failures of planning, time-pressure 
should increase their rate of occurrence. If, on the other hand, 
disfluencies are a luxury, a rhetorical device available to 
speakers but not required for the process of maintaining 
mutual knowledge, then they may be more common when 
interlocutors have the time to indulge in them, that is, in the 
untimed condition.  
The feedback variable contrasts monologue map tasks, 
supposedly transmitted to a listener in another room, with 
tasks for which there is minimal feedback in the form of a 
square projected on the map to represent the direction of the 
Follower’s gaze. If modeling the listener’s knowledge is critical 
to the process of dialogue, then this is the most important kind 
of feedback, for it tells one interlocutor what the other knows 
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about the map and how s/he interprets the instructions. If 
speakers treat these tasks as interactive, and if disfluency is an 
intentionally helpful signal, then disfluency should be more 
common in this condition than in pure monologue. For 
example, repetition disfluency should be induced by the 
availability of the listener [14].  
The interactions of these two manipulations are of particular 
interest. A pure strategic model demands a main effect of 
feedback but would sit well with enhanced rates of disfluency 
in the feedback condition with time pressure, where most 
difficulties would arise. A pure cognitive difficulty model 
predicts enhanced rates of disfluency under time pressure, but 
particularly again where feedback and time-pressure both add 
to the speaker’s cognitive burdens. Associated with the 
cognitive difficulty model are a set of results which could 
support a hybrid view: that listener-centric behaviour in 
dialogue is a luxury [15, 16] which will be abandoned when the 
speaker has more pressing tasks to pursue. This model 
predicts that disfluencies will appear at a higher rate where 
feedback makes the task interactive and where ample time 
permits the consideration of the listener’s needs. 
2. Method 
2.1. Task  
Disfluencies are obtained from the MONITOR corpus 
currently under collection [7]. This corpus employs a variant 
of the map task [1, 11]. In this version of the MONITOR 
task, subjects are seated before a computer screen displaying a 
map of a fictional location which includes a route from a 
marked start-point to buried treasure. Labelled landmarks and 
map designs are adapted from the HCRC Map Task Corpus 
[1]. Subjects are requested to help a distant listener reproduce 
the route. Subjects’ instructions were recorded onto the video 
record by a close-talking microphone and their gaze direction 
was recorded by a screen-mounted eye-tracker. At the 
beginning of each trial, the tracker was calibrated. 
2.2. Experimental Design  
The experiment crossed feedback (2) and time-pressure (2). In 
the no feedback conditions, subjects saw only the map. In the 
feedback condition, a small moving square was superimposed 
on the map and subjects were told that this represented the 
current direction of their Instruction Follower’s gaze. 
Unbeknownst to the subjects, there was no actual Follower. 
The feedback gaze-square followed a pre-programmed 
sequence. It remained on the landmarks determining the route 
until the first two or three had been successfully negotiated. 
Subsequently, feedback gaze wandered off-course at least once 
every other landmark The pattern of incorrect gaze-responses 
corresponded roughly to the distribution of landmarks which 
did not match across Giver and Follower maps in [1]. In four 
cases in each map, the feedback square did not go to the 
intended landmark, but instead moved to a second, but distant, 
copy of that landmark or to a space on the map which would 
have hosted a landmark on the Follower’s version of the 
corresponding HCRC map. In each case, once the subject had 
introduced the next route-critical landmark, an experimenter in 
another room advanced the feedback gaze square to its next 
scheduled target. The square moved about its target landmark 
in a realistic fashion, with sorties of random radius and angle. 
Crossed with feedback was the time-pressure variable. In 
half of the trials, speakers were permitted only one minute to 
complete the task; otherwise time was unlimited.  
Subjects with normal uncorrected vision were recruited from 
the Glasgow University community. All were paid for their 
time. All encountered all 4 conditions. Four different basic 
maps were used, counter-balanced across conditions over the 
whole design. Subjects were eliminated if any single map trial 
failed to meet criteria for feedback or capture quality. The 
feedback criterion demanded that the experimenter advance the 
feedback square between the introduction of the pertinent 
landmark and the onset of the following instruction in all cases 
where where the feedback was scheduled to be errant and in 
70% where the square’s movement was scheduled to be 
correct. The capture criterion demanded that at least 80% of 
the eye-tracking data was intact. Fifty-four subjects were run 
before 24 remained with valid sessions in all conditions and 
with a balanced design in total.  
3. Results  
3.1. Dialogue Structure 
Each monologue was transcribed verbatim and then coded for 
transaction [12]. A transaction is a block of speech in task-
oriented dialogue which accomplishes a task sub-goal. 
Accordingly, in this task Normal transactions are periods of 
standard instruction giving. Review transactions recount the 
route negotiated thus far. Overviews describe the route or map 
in general. Irrelevant transactions are all off-task remarks.  
A fifth type of transaction, Retrievals, was identified in the 
present monologues and can be used to show that the feedback 
conditions were in fact interactive. In a Retrieval the speaker 
neither gives new instructions nor reviews the route but 
instead moves the presumed IF to a previously named 
landmark where s/he should be but apparently is not. Figure 1, 
which divides Transactions by type in each of the four 
conditions, shows that Retrievals occurred in the two feedback 
conditions (13% of all Transactions in Feedback-Timed; 18% 
in Feedback-Untimed) but very rarely otherwise (0.8% of all 
No Feedback Timed Transactions and 0.3% of No Feedback 
Untimed: by-subjects 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA main 
effect for Feedback, F1(1,23) = 25.84, p < .001). The imbalance 
suggests that Retrievals are unlikely to be mere clarifications, 
independent of the IF’s behaviour. Since each speaker 
encountered 4 off-route gaze locations per dialogue, the average 
number of Retrieval transactions per dialogue, 1.58 for 
Feedback Timed; 2.58 for Feedback Untimed, shows fairly 
good uptake of the feedback square’s ‘mistakes’. The effect of 
Time-pressure approached significance (F1(1,23) = 4.12, p = 
.054). but only because of an increase in Retrievals in Feedback 
conditions (interaction: F1(1,23) = 5.40, p = .029). 
As Figure 1 also shows, Retrievals do not follow the general 
trends for volume of transactions. Both Normal transactions 
and total number of transactions are more numerous in the 
Untimed conditions (11.40 Normal transactions, 13.83 in total 
per trial) than in the Timed (9.63 Normal, 11.27 total) 
Proceedings of DiSS’03, Disfluency in Spontaneous Speech Workshop. 5–8 September 2003, Göteborg University, Sweden. 
Robert Eklund (ed.), Gothenburg Papers in Theoretical Linguistics 89, ISSN 0349–1021, pp. 15–18. 
 17 
(F1(1,23) = 5.77, p = .025 for normal; F1(1,23) = 9.95, p < .01, 
overall), with no effect of feedback. Other transaction types 
were unaffected by the experimental variables. 
Figure 1: Mean numbers of transactions per trial by type and 
experimental condition (N = No Feedback; F = Feedback; T = 
Timed; U = Untimed). 
 
3.2. Words 
Word counts included whole and part-words. Again results 
show less speech with time-pressure (224 words/trial on 
average) than without (319): (F1(1,23) = 33.69, p < .001).  
There was a non-significant tendency for speakers to resist the 
effect of time-pressure more with feedback (FT: 238 
words/trial; FU: 316) than without (NT: 209; NU: 320): 
(F1(1,23) = 3.31 p = .082).  
3.3. Disfluencies 
Disfluencies were first labeled according to the system devised 
by Lickley [18]: as repetitions, insertions, substitutions or 
deletions. The disfluency coder used Entropic/Xwaves 
software to listen, view and label disfluent regions of speech. 
Spectrograms were analyzed whenever necessary. Each word 
within a disfluent utterance was labeled as belonging to the 
onset, reparundum, repair, or continuation [17].  
Because disfluencies are more common in longer utterances 
[3, 14, 21], raw disfluency counts may reflect only 
opportunities for disfluency. To provide a measure of 
disfluency rate, we divided the number of disfluencies in a 
monologue by its total number of fluent words, that is by the 
total number of words less the words in reparanda.  
Figure 2: Rates of disfluency by type and experimental 
condition 
 
The data in Figure 2 display a pattern which would be 
predicted from an strategic model of disfluency: Speakers were 
more disfluent in conditions with feedback (0.044) than in 
conditions without feedback (0.034), (F1(1,23) = 8.66, 
p = .007), but were unaffected by time pressure (F1(1,23) = 
1.87, p = .185) or by any interaction (F1(1,23) < 1). Because 
transaction-initial utterances are prone to disfluency, the 
effects were recalculated with number of transactions in the 
trial as a covariate. Again, only feedback affected disfluency 
(F1(1,22) = 11.33, p < .003).  
3.4.  Disfluency Type 
Figure 2 also displays the breakdown of disfluencies by type 
across experimental conditions. Only the rate of deletions 
showed any significant effect of feedback: an increase in the 
feedback conditions (.008) over no feedback (.004): (F1(1,23) = 
14.61, p = .001; F1(1,22) = 14.24, p = .001 with transactions 
as covariate). There was no overall effect of time pressure on 
deletion (F1(1,23) = 2.44 p > .10), though there was a non-
significant tendency (F1(1,23) = 3.59, p = .071; F1(1,22) = 
3.62, p = .070 with transactions as covariate) towards the 
‘disfluency as luxury’ pattern: deletions tended to be more 
common in Feedback Untimed (0.010) than in Feedback Timed 
(0.007) trials, with no corresponding effect of time pressure in 
the No Feedback conditions (0.004 in both cases). No other 
type of disfluency and no combination of other types showed 
significant effects, though the rate of all non-deletion 
disfluencies was numerically higher (0.035) with feedback than 
without (0.030) (F1(1,23) = 3.21, p = .086).  
4. Discussion and Conclusions  
The literature provided us with two major proposals for the 
causes of disfluency. One suggests that interlocutors 
intentionally employ disfluencies to warn each other of local 
difficulty. An interactive situation should encourage more 
disfluency, and if the signal function is critical, it should be 
maintained or even increase as the speaker’s difficulties are 
augmented with increasing time pressure. An alternative view 
suggests that disfluency is an accident of heightened cognitive 
burden. If so, time pressure should promote disfluency 
particularly when feedback complicates the speaker’s task. A 
third prediction stresses the fragility of listener-centric 
behaviour. If disfluency is listener-centric and all such 
behaviour is at best an option available to speakers when time 
or attention permit, disfluencies should be more frequent 
when speakers are not under time pressure but are interacting 
with listeners.  
  The experiment reported above successfully manipulated 
the interactive quality of the speaker’s task and the pressure 
to complete it efficiently. Feedback in the form of a visual 
representation of a presumptive listener’s gaze changed 
speakers’ strategic treatment of the route communication task. 
A novel type of transaction, provides circumstantial evidence 
that subjects took seriously the task of tracking and 
redirecting their listener’s gaze when it appeared to have 
strayed off-course. Retrievals were almost exclusive to the 
Feedback trials. Time pressure affected how much subjects 
said, with fewer transactions and fewer words under the one-
minute limit.  
With the manipulations effective in altering speakers’ 
behaviour, we can return to the predictions for disfluency rate. 
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At first glance, disfluency seems to operate as an important 
strategic tool, with higher rates in the conditions with 
feedback and no effect of time-pressure. Yet, when 
disfluencies are subdivided by type, only deletion disfluencies 
were significantly more common in feedback trials. This fact is 
not just a result of sparse data in certain disfluency sub-types. 
Taken together, all the other kinds of disfluency still failed to 
respond robustly to feedback.  Deletions alone support the 
strategic view. 
 
Subject 10. Feedback Untimed 
Start  Utterance 
70.4340 ehm go around and do a big circle ehm like just do 
a big loop down, not 
71.4250 oh sorry there was 
72.1388 <breath 
72.2730 two stone creeks 
72.4504 breath> 
75.1890 ehm so yeah you're in the right place 
 
Subject 19. Feedback Timed 
Start  Utterance 
55.6070 and then you take a right across the farmed land 
56.4686 < breath 
56.7157 breath> 
57.8160 doing a s- 
58.8550 no you go right right at the farmed land 
 
Figure 3: Deletion examples. Deletion disfluency in boldface.  
 
It cannot yet be said that they support it conclusively. 
First, there was a nearly significant interaction of the type 
which would be predicted if disfluency were a luxury: 
disfluency rates were highest in the untimed feedback trials 
rather than in the timed, where there ought to have been more 
problems to report. Though we are unable to conclude 
definitively that deletions result from some optional rhetorical 
strategy, their content invites further investigation.  
The examples in Figure 3 are typical. Subject 10 appears to 
be abandoning an utterance because he encountered difficulties 
in reading the map, and resumed with more accurate 
instructions. His deletion marks ‘Giver failure’. Subject 19, on 
the other hand, interrupts the flow of speech and begins anew 
because the feedback gaze square did not move in the correct 
direction. This is an instance of ‘Follower failure’: the 
‘Follower’s’ action appears to have induced the subject to 
abandon an instruction which the Follower was in no position 
to obey.   
Though deletions are indicators of interaction, it would be 
difficult to see them as signalling commitment to an utterance, 
as is thought to be the case for repetitions [14]. Instead, by 
abandoning an utterance, the speaker is expressing either the 
inadequacy of his/her own description or inappropriacy of the 
Follower’s response. Whether the two functions are equally 
likely in both timing conditions we do not yet know. 
It is plain, however, that both of these actions would require 
visual attention beyond what is needed for tracking the route 
to the next landmark and describing it. Our preliminary 
analyses of the eye-tracking data captured during these trials 
indicate that subjects’ gaze primarily at the landmarks which 
are critical to the route [7]. The operations which appear to 
underlie deletions would produce two different patterns of off-
route speaker gaze: scanning the map in the case of Giver 
failures and monitoring the feedback square’s location in the 
case of Follower failures. If digressions are more common with 
feedback than without, and if they predominantly track the 
feedback square, then we may have a visual substrate for 
Follower failure deletions. If digressions are more common in 
untimed trials than in timed, then time to acquire the 
knowledge which underlies any deletion may be the real luxury 
afforded by our paradigm. Exactly how such a luxury is used – 
for better scanning of the map or tracking of the interlocutor, 
we do not yet know. At present, we are examining Giver gaze 
data to determine which patterns accompany disfluency. 
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 Abstract 
Previous research on disfluency types has focused on their 
distinct cognitive causes, prosodic patterns, or effects on the 
listener [9, 12, 17, 21].  This paper seeks to add to this 
taxonomy by providing a psycholinguistic account of the 
dialogue and gaze behaviour speakers engage in when they 
make certain types of disfluency. Dialogues came from a 
version of the Map Task, [2, 4], in which 36 normal adult 
speakers each participated in six dialogues across which 
feedback modality and time-pressure were counter-balanced. 
In this paper, we ask whether disfluency, both generally and 
type-specifically, was associated with speaker attention to the 
listener. We show that certain disfluency types can be linked 
to particular dialogue goals, depending on whether the speaker 
had attended to listener feedback. The results shed light on the 
general cognitive causes of disfluency and suggest that it will 
be possible to predict the types of disfluency which will 
accompany particular behaviours. 
1. Introduction 
Types of disfluency distinguished by their form are also 
distinguishable by other characteristics. Repetition 
disfluencies are the most common in spontaneous speech [21]. 
In a pioneering paper, Maclay & Osgood showed that 
repetitions precede content words more often than function 
words [22]. Repetitions have been linked to strategic 
signalling commitment to both listener and utterance [10, 12].  
The prosodic cues for repetitions are linked to certain 
strategies in dialogue [25]. Savova showed, however, that the 
prosodic cues to repetitions differ from the cues to a 
substitution, providing support for the notion that disfluency 
types have distinct sources in the cognitive processes 
underlying the production of speech in dialogue [26].    
It is already clear that disfluencies of different types cause 
different processing problems for the listener.  While 
repetitions cause less disruption than false starts [a kind of 
deletion disfluency] for a word recognition task, [13], 
repetitions are more difficult for trained transcribers to detect 
than false starts of the same length [20].  
Disfluency has been linked to cognitive causes by Levelt 
[17], who proposes that some disfluencies occur for covert 
cognitive reasons while other disfluencies are overt 
corrections. Lickley found that disfluency types vary 
systematically across turn types whereby turns that involve 
planning typically involve more self-corrections than 
utterances which are responses to queries [18]. Replies to 
queries, on the other hand, tend to involve more filled pauses 
(ums, uhs) and repetitions in order to buy time [18]. Thus, it 
seems that certain types of disfluencies have already been 
linked to certain dialogue behaviours. 
  More recently, psycholinguistic studies of a speaker’s eye-
gaze at a visual array have revealed that speakers look at 
objects involved in the process of speech perception and 
production. [15, 28].  Speakers who made a speech error when 
performing a simple object naming task had spent just as long 
gazing at the object as they did when they named it fluently. 
Apparently, then, disfluency did not result from either long or 
hasty examination of the object to be named. Disfluency does 
not appear to be a measure of perceptual problems per se.  
Instead, disfluency is related to the cognitive burdens of 
production [5]. We will use disfluency to discover whether 
there is a cognitive cost involved in taking up information 
needed to pursue a dialogue task.  We will then show that this 
cost is put to good use: the locations of disfluencies reveal that 
they are appropriate responses to the information that speakers 
have garnered.  
The information in question underpins what is thought to be 
a crucial task in dialogue: each participant must maintain a 
model of her interlocutors’ knowledge so as to adjust to their 
mutual knowledge both what she says and how she says it.  
Most views of dialogue now assume that speakers will take 
some interest in indications both of the listener’s knowledge 
about the domain under discussion and of the listener’s 
satisfaction with the communication just made.  Clark and 
Krych [9], for example, propose that speakers monitor 
listeners’ faces for all manner of feedback, much as they track 
listeners’ utterances.  Horton and Gerrig [16] acknowledge the 
costs of this operation, suggesting that complete uptake and 
application of listener information could prove to be taxing in 
some cases, so that utterances will be less perfectly designed 
for the audience as the cognitive burden increases.  
To determine whether garnering cues to listener knowledge 
is indeed costly to production, we use a variant of the map 
task [2, 7]. As in the original task, players have before them 
versions of a cartoon map representing a novel imaginary 
location. The Instruction Giver communicates to the 
Instruction Follower a route pre-printed on the Giver’s map. 
The present experiment manipulates time-pressure and the 
modality or modalities in which a distant confederate delivers 
pre-scripted feedback to the speaker’s instructions.  Verbal 
feedback affirms comprehension of some instructions and 
declares general incomprehension of others. Visual feedback, 
in the form of a simulated listener-eyetrack projected onto the 
map, may correctly go to the named map landmark or wrongly 
advance to another.  Where both modalities are used, their 
feedback may be concordant or discordant across modalities. 
Scripted and simulated responses are used to control the 
conditions under which speakers are operating. Genuine 
speaker eye-gaze is tracked.   
We use eyetracks, rather than sight of the speaker’s 
direction of gaze, to represent listener feedback for two 
reasons.  First, simulated gaze is much easier to control than 
genuine gaze on the part of the confederate.  Second, though 
facial expressions and direction of gaze have real value, tasks 
with a visual component produce remarkably little inter-
interlocutor gaze [[1,3,11]]. To allow simultaneous 
performance of the task and uptake of listener information, the 
  
listener’s ‘eyetrack’ was superimposed on the map (See 
Figures 1 and 2). 
The present paper will examine two kinds of disfluency 
diistinguished by previous research, repetitions and deletions. 
In the current definition, a repetition is produced when the 
speaker repeats verbatim one or more words with no additions, 
deletions, or re-ordering, as in (1)  
(1) Now you want to go go just past the tree 
Repetitions are thus a single faulty attempt at communicating 
the same message in the same form. In contrast, a deletion has 
occurred whent the speaker interrupts an utterance without 
restarting or substituting syntactically similar elements, as in 
(2) 
(2) A MOVE 36 You need to be just under… 
            A MOVE 37  Do you have a White Mountain? 
Thus, deletions abandon one communicative act in favour of 
another. 
In this setting, there seem to be two distinguishable 
predictions. Clark and Krych [9] predict good uptake of all 
visual cues to listener knowledge and suitable application of 
the information. Horton and Gerrig [16] predict that the more 
complex the input, the more difficult will be both uptake of 
cues and the production of suitable speech. Thus there should 
in principal be an increase in dsfluency if speakers observe 
negative visual feedback (’follower gaze’ at wrong landmarks) 
and if there ar conflicts between verbal and visual feedback. 
1.1. Task and procedure 
All the materials come from an experiment which used 
conversations between subject Instruction Givers and a 
confederate Instruction Follower. Each subject was greeted 
individually with the confederate. Each subject was naïve to 
the status of the confederate and during post-experimental 
debriefing, none reported any suspicions. Both subject and 
confederate were told that whoever took the role of Instruction 
Giver should guide the Instruction Follower, from a marked 
start-point to buried treasure. Subject and confederate then 
‘negotiated’ that the subject would be Giver and the two were 
taken to separate rooms. The Giver was seated 60 cm from a 
flat screen monitor displaying the map. Labelled landmarks 
and map designs were adapted from the HCRC Map Task 
Corpus [2]. Eye tracking movements were recorded using a 
non-invasive Senso-Motor Instruments remote eye-tracking 
device placed on a table below the monitor. Eye movements 
were captured with Iview version 2 software. The tracker was 
re-calibrated at the beginning of each trial. Speech was 
recorded in mono using Asden HS35s headphone- microphone 
combination headsets. Video signals from the eye tracker and 
the participant monitor were combined and recorded in Mpeg 
with Broadway Pro version 4.0 software.  
Feedback from the confederate took two forms.  Visual 
feedback consisted of a simulated eyetrack, a small red square 
advancing from landmark to landmark once each landmark 
was named, and showing saccades of random length and 
direction. The visual feedback was under the control of the 
experimenter, who advanced the feedback square to its next 
programmed position when the Giver first mentioned a new 
route-critical a landmark. When feedback was scheduled to be 
wrong, the square moved to a landmark that had not been 
named. When feedback was to be correct, the feedback square 
advanced to the landmark just named. Similarly, verbal 
feedback came from the confederate subject who read pre-
scripted responses. Just as with the visual feedback, the 
confederate provided verbal feedback when the speaker 
uttered the first mention of the landmark in question. Figures 1 




Figure 1. Discordant feedback. Circle = Giver’s gaze; Square = 

















Figure 2. Concordant feedback. Circle = Giver’s gaze; Square = 
Follower’s feedback (correct location). 
1.2. Experimental Design  
The experiment crossed feedback modality (3), single 
modality group (2), and time-pressure (2). In the No Feedback 
conditions, subjects saw only the map. In the Single-Modality 
condition, subjects in the Verbal Group got verbal feedback 
only, while those in the Visual Group had only visual 
feedback. Finally, in the Dual-Modality condition, all subjects 
received both visual and verbal feedback. The two modalities 
might be discordant or concordant. Concordant feedback 
consisted on average of 8 instances of positive verbal and 
correct visual feedback, and 6 instances of negative verbal and 
wrong visual feedback per map.  In each map, discordant 
feedback included roughly 3 instances of negative verbal and 
correct visual feedback, and 6 instances of positive verbal and 
wrong visual feedback. This design is portrayed in Table 1. In 
half of the trials, speakers under time-pressure had three 
minutes to complete the task; in untimed dialogues there was 
no time limit. 
 
Table 1. The relationship between the Experimental Groups and the 
various Feedback Modalities. 
 
Experiment Feedback Modalities 
 None Single Dual 
Verbal Group None Verbal Verbal + Visual 
Visual Group None Visual Verbal + Visual 
 
Thirty-six subjects with normal uncorrected vision were 
recruited from the Glasgow University community. All were 
paid for their time. All encountered all 6 conditions. Six 
Instruction Follower: 
’Okay, that’s fine’ 
Instruction Follower: 
‘Yes, got it.’ 
 
different basic maps were used, counter-balanced across 
conditions over the whole design. Subjects were eliminated if 
any single map trial failed to meet criteria for feedback or 
capture quality. The feedback criterion demanded that the 
experimenter advance the feedback square between the 
introduction of the pertinent landmark and the onset of the 
following instruction in all cases where the feedback was 
scheduled to be errant and in 70% where the square’s 
movement was scheduled to be correct. The capture criterion 
demanded that at least 80% of the eye-tracking data was 
intact. Subjects were also eliminated if on debriefing they 
revealed any suspicions about the nature of the interlocutor. 
2. Results  
2.1. Baseline effects: Words 
Since the opportunities for disfluency increase with increasing 
amount of speech, it is important to note effects of the 
experiment’s design on word counts. Word counts for whole 
and part-words show less speech with time-pressure (425 
words/trial on average) than without (579): (F1(1,34) = 24.38, 
p < .001). Visual Group Single-Modality trials (459 words) 
were shorter than the corresponding Dual-Modality trials  (590 
words) with no corresponding change for Verbal subjects 
(Feedback Modality x Group: (F1(2,68) = 8.65 p < .001; 
Bonferroni: t = -6.4, p < .001). Since Dual-Modality 
Conditions do not differ between groups (Verbal: 616, Visual: 
590), we can use this condition to examine the relationships 
between disfluency and gaze or dialogue events.  
 We also examined speech rate across the experimental 
conditions. To calculate speech rate we divided the Giver 
words per map by the total Giver speaking time for the map 
(the summed durations of all conversational moves less the 
summed durations of both simple and filled pauses). Time-
pressure had no significant effect on speech rate. The 
interaction between Feedback Modality and Group (F1(2,68) = 
4.87, p < .02) presented in Table 2, is due only to a difference 
between the No-Feedback (.34) and Dual-Modality (.30) 
conditions for the Verbal Group (Bonferroni p = .004). Again 
Dual Modality conditions are alike. 
 
Table 2. Speech rate (Words/Total speaking time) means from 
Feedback Modality x Group interaction 
 
Experiment Feedback Modalities 
 None Single Dual 
Verbal Group .340 .303 .304 
Visual Group .344 .343 .340 
 
2.2. Baseline effects: Gaze  
In order to test for the relationship between disfluency and 
Giver gaze, it was necessary to determine whether all 
conditions in which a Giver might gaze at a feedback square 
actually did succeed in directing the Giver’s attention to the 
square. To check for overlap of gaze between Giver and 
’Follower’, the video record of feedback and Giver Gaze were 
analyzed frame by frame for the landmark at which each was 
directed. When Follower Gaze and Giver Gaze were on the 
same landmark, the Giver was considered to be looking at the 
feedback square. Here we report the number of feedback 
episodes [task sub-portions containing in feedback] in which 
any frame contained an instance of gaze at the feedback 
square].  
Givers did not make use of all their opportunities by any 
means (Figure 3). Nor did they use their opportunities equally 
(Visual feedback x Verbal feedback: F1(1,34) = 7.70, p < .01).  
Strangely enough, Givers used fewest opportunities in an 
important concordant condition, the one in which the Follower 
was clearly lost: the Follower square was hovering over a 
wrong landmark while the Follower was simultaneously 
providing negative verbal feedback (verbal- vis-: .366). These 
attracted less gaze than another concordant condition – when 
the Follower needed no help because she was in the right 
place and said so (verbal+ vis+: .511). Similarly Givers looked 
less when the Follower was lost but claimed not to be (verbal+ 
vis-: .448) than when she was correct but claimed to be lost 
(verbal- vis+:.591) (Bonferroni t-tests at .008).  A simple 
description says that speakers are most likely to track 
listeners, the listener’s location falls under their own gaze, 
which is occupied by the things they are describing.  
Apparently, spekaers prefer not to go off-route to learn the 
whereabouts of an errant follower. 

















FIGURE. 3 Proportion of feedback episodes attracting speaker gaze 
to feedback square: Effects of combinations of visual and verbal 
feedback in dual channel conditions  
2.3. Disfluencies Overall 
The first author labeled disfluencies according to the system 
devised by Lickley [19] as repetitions, insertions, substitutions 
or deletions. She used Entropic/Xwaves software to listen to, 
view and label disfluent regions of speech. Spectrograms were 
analyzed whenever necessary. Each word within a disfluent 
utterance was labeled as belonging to the reparandum, the 
interregnum, or the repair. A reparandum involves speech that 
is either overwritten, expunged or retraced in the repair [19]. 
Repairs typically ‘replace’ the error in the reparandum. Since 
deletions are typically abandoned utterances, they have no 
repair [19, 27].  
Because disfluencies are more common in longer utterances 
[6, 10, 25] we divided the number of disfluencies in a 
monologue by its total number of words, yielding disfluency 
rate as a dependent variable.  
Disfluency rates were submitted to a by-subjects ANOVA 
for Group (2) (Verbal vs. Visual), Time-pressure (2) (timed 
vs. untimed) and Feedback Modality (3) (none, Single-
Modality, Dual-Modality). The baseline No-Feedback 
conditions differed between Verbal and Visual groups (Group 
* Modality: F2(2,68) = 5.21, p < .01; Bonferroni, t = 2.94, p < 
.02). This difference can be explained by a single subject in 
the Verbal Group who was an outlier in terms of disfluency. 
Because of this subject, there was no effect of Feedback 
Modality within the Verbal Group, while the Visual Group 
showed the expected increase in rate of disfluency between 
No Feedback and Single- (Bonferroni t = -4.12, p = .001) or 
Dual-Modality conditions (Bonferroni t = -5.77, p < .001). 
Since Single and Dual Modality conditions did not differ, we 
can proceed to examine only the Dual Modality conditions in 
the expectation that conflicting feedback (only found in Dual 
Modality) per se is not an overall cause of disfluency. 
  
2.4. Disfluency Types: Repetitions v Deletions 
















Figure 4. Rates of disfluency by type and experimental condition for 
the Verbal and Visual Groups combined. nf = no feedback, one = 
Single-Modality feedback, dual = Dual modality feedback; t = timed, u 
= untimed.   
 
An initial investigation of deletions and repetitions begins to 
separate them. Figure 4 displays their distributions across 
experimental conditions. Independent analyses were done for 
each type of disfluency; that is one analysis within deletions 
only and one within repetitions only.   
As found in [23], only deletion rate showed any significant 
effect of feedback: Deletion rate rose significantly with each 
additional feedback modality (No Feedback .002, Single-
Modality .004, Dual-Modality .007; F1(2,68) = 21.00, p < 
.001;  all Bonferroni t-values < .01). There were no effects of 
time-pressure on deletion rate and no significant interactions.  
 For repetitions on the other hand, an interaction between 
Time-pressure and Group (F(1,34) = 6.27, p < .02) revealed 
that subjects were more disfluent in the untimed condition 
(.012) of the Verbal Group than they were anywhere else in 
either the Verbal or the Visual Group, timed or untimed, 
though the internal comparisons were not significant.     
3.5 Disfluency & Eye-Gaze 
Within the Dual-Modality condition, the experimental design 
contrasted positive and negative feedback in the two 
modalities. However, the modalities are concordant or 
discordant only if the Giver actually takes up both visual and 
verbal feedback. The tendency for more speech in conditions 
with verbal feedback suggests that subjects were attending to 
what the confederate Follower said. Eye-tracking enabled us 
to tell when the Giver had actually looked at the Follower’s 
visual feedback. As Figure 3 made plain, Givers do not take 
up the same proportion of concordant and discordant 
feedback. They gazed most at one kind of discordant feedback 
(negative verbal + correct visual) and least at a concordant 
condition (negative + wrong visual feedback). 
 To look for disfluency in truly vs potentially concordant and 
discordant situations, we examined disfluency per feedback 
opportunites in concordant and discordant situations 
contrasting those in which Givers did or did not look at 
Follower feedback. In fact, Givers who attended to discordant 
feedback from the Follower encountered subsequent fluency 
problems.  The number of disfluencies per feedback 
opportunity was greatest following a discordant feedback 
episode in which the Giver had actually gazed at the Follower 
feedback square (.333), a significantly higher rate than 
following a concordant feedback episode which had drawn the 
Giver’s attention (.205) (Bonferroni t = -3.51, p = .001 within 
by-subjects Group (2) x Giver attention (looking v not 
looking) x Concordance of modalities (concordant v 
discordant:  F1(1,34) = 7.24, p = .01). None of the other 
pairwise comparisons was significant. 







Figure 5. Rate of repair disfluencies per concordant or discordant 
feedback opportunity with respect to whether the Giver was either 
looking or not looking at the Follower. The difference is significant 
when the Giver looked at the Follower. 
3.6 Disfluency Type, Gaze & Motivation 
So far we have seen that speakers’ gaze behaviour is not 
randomly distributed.  It follows certainly problems (a 
Follower on-route who claims not to be) and ignores others (a 
Follower off-route who claims to be on-route). We have also 
seen that on those occasions when an instruction Giver 
actually takes in enough information to see what is amiss, he 
or she is more likely to speak disfluently.  The question we 
ask here is whether these disfluencies are part of well formed 
communicative processes.  If the information taken in by 
examination of listener feedback is properly processed by the 
speaker, what s/he says disfluently will be something 
appropriate to the situation.  To determine whether this is 
really the case, it was necessary to classify utterances by their 
goal or motivation. To do this, the first author examined all 
564 repetitions and 280 deletions occurring in the Dual 
Modality feedback condition.   
The first stage of this process was to identify an interval for 
analysis. All dialogues were coded according to the HCRC 
Conversational-Game-Move coding scheme [8]. In this 
system, each turn is decomposable into conversational Moves, 
or sub-units of the dialogue. For example, a speaker might 
‘Instruct’ by giving directions or ‘Align’ when noting that the 
Follower has gone astray. Analyses began with the Move that 
carried the disfluency. The coder searched backwards from the 
Interruption Point of the disfluency to the most recent Giver 
Move introducing a new landmark. The start time was 
considered to be the Giver’s first mention of a new landmark 
while the end time was the Interruption point of the disfluency 
or for deletions, the end of the repair.  
The second stage was to identify Giver gaze behaviours 
within these intervals. The gaze record of the speaker for this 
time-span was then checked and disfluency was coded as 
‘Looking’ if there were any overlaps of Giver and Follower 
Gaze from the introduction of the landmark to the end of the 
disfluency. All others were coded ‘Not Looking’.  
Third, each disfluency was classified by Motivation, the 
content of the repair. Repetitions necessarily occur within the 
same dialogue Move, while deletions are almost always a 
single abandoned Move, so that the repair effectively lies in 
the next Move. Motivations were classified under two major 
goals: either the speaker was ‘confirming’ that the Follower 
was at a correct or incorrect landmark or the speaker was 
‘reformulating’ by adding, elaborating, or correcting 
information being transmitted. Examples of goal and 
disfluency combinations are given in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3.  Examples of disfluencies by goal and type. For repetitions, 
both reparandum and repair appear in bold text. For deletions, just the 
reparandum appears in bold text since the repair is effectively non-
existent.  
Disfluency Dialogue Goal 
Type Confirmation Reformulation 
Repetition ‘That’s, That’s just 
fine 
‘Eh you travel 
directly ehm sort of 
north…north and 
east’ 
Deletion ‘So loop around the 
waterfall over….Yeah, 
there’ 
‘Um can you si-
…it’s to the left of 
that’ 
   
Since appropriate confirmation of position should depend on 
the Giver actually determining where the Follower was, we 
would expect confirmations to accompany gaze at the 
follower. Since the arrival of the Follower at the goal or her 
movement off route should complete the execution of a series 
of instructions, all the Giver need do is cease instructing and 
declare the Follower to be right or wrong. Accordingly, 
deletion disfluencies are appropriate: in this view they mark a 
sequence of instructing, checking, and, finally, abandoning 
any ongoing  instruction for a new a phase in the dialogue.   
Our second goal category, reformulation, can also repair 
communication problems but by elaborating the material 
serving the current goal.  Typically [14], speakers have to look 
away from their interlocutors when formulating complex 
material. Also on the grounds of complexity, we might expect 
not looking and reformulating to accompany repetition 
disfluencies [10].  
Analyses of Giver’s Gaze (2: looking vs. not looking), 
Motivation (2: confirmation vs. reformulation), Disfluency 
Type (2: repetition vs. deletion) and Time-pressure (2: timed 
vs. untimed)  showed part of this pattern.  
We predicted that reformulations would attract repetition 
disfluencies and confirmations would attract deletions. As 
Figure 6 illustrates, numerically repetitions (confirmation = 
0.083; reformulation = 0.403) and deletions (confirmation = 
0.245; reformulation = 0.186) worked as predicted (F1(1,34) = 
59.60, p < .001). The predicted effect of Motivation, however,  
was significant only for repetitions (F1 (1,34) = 124.17, p < 
.001).  
We predicted that looking at the feedback square would 
yield confirmations and not looking would accompany 
reformulations.  In fact, only when Givers did not gaze at the 
Follower’s square was the prediction met: there was a higher 
rate of reformulations than confirmations (Gaze x Motivation: 
F(1,34) = 9.27, p < .01, Bonferroni t at p = .008.). 
Since we have an association between reformulations and 
repetitions, and one just reported between reformulations and 
not looking at the interlocutor, we tested for the effects within 
repetitions and deletions separately. Though the Giver tended 
not to look at the Follower square during repetition 
disfluencies, the trend is weak because it appears to hold only 
in the Verbal Group (Disfluency Type x Gaze: F(1,34) = 3.59, 
p = .067; Gaze x Motivation x Experiment: F(1,34) = 8.62, p 
< .006; Bonferroni at p = .001). For deletion disfluencies, the 
effect of gaze depends on motivation: deletions classified as 
confirmations were, as we predicted, more common when the 
Giver took the opportunity to look at the Follower (Bonferroni 
at p = .008), whereas deletions classed as reformulations 
showed an insignificant tendency to be more common when 
the Giver was not looking at the Follower (Motivation x Gaze: 
F(1,34) = 8.61, p < .01). Thus, there were associations 
between disfluency type and motivation type and between 






























Figure 6. Rates of Repetitions and Deletions per opportunity with 
respect to Behaviour type, either confirmation (Conf) or reformulation 
(Form) and Gaze. The difference is significant for Repetititions but not 
for Deletions. 
3. Discussion and Conclusions 
Although the visual feedback provided the Giver with the 
Follower’s exact location at any point during the interaction, 
this information had a cost. The Giver tended to gaze away 
from the Follower’s location. Gaze aversion during difficulty 
is a common phenomenon found in conversational analysis 
and gaze studies [14, 15], and we find that gaze itself makes 
for production difficulty: speakers are more disfluent if they 
look at the follower feedback. Furthermore, Givers tended not 
to look at concordant negative feedback which clearly 
indicated trouble, though they did look at discordant feedback 
when the Follower was easily found – on the landmark being 
described.  
When a Giver noticed this discordance, disfluency often 
occurred as result, presumably because the speaker was 
burdened with resolving the conflicting verbal and visual 
signals and in a sense handling the Follower’s confusion.  
Disfluency, it seems, tend to co-occur first with uptake of the 
speaker’s whereabouts and misalignment in dialogue, as 
predicted in [24] 
If speakers are committed to tracking and accommodating 
listeners’ knowledge [9, 10], and if repetitions indicate 
commitment to listener and message, Givers should visually 
attend to their Followers whilst making a repair: a committed 
speaker might be expected to assist a Follower who is clearly 
in difficulty by looking at the Follower’s feedback and 
tailoring any following utterances to them. Instead, 
repetitions tended to associate with reformulation and thus by 
reformulation to gaze aversion during critical need. Looking 
at the follower instead accompanied deletions, as the Giver 
abandoned a Move in order to confirm or deny the listener’s 
progress. Thus, it seems deletions, or false starts were 
associated with attending to the Follower but not with 
commitment to the utterance.  
The present paper has added a psycholinguistic and 
  
dialogue perspective to the taxonomy of disfluency. We 
found that speakers are disfluent in different ways depending 
upon the dialogue task in which they are currently engaged. 
The nature of listener feedback and the Giver’s uptake of 
information about the listener both had effects.  
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APPENDIX AA. – INSTRUCTION SHEETS AND CONSENT FORM FROM 
THE MONITOR PROJECT 
 




Your map was drawn by an explorer in order to provide a route to some treasure 
buried at the finish point. Your task is to explain to another person (in a separate 
audio-linked room) as accurately as possible the route shown on your map. The other 
person has a similar map, but with no start point, finish point, or route drawn on it. 
They will draw the route on their map using with respect to your instructions. The two 
maps were drawn by different explorers, thus some of the landmarks on the map may 
differ slightly. 
 
The task will be repeated on four different maps. On some maps, you will be provided 
with an indicator showing you where the other person is looking on their map. On two 
of the maps you will have a time limit of one minute to complete your instructions. 
You will be given a 30 second warning such that you can gauge how long you are 
taking. On the other maps, there will be no time limit.  
 
You are free to terminate the experiment at any stage, and have your data destroyed if 
you feel in any way uncomfortable. Simply advise the experimenter that you wish to 
do so. 
 
Should you have any questions, please ask the experimenter before the session starts. 




Your map was drawn by an explorer in order to provide a route to some treasure 
buried at the finish point. Your task is to explain to another person (in a separate 
audio-linked room) as accurately as possible the route shown on your map. The other 
person has a similar map, but with no start point, finish point, or route drawn on it. 
They will draw the route on their map using with respect to your instructions. The two 
maps were drawn by different explorers, thus some of the landmarks on the map may 
differ slightly. 
 
The task will be repeated on six different maps. On some maps, you will be provided 
with an indicator showing you where the other person is looking on their map. On 
three of the maps you will have a time limit of two minutes to complete your 
instructions. You will be given a one-minute warning such that you can gauge how 
long you are taking. On the other maps, there will be no time limit.  
On some of the maps, you will be provided with a two-way audio link, such that you 
can receive verbal feedback from the other person, but on the other maps, you will 
communicate only through a one-way audio link. The experimenter will advise you as 
to the conditions of each map before each trial starts.  
 
You are free to terminate the experiment at any stage, and have your data destroyed if 
you feel in any way uncomfortable. Simply advise the experimenter that you wish to 
do so. 
 












Your map was drawn by an explorer in order to provide a route to some treasure 
buried at the finish point. Your task is to explain to another person (in a separate 
audio-linked room) as accurately as possible the route shown on your map. The other 
person has a similar map, but with no start point, finish point, or route drawn on it. 
They will draw the route on their map using with respect to your instructions. The two 
maps were drawn by different explorers, thus some of the landmarks on the map may 
differ slightly. 
 
The task will be repeated on three different maps. On some maps, you will be 
provided with an indicator showing you where the other person is looking on their 
map. You will also be able to converse with the other person on some maps. 
 
In order to use these recordings, we need ‘perfect’ descriptions. This means that if you 
describe the route in such a way that the other person doesn’t make any mistakes, we 
will double your money to £10 per hour. 
 
The experimenter will advise you as to the conditions of each map before each trial 
starts. 
 
You are free to terminate the experiment at any stage, and have your data destroyed if 
you feel in any way uncomfortable. Simply advise the experimenter that you wish to 
do so. 
 
Should you have any questions, please ask the experimenter before the session starts. 
Monitor Map Task Experiment 
 
 
The experiment you are about to take part in will be audio recorded. 
During the experiment we will also be measuring your eye gaze. All data 
collected will be treated with confidentiality and your anonymity will be 
maintained at all times. Please sign the consent form below to say that 
you are aware of this, and that you understand that you may leave the 







I (please print name)______________________________________give 







APPENDIX B - MAPS IN EXPERIMENT 1 
 























Telephone Kiosk Map 
 
 
APPENDIX D – EXAMPLES OF PLANNING AND HESITATION 





 Planning Deletions 
Speaker Map Transcription 
s19 Crane Bay 
if you go to the well, if you look ... that's it 
yeah...that's that's the start 
s19 Crane Bay 
doing a s ... no you go right right at the farmed land 
s5 Crane Bay 
Ehm down the bottom bi- … you look like you’re 
looking in the wrong place 
s10 Diamond Mine 
and then go...head...no, not right around the 
diamond mine 
s11 Diamond Mine 
Now you want to kee ... yeah anticlockwise round it 
s3 Diamond Mine 
The outlaws hideout and then ... yep ... go there 
s10 Mountain 
Oh sorry the bot the…yeah that lost steps 
s18 Mountain 
that's right…no you were right before 
 
s19 Mountain 
there we go, that's the st ... that's exac ... <breath 
breath> oh no wait sorry you had it. 
s9 Telephone Kiosk 
towards the farmer’s gate which is to the…yeah, 
that’s right there 
s7 Telephone Kiosk 
the dead tree…and then…yeah 
s2 Telephone Kiosk 









 Hesitation Deletions 
Speaker Map Transcription 
s10 Crane Bay 
then cross over the water <breath> ehm go ehm 
trace the line of like ... ehm like just follow the line 
... follow the shore of 
 
s5 Crane Bay 
Ehm you go straight over the top uh well it’s jus- 
sorry it’s horizontal 
s9 Crane Bay 
So, when we get past…we we go above this farmed 
land 
s10 Diamond Mine 
the bottom stone creek t- go right round 
 
s15 Diamond Mine 
Right okay I- from the upper left-hand corner go 
 
s15 Diamond Mine 








is it a little bit south but then w- curved up east past 
the waterfall 
s10 Mountain 
ehm go around and do a big circle ehm like just do a 
big loop down, not, oh sorry there was two stone 
creeks 
s9 Telephone Kiosk 
the picture in the right-hand si-…uh…to the…in the 
centre of the map 
s7 Telephone Kiosk 
And then to f- …and then just to the left of the great 
viewpoint 
s2 Telephone Kiosk 
and then go sort of diagonally sort of a slight eh 
slight ... slightly diagonally eh up to the right 
 
APPENDIX E – MAPS USED IN EXPERIMENT 2 and EXPERIMENT 3 
 

























TELEPHONE KIOSK MAP 
 
 
APPENDIX F. – SCHEDULE OF VISUAL AND VERBAL FEEDBACK FOR 
EXPERIMENTS 2A, 2B and 3. 
 
 
Map:- Crane Bay 
 
LM    Verbal Response   Visual FB 
Start / Sandy Shore:  Ok got that.     Correct 
Well:    Ok, yes.    Correct 
Hills:    Yep, fine    Correct 
Local Residents:  Can’t see it    Correct 
Iron Bridge:   I don’t see it    Wrong 
Wood:    Okay, fine    Correct 
Forked Stream:  Got it.     Wrong 
Farmed Land 1:  Don’t know where you mean.  Wrong 
Dead Tree:   Okay, got it.    Correct 
Pine Grove:   Ok, got that    Wrong 
Farmedland 2:   Can’t see it.    Correct 
Lagoon:   Yep, got it.    Wrong 
Crab Island:   Ok, I’m with you   Correct 
Rock Fall:   No, not with you.   Correct 
CCSub
1
:   Stop, where’s that?   Wrong 
Pirate ship / Finish:  Yes, ok.    Correct 
                                                 
1






LM    Response    Visual FB  
Start:    Ok got that.     Correct 
Diamond Mine:  Ok, yes.    Correct 
Wagon Wheel:  No, not with you.   Correct 
Rift Valley:   Ok Got it.    Correct 
Rocks:    Got it.     Wrong 
Stone Creek1:   Don’t know where you mean.  Wrong 
White Water:   Yes, ok.    Correct 
Swamp:   Ok, that’s fine.   Wrong 
Ravine:   Yes, ok.    Correct 
Manned Fort:   Yes that’s fine.   Wrong 
Stone Slabs:   Don’t know where that is.  Correct 
Outlaw’s Hideout:  Yep, got it.    Correct 
Noose:    Stop! Where’s that?.   Wrong 
Swan Pond:   No, not with you.   Correct 
Stone Creek2   Ok, got it.    Correct 
Saloon Bar:   Don’t know where you mean.  Wrong 





LM    Response    Visual FB 
Start:    Ok got that.    Correct 
Missionary Camp:  Ok, yes.    Correct 
Gorillas:   Yes, that’s fine.   Wrong 
Rope Bridge:   No, not with you.   Correct 
Waterfall:   Got it.     Correct 
Lost Steps:   Don’t know where you mean.  Wrong 
Fallen Pillars:   Ok, got it.    Correct 
Flamingos:   Yes that’s fine.   Wrong 
Avalanche   Yep, ok    Correct 
Ancient ruins:   No, not with you.   Correct 
Stones:   Yep, got it.    Wrong 
White Mountain:  Ok, got it.     Correct 
Pebbled Shore   Stop! Where’s that?   Wrong 
Lost Steps2:   Yes, that’s fine.   Correct 
Soft Furnishings Store: Don’t know where you mean.  Correct 
Gazelles:   Nope, not with you.   Wrong 





LM    Response    Visual FB 
Start:    Ok got that.    Correct 
Broken down truck:  Ok, yes    Correct 
Pyramid:   Yes that’s fine. .   Correct 
Disused warehouse:  Yep, ok.    Wrong 
Abandoned cottage:  No, not with you.   Correct 
Chapel:   Ok, yes    Correct 
Chestnut Tree:  Yes, ok     Wrong 
Allotments 1:   I don’t see it.    Wrong 
Picnic Site:   Ok, got it    Correct 
Alpine Garden:  Yep, ok.    Wrong 
Flight museum:  No, not with you.   Correct 
Parked Van:   Ok, yes    Correct 
Graveyard:   I don’t know where you mean  Correct 
Granite Quarry:  Stop, Where’s that?   Wrong 
Allotments 2:   Ok, got it.    Correct 
Collapsed Shelter  Nope, not with you.   Wrong 
Level Crossing:  Ok, fine    Correct 






LM    Response    Visual FB 
Start:    Ok got that.    Correct 
Field Station:   Ok, yes    Correct 
Old Temple:   No, not with you.   Correct 
Lion country:   Ok, yes.    Wrong 
Extinct Volcano:  Got it.     Correct 
Yacht club:   Ok, got it    Wrong 
Giraffes1:   Don’t know where you mean? Wrong 
Camera shop:   Yes, ok     Correct 
Canoes:   Ok, got it.    Wrong 
Buffalo:   Yes that’s fine.   Correct 
Overgrown Gully  Don’t see it.    Correct 
Giraffes 2:   Okay, fine.    Correct 
Tribal Settlement:  No, not with you.   Wrong 
Thatched Mud Hut  Yes, got it.    Correct 
Site of forest fire:  I can’t see that   Correct 
Cave:    Stop, where’s that?.   Wrong 




Map:- Telephone Kiosk 
 
LM    Response   Visual FB 
Start:    Ok got that.   Correct 
Telephone kiosk:  Ok, yes.   Correct 
Stone Circle:   No, not with you.  Correct 
Farmer’s Gate:  Ok, Got it.   Correct 
Meadow:   Got it.    Wrong 
Pelicans:   Ok, found it.   Correct 
Carpenter’s cottage:  Yep, got it.   Wrong 
Ruined Monastery:  Don’t see it.   Correct 
West Lake:   Right, ok.   Correct 
Stile:    Yes that’s fine.  Wrong 
Great View point 1:  I don’t see it   Wrong 
Popular Tourist Spot:  Yep, got it.   Correct 
Youth Hostel:   Stop, where’s that?  Wrong 
Great View Point2:  Yep, found it.   Correct 
East Lake:   Can’t see it.   Correct 
Collapsed Shelter:  Don’t see it.   Wrong 
Finish:    Right, got it.   Correct 
 
 
 
